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In the next era of communications, where heterogeneous, asynchronous and ultra-low latency
networks are drawn on the horizon, classical cryptography might be inadequate due to
the excessive cost of maintaining a public-key infrastructure and the high computational
capacity required in the devices. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly difficult to guarantee
that the computational capacity of adversaries would not be able to break the cryptograms.
Consequently, information-theoretic security, and particularly its application to keyless secrecy
communication, might play an important role in the future development of these systems.
The notion of secrecy in this case does not rely on any assumption of the computational power
of eavesdroppers, and is based instead on guaranteeing statistical independence between the
information message and the observed cryptogram. This is possible by constructing channel
codes that exploit the noisy behavior of the channels involved in the communication.
Although there has been very substantial research in the last two decades regarding
information-theoretic security, little has gone to study and design practical codes for keyless
secret communication. In recent years, polar codes have changed the lay of the land because
they are the first constructive and provable channel codes that are able to provide reliability
and information-theoretical secrecy simultaneously. Additionally, their explicit construction
and the low complexity of the encoding/decoding schemes makes them suitable for the new
generation of communication systems, so much so that they have been chosen as part of the
channel coding scheme for the 5th generation wireless systems (5G) standardization process.
The main objective of this dissertation is to provide polar coding schemes that achieve
the best known inner-bounds on the capacity regions of different multiuser models over
the discrete memoryless broadcast channel. These models not only impose a reliability
constraint, but also some sort of information-theoretical secrecy condition in the presence of
eavesdroppers. In general, we focus on describing the construction and the encoding/decoding
schemes of the the proposed polar code for a particular setting. Then, we analyze the
reliability and the secrecy performance of schemes in order to prove that they are able to
achieve these inner-bounds as the blocklength tends to infinity.
The first part of the thesis drives the attention to two different models over the degraded
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broadcast channel that commonly appear in real communication systems. In this models,
there are a set of legitimate receivers and a set of eavesdroppers that can be ordered based
on the quality of their channels. According to this ordering, different reliability or secrecy
constraints apply for each legitimate receiver or eavesdropper respectively. Moreover, we
propose practical methods for constructing the polar codes for both models and analyze the
performance of the coding schemes by means of simulations. Despite we only evaluate the
construction for these two particular settings, the proposed methods are also suitable for any
polar coding scheme that must satisfy some reliability and secrecy conditions simultaneously.
In the second part of the dissertation we describe and analyze two different polar coding
schemes for the general broadcast channel (where channels are not necessarily degraded) with
two legitimate receivers and one eavesdropper. We consider a model where a confidential and
a non-confidential message must be reliably decoded by both legitimate receivers in presence
of an eavesdropper. Despite it is almost immediate to find an inner-bound on the capacity
for this model using random coding arguments, how to secretly convey the same confidential
message to both legitimate receivers using polar codes is not straightforward. We also analyze
the setting where a transmitter wants to send different confidential and non-confidential
messages to the corresponding legitimate receivers. We compare two inner-bounds on the
capacity of this model, and we design a polar coding scheme that achieves the inner-bound
that surely includes the other.
Resum
La criptografia clàssica o computacional pot suposar certs inconvenients en els sistemes
de comunicació de nova generació que es basen en xarxes heterogènies, asíncrones i que
requereixen molt baixa latència. Els motius principals són l’alt cost que suposa mantenir una
infraestructura de clau pública i l’elevada capacitat computacional que requereix als dispositius
electrònics. A més, cada cop és més difícil garantir que aquesta capacitat computacional dels
dispositius adversaris no sigui suficient per trencar els criptogrames. Per tant, la seguretat
basada en la teoria de la informació, i particularment la seva aplicació en la transmissió
d’informació confidencial sense la necessitat d’utilitzar una clau secreta, pot tenir un rol molt
important pel futur desenvolupament d’aquests sistemes. La noció de seguretat en aquest
cas no es basa en cap suposició sobre la potència computacional dels adversaris, sinó que
consisteix en garantir que el missatge que es vol transmetre i el criptograma enviat pel canal
siguin independents estadísticament. Això és possible utilitzant una codificació que aprofita
el comportament sorollós del canal involucrat en la comunicació.
Malgrat durant les dues darreres dècades la recerca en el camp de la seguretat basada en
la teoria de la informació ha estat important, s’han destinat pocs esforços al disseny de codis
pràctics per tal de transmetre informació confidencial sense utilitzar claus secretes. Així i tot,
en els últims anys, els codis polars, un tipus de codis bloc lineals, han demostrat ser molt
útils per tal de transmetre informació sense errors i de forma confidencial des d’un punt de
vista de la teoria de la informació. A més, gràcies a que la seva construcció és explícita i a la
seva baixa complexitat, els codis polars són apropiats per a la nova generació de sistemes
de comunicació, tant que han estat escollits com a part de l’esquema de codificació del nou
estàndard de 5G per a comunicacions sense fil.
L’objectiu principal d’aquesta tesis és construir esquemes de codificació basats en codis
polars que assoleixin la capacitat (o la millor aproximació coneguda) per diferents models
sobre el canal de difusió (broadcast channel) amb presència d’adversaris. Aquests models
no només imposen restriccions sobre la fiabilitat de la transmissió, sinó que també imposen
restriccions sobre la confidencialitat des del punt de vista de la teoria de la informació. En
general, per a cada model descriurem un esquema de codificació i després analitzarem el
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seu rendiment per demostrar que són capaços de transmetre informació de forma fiable i
confidencial a la màxima taxa de transmissió possible quan la longitud del codi tendeix a
infinit.
La primera part d’aquesta tesis centra l’atenció en dos models de comunicació diferents
pel canal degradat de difusió (degraded broadcast channel) que representen molts de sistemes
de comunicació reals. En aquests models, hi ha un conjunt de receptors legítims i un conjunt
d’adversaris, i els canals de tots ells es poden ordenar en base a la seva qualitat. En base a
aquest ordre, s’apliquen condicions de fiabilitat i de seguretat diferents per a cada receptor o
adversari, respectivament. També, en aquesta part proposem mètodes pràctics de construcció
dels codis polars i analitzem el seu rendiment mitjançant simulacions. Malgrat que només
avaluem la construcció per aquests dos models particulars, els mètodes proposats es poden
generalitzar per qualsevol esquema de codificació polar que hagi de satisfer condicions de
fiabilitat i seguretat de forma simultània.
En la segona part de la tesi es descriuen i s’analitzen dos esquemes de codificació basats
en codis polars pel canal de difusió general (on els canals individuals no necessàriament són
degradats) compost per dos usuaris legítims i un adversari. Primer, considerem un model
en el que dos missatges s’han de transmetre de forma fiable als dos receptors de manera
que un ha de ser confidencial davant la presència d’un adversari. Encara que trobar una
aproximació teòrica de la capacitat de canal en aquest model és pràcticament immediat, com
dissenyar un sistema de codificació polar que permeti enviar el mateix missatge confidencial
a dos receptors diferents no és un problema directe. En segon lloc, considerem un model on
el transmissor vol enviar diferents missatges confidencials i no confidencials als dos receptors.
En aquest cas, comparem dues aproximacions a la capacitat d’aquest model i observem que
una és almenys igual o millor que l’altra. Finalment, dissenyem un esquema de codificació
basat en codis polars que permet transmetre a una taxa igual a aquesta aproximació de la
capacitat.
Resumen
La criptografía clásica o computacional puede suponer ciertos inconvenientes en los sistemas
de comunicación de nueva generación que se basan en redes heterogéneas, asíncronas y
que requieren muy baja latencia. Los motivos principales son el elevado coste que supone
mantener una infraestructura de clave pública i la elevada capacidad computacional que
requieren los dispositivos electrónicos. Además, cada vez es mas difícil garantizar que esta
capacidad computacional de los adversarios no sea suficiente para romper los criptogramas.
Por tanto, la seguridad basada en la teoría de la información, y en particular su aplicación
en la transmisión de información confidencial sin la necesidad de utilizar una llave secreta,
puede tener un rol muy importante para el futuro desarrollo de estos sistemas. La noción de
seguridad en esta caso no se basa en ninguna suposición sobre la potencia computacional
de los adversarios, sino que consiste en garantizar que el mensaje que se quiere transmitir y
el criptograma enviado por el canal sean independientes estadísticamente. Esto es posible
utilizando una codificación que aproveche el comportamiento ruidoso del canal involucrado
en la comunicación.
A pesar que durante las dos últimas décadas la investigación en el campo de la seguridad
basada en la teoría de la información haya sido importante, se han destinado pocos esfuerzos
en el diseño de códigos prácticos para transmitir información confidencial sin utilizar claves
secretas. Aún así en los últimos años los códigos polares, un tipo de códigos bloque lineales,
han demostrado ser muy útiles para transmitir información sin errores y de forma confidencial
desde un punto de vista de la teoría de la información. Además, gracias a que su construcción es
explícita y a su baja complejidad, los códigos polares son apropiados para la nueva generación
de sistemas de comunicación, tanto que han sido escogidos como parte del esquema de
codificación del nuevo estándar de 5G para las comunicaciones inalámbricas.
El objetivo principal de esta tesis es construir esquemas de codificación basados en
códigos polares que alcancen la capacidad (o la mejor aproximación conocida) para diferentes
modelos sobre el canal de difusión (broadcast channel) con presencia de adversarios. Estos
modelos no solo imponen restricciones sobre la fiabilidad de la transmisión, sino que también
imponen restricciones sobre la confidencialidad des de un punto de vista de la teoría de
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la información. En general, para cada modelo describiremos un esquema de codificación y
después analizaremos su rendimiento para demostrar que son capaces de enviar información
de forma fiable y confidencial a la máxima tasa de transmisión posible cuando la longitud
del código tiende a infinito.
La primera parte de esta tesis centra la atención en dos modelos de comunicación
diferentes para el canal degradado de difusión (degraded broadcast channel) que representan
muchos sistemas de comunicación reales. En estos modelos, hay un conjunto de receptores
legítimos y un conjunto de adversarios, y los canales de todos ellos se pueden ordenar
dependiendo de su calidad. En función de este orden se aplican condiciones de fiabilidad y
de seguridad diferentes para cada receptor o adversario, respectivamente. También, en esta
parte proponemos métodos prácticos de construcción de los códigos polares y analizamos su
rendimiento mediante simulaciones. A pesar de que solo evaluamos la construcción para estos
dos modelos particulares, los métodos que se proponen se pueden generalizar para cualquier
esquema de codificación polar que tenga que satisfacer condiciones de fiabilidad y seguridad
de forma simultánea.
En la segunda parte de la tesis se describen y analizan dos esquemas de codificación
basados en códigos polares para el canal de difusión general (donde los canales individuales
no necesariamente son degradados) compuestos por dos receptores legítimos y un adversario.
Primero, consideramos un modelo en el que los dos mensajes se tienen que transmitir de
forma fiable a los dos receptores y uno de forma confidencial delante de la presencia del
adversario. Aunque encontrar una aproximación teórica de la capacidad de este modelo
es prácticamente inmediato, como diseñar un sistema de codificación polar que permita
enviar el mismo mensaje confidencial a dos receptores diferentes no es un problema directo.
En segundo lugar, consideramos un modelo donde el transmisor quiere enviar diferentes
mensajes confidenciales y no confidenciales a los dos receptores. En este caso, comparamos
dos aproximaciones a la capacidad de este modelo y encontramos que una es mejor o igual
que la otra. Después diseñamos un esquema de codificación basado en códigos polares que
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One of the most important problems in communications is how to securely transmit messages
between legitimate receivers over an insecure communication channel without eavesdroppers
being able to leak any information about them. Up to know, computational security has
provided a wide variety of tools (cyphers) for solving this problem, which rely mainly on
the assumption of limited computational power at eavesdroppers. These cyphers are broadly
used in practice and they assume that eavesdroppers have full knowledge of the cryptogram
sent through the channel. Nevertheless, the assumption of limited computational power
at eavesdroppers ensure that they cannot break the cryptogram due to the “unproven”
difficulty of recovering the message without the knowledge of some key that is shared between
legitimate receivers.
Otherwise, information-theoretic security is defined based on a condition on some in-
formation theoretic measure that is fully quantifiable and does not make any assumption
regarding the computational power of eavesdroppers. This notion of security was introduced
first by Shannon in his seminal paper [Wyn75], who proved that one transmitter can send
a message to a receiver with prefect secrecy through an insecure error-free communication
channel. Here, perfect secrecy refers to statistical independence between the message and the
transmitted cryptogram that is observed directly by an eavesdropper. To do so, transmitter
and legitimate receiver must share a uniformly distributed random secret-key of the same
size as the message and this key can be used only once.
Based on Shannon’s result, it might seem that information-theoretic security is unpractical.
Nevertheless, real communications usually take place in physical environments that are not
1
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error-free but noisy, and the perfect secrecy condition can be replaced by a less stringent
one. In this sense, Wyner [Wyn75] and later Csiszár and Körner [CK78] proposed a new
model, called the wiretap channel. In this setting, secure transmission between two legitimate
receivers is possible without using any pre-shared secret key by designing a particular encoder
(stochastic encoder) that takes advantage of the statistical knowledge of the channel noise.
Despite upper layers of communication protocols already have cryptographic primitives
for secret transmission (also for authentication or privacy), information-theoretic security
over noisy channels aims to provide secrecy at the physical layer1, on which all other upper
layers rely. Therefore, computational and information-theoretic security should not be seen
as mutually exclusive, but as supplementing and supporting each other.
In the last two decades, information-theoretic security has been extended to a large
variety of contexts (keyless secret communication, secret key generation over noisy channels,
authentication, etc.) and models (single-user communications, multi-user communications,
MIMO channels, etc.). However, most of the work done until know has been focused on
characterizing communication limits by using random coding schemes that are nonconstructive
in practice. Otherwise, little progress has been made toward the design of constructive coding
schemes that will allow physical-layer security to become a practical solution for the emerging
communication technologies.
In recent years, polar codes have changed the lay of the land because they are the first
constructive and provable channel codes that are able to provide reliability and information-
theoretical secrecy simultaneously. These codes are a class of linear block codes originally
proposed by Arikan in [Ari09] for reliable transmission over the binary-input symmetric
point-to-point channel, and rapidly attracted the attention of the academia and industry
due to their provably capacity-achieving property, their explicit construction and the low
complexity of the encoding/decoding schemes.
This dissertation focuses on providing polar coding schemes that achieve the best-known
inner-bounds on the secrecy-capacity region of different models for the wiretap broadcast
channel. In this channel there is an arbitrary set of legitimate receivers and an arbitrary set
of eavesdroppers. Then, each model imposes different reliability conditions for the former,
while different secrecy constraints are established for the later.
1.1 Information-theoretic security
In information-theoretic security, one of the most commonly used measures of secrecy is the
information leakage. This information-theoretic measure is defined as the mutual information
1Information-theoretic security is referred also as physical-layer security.
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I(W ;Zn) between some transmitted random message W and the eavesdropper’s channel
observations Zn. Based on the information leakage, different secrecy conditions can be
imposed to the coding schemes. As mentioned previously, one of this measures is the perfect
secrecy, which requires I(W ;Zn) = 0, where W is distributed according to some arbitrary
distribution pW . Usually, the random message is considered to be distributed uniformly and
two less stringent secrecy conditions are broadly used under this assumption: weak secrecy
and strong secrecy. The weak secrecy condition requires the rate of information leakage to
vanish for the blocklength n, that is, limn→∞ 1nI(W ;Z
n) = 0. On the other hand, the strong
secrecy condition requires the information leakage to vanish, i.e., limn→∞ I(W ;Zn) = 0.
In the following, the Wyner’s wiretap channel [Wyn75], also referred as Degraded Wiretap
Channel (DWTC), is analyzed formally in order to introduce some of the important definitions
related to information-theoretic security for keyless secure communication. In this model,
one transmitter wishes to reliably send one uniformly distributed random message W to the
legitimate receiver that observes the channel (X , pY |X ,Y), while keeping it secret from an
eavesdropper that observes the channel (X , pZ|X ,Z) such that is (stochastically or physically)
degraded with respect to that of the legitimate receiver.
Definition 1.1 (Physically degraded channel). A point-to-point channel (X , pZ|X ,Z) is physi-
cally degraded with respect to other channel (X , pY |X ,Y) if X−Y −Z forms a Markov chain,
that is, pY Z|X(y, z|x) = pY |X(y|x)pZ|Y (z|y)
Definition 1.2 (Stochastically degraded channel). A channel (X , pZ|X ,Z) is stochastically
degraded with respect to channel (X , pY |X ,Y) if there exists some distribution p′Z|Y such that
pZ|X(z|x) =
∑
y pY |X(y|x)p′Z|Y (z|y). This property is denoted as pY |X  pZ|X .
A (2nR, n) code Cn for the DWTC consists of a message set W = [1, d2nRe], an stochastic
encoding f : W → Xn that maps a message w ∈ W to a codeword xn ∈ Xn according to
a transition probability function pXn|W (the encoding process is not deterministic), and a
decoding function g : Yn →W that maps the channel observations of the legitimate receiver
yn to a message ŵ ∈ W . The reliability performance of this code is measured in terms of the
average probability of error, P[Ŵ 6= W ], and the secrecy performance is measured in terms
of the information leakage I(W ;Zn).
Definition 1.3 (Achievable rate). A rate R is full-secrecy achievable for the DWTC if there
exists a sequence of (2nR, n) codes {Cn}n≥1 such that
lim
n→∞
P[Ŵ 6= W ] = 0 (reliability condition),
lim
n→∞
I(W ;Zn) = 0 (strong secrecy condition).
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Definition 1.4 (Achievable region). The full-secrecy achievable region R is defined as the
closure of all full-secrecy achievable rates, that is, R , cl {R : R is full-secrecy achievable}.
Definition 1.5 (Secrecy-capacity). The secrecy-capacity C is defined as the supremum of the
full-secrecy achievable region R, that is, C , supR {R : R ∈ R}.
Remark 1.1. Originally, [Wyn75] considers the weak secrecy condition for the previous
definitions. Nevertheless, [MW00] proved that both secrecy conditions result in the same
achievable region. Despite this surprisingly result, the weak secrecy requirement in practical
applications can result in important system vulnerabilities [BB11](Section 3.3).
Remark 1.2. The term full-secrecy in the previous definitions means that the entire message
W is hidden from the eavesdropper, i.e., limn→∞ I(W ;Zn) = 0 and has nothing to do with
perfect secrecy. Indeed, [Wyn75] defines an achievable region where limn→∞ I(W ;Zn) is not
necessarily zero, but some arbitrary level of secrecy that is referred as equivocation rate.
Therefore, notice that the secrecy-capacity is defined as the maximum information bits
that the transmitter can send satisfying both the reliability and secrecy conditions.
Proposition 1.1 ([Wyn75]). Let (X , pY Z|X ,Y × Z) be an arbitrary DWTC where pY Z|X is
such that pY |X  pZ|X or X − Y − Z. The secrecy-capacity of this model is
CDWTC = max
pX
(I(X;Y )− I(X;Z)) .
The key point of the achievability proof is the use of the stochastic encoder, which
takes advantage of the statistical knowledge of the channel noise in order to confuse the
eavesdropper about the message transmitted over the DWTC. Since the eavesdropper’s
channel is degraded with respect to that of the legitimate receiver, notice that CDWTC ≥ 0
with equality only if I(X;Y ) = I(X;Z), that is, both channels have the same quality.
The major drawback of the previous model is the assumption of the legitimate receiver
having significant advantage over the eavesdropper due to the degradedness condition imposed
to the channels. In this sense, Csiszár and Körner in [CK78] generalized Wyner’s results to
the Wiretap Channel (WTC), in which eavesdropper’s channel is not necessarily degraded2.
Proposition 1.2 ([CK78]). Let (X , pY Z|X ,Y ×Z) be an arbitrary WTC. The secrecy-capacity
of this model is
CWTC = max
pVX
(I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)).
2Indeed, [CK78] introduces a more general model, called the Broadcast channel with Confidential Messages
(BCC), where besides the confidential message to be transmitted secretly to the legitimate receiver, both the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper must be able to reliably decode a common message.
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where pV XY Z is such that V −X − Y Z forms a Markov chain.
In this setting, the coding scheme that achieves the secrecy-capacity uses channel prefixing
pX|V to introduce additional randomness at the encoding, which is necessary because the
eavesdropper’s channel is not degraded with respect to the legitimate receiver one.
Certainly, the most important limitation of information-theoretic security is the trans-
mitter having to know the statistics of eavesdropper’s channel in order to construct a good
wiretap code. Nevertheless, as pointed out in [BB11] (Proposition 3.3), one can design a
good code ensuring the strong secrecy condition for some arbitrary eavesdropper’s channel
(X , pZ(a)|X ,Z(a)) and, by the date processing inequality [CT12], this code will also ensure
the strong secrecy condition for any other eavesdropper’s channel (X , pZ(b)|X ,Z(b)) such that
is degraded with respect to the previous one because, in this case, I(X;Z(b)) ≤ I(X;Z(a)).
1.2 Outline of the dissertation and related publications
Chapter 2
In this chapter we revisit the fundamental theorems of polar codes and their application
for different channel coding problems. Generally, channel coding for different scenarios by
using polar codes has been addressed from two viewpoints: source polarization or channel
polarization. For a better understanding, we review the polar coding schemes for different
models –those on which our work rely– by means of source polarization.
Furthermore, in Section 2.5 we present a generic polar-based encoder for multi-user settings
that uses an asymptotically negligible amount of randomness, and induces a distribution
that is statistically close to the one that attains the capacity of the model. This result is
stated in Lemma 2.3, which generalizes the results in [CB15] (for single-user scenarios). This
statement will be crucial for the construction and the performance analysis of the polar
coding schemes that we propose in the following chapters.
Chapter 3
In this chapter we describe two different polar coding schemes for two different models over
the degraded wiretap broadcast channel. One model assumes a layered decoding structure
that requires receivers with better channel quality to reliably decode more messages, while
the other imposes a layered secrecy structure that requires eavesdroppers with worse channel
quality to be kept ignorant of more messages. We show that the proposed polar codes are
secrecy-capacity achieving in Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2.
6 Introduction
Moreover, in Section 3.4 we propose practical methods for constructing polar codes
that must satisfy reliability and secrecy constraints simultaneously, and we analyze their
performance for a finite blocklength by means of simulations. It is important to mention that,
despite we propose a construction for two particular models, our method can be extended to
any model with information-theoretic secrecy constraints.
Publications:
J. del Olmo and J. R. Fonollosa, “Strong Secrecy on a Class of Degraded Broadcast
Channels Using Polar Codes,” in 2016 IEEE Conference on Communications and
Network Security (CNS), pp. 601-605, 2016.
J. del Olmo and J. R Fonollosa, “Strong Secrecy on a Class of Degraded Broadcast
Channels Using Polar Codes,” Entropy, vol. 20, no. 6, 467, June 2018.
Chapter 4
This chapter focuses on a model for the wiretap broadcast channel where the transmitter
wishes to send common public and confidential information to two different receivers with
the presence of one eavesdropper. We describe a polar coding scheme that achieves the
best-known inner-bound on the secrecy-capacity region of this setting (Theorem 4.1).
The main novelty in this chapter is the introduction of a new chaining structure that
allows the polar coding scheme to convey common confidential information to different
receivers. This chaining construction induces bidirectional dependencies between adjacent
encoding blocks that need to be analyzed carefully in the secrecy analysis of the polar code.
Publications:
J. del Olmo and J. R. Fonollosa, “Polar Coding for Common Message Only Wiretap
Broadcast Channel”, in International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), pages
1762-1766, July 2019.
J. del Olmo and J.R. Fonollosa, “Polar Coding for Common Message Only Wiretap
Broadcast Channel,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.07649, 2019.
Chapter 5
This chapter focuses on a model for the wiretap broadcast channel where the transmitter
wishes to send different public and confidential information to two different legitimate receivers
with the presence of one eavesdropper. There exists two different inner-bounds on the secrecy-
capacity of this model in the literature, one being strictly larger for a particular input
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distribution (consequently, it includes the other). The stronger inner-bound is obtained by
considering joint decoding, whereas the second is derived by considering successive decoding.
We describe a polar coding scheme that achieves the stronger inner-bound on the secrecy-
capacity region of this model (Theorem 5.1) and we show that, for a particular input
distribution, polar-based joint decoding is crucial. Indeed, the achievability of this inner-
bound by means of polar codes requires a chaining construction that induces not only
bidirectional dependencies between adjacent encoding blocks, but also these dependencies
can occur between different encoding layers.
Publications:
J. del Olmo Alos and J.R. Fonollosa, “Polar Coding for the Wiretap Broadcast Channel




In his seminal paper [Ari09], Arikan proved that polar codes achieve the capacity of binary-
input, symmetric, point-to-point channels under Successive Cancellation (SC) decoding.
Moreover, they are low-complexity codes and, consequently, practical: the proposed encod-
ing/decoding algorithms in [Ari09] have complexity O(n logn), n being the blocklength.
Later, Arikan showed in [Ari10] that the same principle underlying polar codes for channel
coding, that is polarization, can be applied for optimal lossless source coding. Afterward,
Korada and Urbanke in [KU10] proved that polar coding is also optimal for lossy source
coding. Indeed, as pointed out in [Ari10], source polarization (or channel polarization) can
be applied to channel coding (source coding) due to the duality between the two problems.
In this chapter, the fundamental theorems of polar codes and their application for different
channel coding problems are revisited from a source polarization viewpoint. In Section 2.1,
we introduce the source polarization theorem and prove that polar codes are optimal for
lossless source coding. Then, Section 2.2 describes the Polar Coding Scheme (PCS) proposed
in [Ari10] for symmetric channel coding. In Section 2.3, we outline the PCSs for the DWTC
introduced in [MV11] and [SV13], which are secrecy-capacity achieving under the weak and
the strong secrecy condition, respectively. These coding schemes were based originally on
channel polarization, but we revisit them by using source polarization. In Section 2.4, the
PCS for the WTC introduced in [CB16] is summarized. Finally, Section 2.5 generalizes
the results in [CB15] by introducing a generic encoding that uses the minimum amount of
randomness for multi-user settings and causes a distortion (regarding the distribution that




Let (X × Y, pXY ) be a Discrete Memoryless Source (DMS), where1 X ∈ {0, 1} and Y ∈ Y.
The polar transform over the n-sequence Xn, n being any power of 2, is defined as





]⊗n is the source polarization matrix [Ari10]. Since Gn = G−1n , then we





Associated to this polar transform, define the following set of indices:
H(n)X|Y ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
U(j)
∣∣U1:j−1Y n ) ≥ 1− δn} , (2.3)
L(n)X|Y ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
U(j)
∣∣U1:j−1Y n ) ≤ δn} . (2.4)
where δn , 2−n





Theorem 2.1 (Source polarization, adapted from [Ari10]). Consider the sets H(n)X|Y and L
(n)
X|Y





∣∣H(n)X|Y ∣∣ = H(X|Y ) and limn→∞ 1n ∣∣L(n)X|Y ∣∣ = 1−H(X|Y ).
Notice that the source polarization theorem states that the polar transform extracts
the randomness of Xn in the sense that, as n → ∞, the set of indices j ∈ [1, n] can
be divided practically into two disjoint sets, namely H(n)X|Y and L
(n)
X|Y , such that U(j) for
j ∈ H(n)X|Y is practically independent of (U
1:j−1, Y n) and uniformly distributed, that is,
H(U(j)|U1:j−1Y n)→ 1, and U(j) for j ∈ L(n)X|Y is almost determined by (U
1:j−1, Y n), which
means thatH(U(j)|U1:j−1Y n)→ 0. Consequently, the number of elements U(j) that have not
polarized is asymptotically negligible in terms of rate, i.e., limn→∞ 1n
∣∣(H(n)X|Y )C \ L(n)X|Y ∣∣ = 0.
Definition 2.1. Generally, the set H(n)X|Y is referred as the “high entropy set” of X
n given
the observations Y n. On the other hand, L(n)X|Y is referred as the “low entropy set”.
It is worth mentioning that the entropy terms required to define the sets H(n)X|Y and L
(n)
X|Y
can be obtained deterministically from the distribution pXY and the algebraic properties
1Throughout this dissertation, we assume binary polarization. Nevertheless, an extension to q-ary
alphabets is possible [KT10, ŞTA09].
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of the matrix Gn [Ari09, TV13, VVH15, HY13]. Furthermore, consider that the previous
sets are defined from the Bhattacharyya parameters instead of the entropy terms, where the







pU(j)|U1:j−1Y n(0|u1:j−1yn)pU(j)|U1:j−1Y n(1|u1:j−1yn). (2.5)
The following lemma shows that {H(U(j)|U1:j−1Y n)}nj=1 and {Z(U(j)|U1:j−1Y n)}nj=1 po-
larize simultaneously and, consequently, Theorem 2.1 holds in both cases.
Lemma 2.1 (Adapted from [Ari10]). Consider the entropy terms and the Bhattacharyya
parameters associated to the polar transform Un = XnGn. It holds
Z(U(j)|U1:j−1Y n)2 ≤ H(U(j)|U1:j−1Y n),
H(U(j)|U1:j−1Y n) ≤ log(1 + Z(U(j)|U1:j−1Y n)),
where either both inequalities are strict or both hold with equality; and for equality to hold, it
is necessary and sufficient that U(j) is either deterministic or uniformly distributed.
As an example, Figure 2.1 shows the polarization effect when n = 1024 for a DMS
(X × Y, pXY ) such that X = {0, 1}, Y = {0, 1, E}, pX(x) = 0.5 for all x ∈ X , and pY |X(y|x)
is modeled as a Binary Erasure Channel (BEC) with erasure probability ε = 0.4. Notice that
most of the entropy terms tend to be near zero and near to one. Indeed, by Theorem 2.1, the
number of terms that tend to one will approach nH(X|Y ) = nε. However, an asymptotically
negligible (in terms of rate) range of entropy terms shows an erratic behavior.







Figure 2.1: Entropy terms {H(U(j)|U1:j−1Y n)}nj=1 (ordered) when n = 1024 for a DMS (X × Y, pXY )
such that X = {0, 1}, Y = {0, 1, E}, pX(x) = 0.5∀x ∈ X , and pY |X(y|x) is modeled as a BEC (ε = 0.4).
Consider a SC decoder that, from U
[(
L(n)X|Y
)C] and the observations Y n, constructs an
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estimate Ûn of the entire sequence Un as follows. For all j ∈ [1, n], it obtains
Û(j) =
{





arg maxu∈{0,1} pU(j)|U1:j−1Y n
(
u
∣∣Û1:j−1Y n) if j ∈ L(n)X|Y . (2.6)




)C] and Y n with error probability in O(2−nβ).
Theorem 2.2 (Adapted from [Ari10]). Let δn , 2−n















Therefore, Theorem 2.2, along with Theorem 2.1, shows that polar codes are optimal for
lossless source coding with side information.
2.2 Source polarization for symmetric channel coding
A binary Discrete Memoryless Channel (DMC) (X , pY |X ,Y) with some arbitrary pX can be
seen as a DMS (X × Y, pXpY |X). For symmetric channel coding, recall that the capacity
achieving input distribution pX is uniform, that is, pX(x) = 12 for all x ∈ {0, 1}.
Let W and F be uniformly distributed vectors of length
∣∣L(n)X|Y ∣∣ and ∣∣(L(n)X|Y )C∣∣, respec-
tively, where W represents the information message to be sent over the DMC, and F is a
source of common randomness that is available to both the transmitter and the receiver.
Consider the following PCS. First, from pXY and the algebraic properties of Gn, define
the sets of indices H(n)X|Y and L
(n)
X|Y as in (2.3) and (2.4) respectively (polar code construction).
Second, consider a polar-based encoder that construct Ũn as follows. It stores the information




and the random sequence F into Ũ
[(
L(n)X|Y









Then, the encoder computes the polar transform X̃n = ŨnGn and, afterwards, the transmitter
sends X̃n over the channel, which induces Ỹ n. Finally, the receiver, by using the SC decoder




is known because F is available to all parties, and the channel output observations Ỹ n.
Remark 2.1. Since the polar-based encoder will construct random variables that must approach
the target distribution of the DMS, throughout this dissertation we use tilde above the random
variables to emphasize this purpose.
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The previous PCS approaches the capacity of the binary symmetric DMC because, by





∣∣L(n)X|Y ∣∣ = 1−H(X|Y ),
and I(X;Y ) = 1−H(X|Y ) when X is binary and uniformly distributed.
It remains to show whether the PCS is capacity-achieving by analyzing the average block
error probability. First, since the input distribution of the original DMS is the uniform, that is
px(x) = 12 ∀x ∈ {0, 1}, and the elements of X
n are i.i.d. then pUn(un) = pXn(unGn) = 2−n.
Therefore, since W and F are uniformly distributed, the input distribution induced by the
previous encoding, namely q̃Un , and the distribution pUn are statistically indistinguishable,
that is, V(q̃Un , pUn) = 0. Indeed, since Ỹ n depends on the channel transition distribution
pY |X and due to the invertibility of Gn, the joint distribution q̃XnY n induced by the encoding










where we have used Theorem 2.2 because Ũ
[(
L(n)X|Y
)C] = F is available to the receiver. Hence,
the previous PCS is capacity-achieving for the binary symmetric channel.
2.3 Polar codes for the symmetric DWTC
Polar coding relying on channel polarization for the binary symmetric DWTC were introduced
in [MV11] and [SV13], which provide secrecy-capacity achieving polar codes under the weak
and the strong secrecy condition, respectively. This section summarize the relevant techniques
of the PCSs proposed by [MV11] and [SV13] from a source-polarization point of view.
Consider a DMS (X × Y × Z, pXpY Z|X) that represents the input and output random
variables involved in the achievable region of the DWTC defined in Proposition 1.1, where
X = {0, 1}, pX(x) = 12 for all x ∈ {0, 1}, and pY |X  pZ|X (stochastically degraded channels)
or X−Y −Z forms a Markov chain (physically degraded channels). Let (Xn, Y n, Zn) denote
an i.i.d. sequence of this source and define the polar transform Un , XnGn. Associated
to this polar transform, define the sets H(n)X|Y and L
(n)
X|Y as in Equations (2.3) and (2.4)
respectively. Moreover, for this model define
H(n)X|Z ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
U(j)
∣∣U1:j−1Zn ) ≥ 1− δn} , (2.7)
L(n)X|Z ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
U(j)
∣∣U1:j−1Zn ) ≤ δn} , (2.8)
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where recall that δn , 2−n




. Notice that these sets represent the high entropy
set and the low entropy set of Xn given the eavesdropper’s observations Zn.
Lemma 2.2 (Subset property of polar codes, adapted from [MV11, GAG15]). Consider a DMS
(X × Y × Z, pXpY Z|X) such that pY |X  pZ|X (stochastically degradation) or X − Y − Z
forms a Markov chain (physically degradation). Thus, we have
H(n)X|Y ⊆ H
(n)





Based on the definition of the previous sets and Lemma 2.2, reference [MV11] proposes




)C ∩ L(n)X|Y , C(n) , L(n)X|Z , F (n) , (L(n)X|Y )C, (2.9)








F (n) I(n) C(n)
Figure 2.2: Polar code construction for the symmetric DWTC: partition of the set of indices [1, n].
Roughly speaking, according to Theorem 2.1 and Theorem 2.2, the set I(n) contains those
indices that are good for the legitimate receiver and bad for the eavesdropper, where good




can be reliably inferred by the receiver, and bad means
that they can be information-theoretic secured from the eavesdropper. Furthermore, C(n)
contains those indices that are good for both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
because, by Lemma 2.2, L(n)X|Y ⊆ L
(n)
X|Z ; and F
(n) contain those indices that are bad for both.
Let S and F be uniformly distributed vectors of length
∣∣I(n)∣∣ and ∣∣F (n)∣∣, respectively,
where S represents the confidential message and F is a source of common randomness that is
available to both the transmitter and the receiver. Moreover, let C be a uniformly distributed
random sequence of length
∣∣C(n)∣∣. Consider a PCS for the DWTC that is described as follows:
• Polar code construction: from pXY Z and the algebraic properties of Gn, define the sets







• Polar-based encoding: the encoder constructs Ũn as follows. It stores the confidential
























= C. Then, the encoder
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computes the polar transform X̃n = ŨnGn. Afterwards, the transmitter sends X̃n over
the channel inducing the output observations Ỹ n and Z̃n.
• Polar-based decoding: The receiver uses SC decoding described in (2.6) to form an




, which is known because F is available





Definition 2.2. Typically, sequence C is referred as local randomness and is required to
“confuse” the eavesdropper about the confidential message S.
The previous PCS approaches the capacity of the symmetric DWTC because, by applying







∣∣(L(n)X|Z)C ∩ L(n)X|Y ∣∣
= lim
n→∞
∣∣(L(n)X|Z)C∣∣− limn→∞ ∣∣(L(n)X|Y )C∣∣
= H(X|Z)−H(X|Y ), (2.10)
where the last step holds by Theorem 2.1 because
∣∣(L(n)X|Z)C∣∣ = ∣∣H(n)X|Z∣∣+ ∣∣(L(n)X|Y )C \ H(n)X|Y ∣∣.
Let q̃XnY nZn denote the distribution induced by the previous encoding. Since S, F and C
are uniformly distributed, it is clear that V(q̃Un , pUn) = 0. Moreover, due to the invertibility
of Gn and because, given X̃n, (Ỹ n, Z̃n) only depends on the channel transition distribution
pY nZn|Xn , we have V(q̃XnY nZn , pXnY nZn) = 0. Therefore, by Theorem 2.2, the reliability





Regarding the information-theoretical security, [MV11] showed that the previous PCS is
secrecy-capacity achieving only under the weak secrecy condition. Since F is available to all






















∣∣(L(n)X|Z)C \ H(n)X|Z∣∣−H(U[(L(n)X|Z)C \ H(n)X|Z]∣∣U[H(n)X|Z]Zn)
(d)
≤
∣∣H(n)X|Z∣∣δn + ∣∣(L(n)X|Z)C \ H(n)X|Z∣∣−H(U[(L(n)X|Z)C \ H(n)X|Z]∣∣U[H(n)X|Z]Zn)
(e)
≤ nδn + o(n),









= F ; (b) holds because V(q̃XnY nZn , pXnY nZn) = 0; (c) holds
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because, according to (2.9), we have I(n)∪F (n) =
(
L(n)X|Z
)C, the uniformity of Ũ[I(n)∪F (n)]
(confidential message and source of common randomness), and from applying the chain rule
















∣∣U1:j−1Zn) ≥ 1− δn for any j ∈ H(n)X|Z ; and (e) holds because the set of indices
corresponding to those elements that have not polarized is asymptotically negligible only in
terms of rate and δn ≤ H
(
U(j)
∣∣U1:j−1Zn) ≤ 1− δn for any j ∈ (L(n)X|Z)C \ H(n)X|Z . Thus, the
previous PCS fails to provide strong secrecy because
I(S; Z̃nF ) ≤ nδn + o(n)
n→∞−−−−→ o(n).
Nevertheless, it is clear that this PCS is secrecy-capacity achieving under the weak secrecy
condition because it holds that
1
n




Remark 2.2. References [Ari10] and [MV11] show that the source of common randomness
is not necessary for symmetric channels, but F can be deterministic (frozen bits).
Notice that the previous polar code fails to provide strong secrecy because the indices
considered as bad for the eavesdropper are not bad enough. In this sense, [SV13] proposes a
new partition of the set of indices [1, n]:
I(n) , H(n)X|Z ∩ L
(n)
X|Y ,












)C ∩ (L(n)X|Y )C.




)C \ H(n)X|Z) that were problematic in the previous scheme, but they are




)C ∩ (L(n)X|Y )C, but they are included in the new set D(n).




is problematic: the legitimate receiver needs to known these
elements to reliably decode the entire sequence Ũn because D(n) ⊆
(
L(n)X|Y
)C but they cannot
store common randomness because D(n) ⊆
(
H(n)X|Z
)C and the secrecy will be compromised.
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Hence, [SV13] proposes a PCS where transmission takes place over L blocks of size n, and
uses a chaining construction to convey the problematic elements to the legitimate receiver
while keeping masked from the eavesdropper.
Let R(n) be any subset of I(n) with size
∣∣D(n)∣∣. For any block i ∈ [1, L], let Si and Ci be
the random sequences representing the confidential message and the local randomness with
size
∣∣I(n)∣∣− ∣∣R(n)∣∣ and ∣∣C(n)∣∣, respectively. Let F be ∣∣F (n)∣∣-sequence representing the source
of common randomness available to all parties (this sequence will be reused at each block).
Moreover, for i ∈ [0, L], let Di be a uniformly distributed
∣∣D(n)∣∣-sequence that is considered
































Then, it computes X̃ni = Ũni Gn, which is transmitted over the DWTC inducing (Ỹ ni , Z̃ni ).
Additionally, in order to initialize the decoding procedure, before transmitting X̃n1 the
encoder needs to make available D0 to the legitimate receiver keeping it masked from the
eavesdropper. To do so, one can use a separate channel code to reliably send D0 ⊕ κ, where
κ is a uniformly distributed secret-key shared between transmitter and legitimate receiver.
This secret-key is asymptotically negligible in terms of rate because∣∣D(n)∣∣ = ∣∣(H(n)X|Z)C \ L(n)X|Y ∣∣ ≤ ∣∣(H(n)X|Z)C \ L(n)X|Z∣∣ = o(n),
where we have used the fact that L(n)X|Y ⊆ L
(n)
X|Z . Indeed, since the transmission will take place
over L blocks of size n, the rate of this required additional transmission is 1nL
∣∣D(n)∣∣ = o(n)nL .
Consider that D0 has reliably been estimated by the legitimate receiver. Then, the decoder
successively forms an estimate of Ũn1:L, from Ûn1 to ÛL, as follows. For i ∈ [1, L], given D̂i−1
from block i− 1 and Fi, the receiver knows Ûi
[





)C]. Thus, it uses





will be used at the next block i+ 1 to reliably estimate Ũni+1.
Since the size of D(n) is o(n), the rate cost of conveying the problematic elements by





n(L+ 1) = limn→∞
L




where we have used Theorem 2.1 and similar reasoning as in (2.10). Thus, the PCS can








denote the distribution induced by the previous encoding at block i ∈ [1, L].











































, pXnY nZn) = 0 and, therefore, by Theorem 2.2—recall
that (Di−1, Fi) = Ũi
[(
LX|Y
)C]; (b) holds because Di−1 = Ũi−1[R(n)]; and (c) holds by












= L(L+ 1)2 nδn,
where we have used the union bound and (2.11).
Finally, this PCS is secrecy-capacity achieving under the strong secrecy condition. Now,
notice that the information leakage is given by I(S1:L; Z̃n1:LF ) and, therefore, to evaluate
this measure one must consider the dependencies between the random variables of different
blocks. These dependencies are graphically represented in Figure 2.3.














Figure 2.3: Bayesian graph plotting the dependencies between the random variables of different blocks that
are involved in the secrecy analysis when we consider a transmission over several blocks of size n.
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Thus, by applying the chain rule of mutual information, we have
I(S1:L; Z̃n1:LF ) =
L∑
i=1
I(S1:L; Z̃ni |FZ̃n1:i−1) ≤ Lnδn, (2.12)
where the last inequality holds because
I(S1:L; Z̃ni |FZ̃n1:i−1) = I(S1:i; Z̃ni |FZ̃n1:i−1) + I(Si+1:L; Z̃ni |FS1:iZ̃n1:i−1)
≤ I(S1:iZ̃n1:i−1; Z̃ni |F ) + I(Si+1:L; Z̃n1:iFS1:i)
(a)= I(S1:iZ̃n1:i−1; Z̃ni |F )
≤ I(S1:iZ̃n1:i−1Di; Z̃ni |F )
≤ I(SiDi; Z̃ni |F ) + I(S1:i−1Z̃n1:i−1; Z̃ni |FSiDi)
(b)= I(SiDi; Z̃ni |F )












where (a) follows from applying d-separation [Pea09] over graph in Figure 2.3 to prove
that Si+1:L are independent of F and all random variables of previous blocks [1, i]; (b) also
follows from applying d-separation because S1:i−1Z̃n1:i−1 − FSiDi − Z̃ni forms a Markov











, pXnY nZn) = 0 and, by definition, H(U(j)|U1:j−1Zn) ≥ 1− δn for any j ∈ H(n)X|Z .
2.4 Polar codes for the general WTC
Polar coding has been extended to the general WTC in [RRS13, WU16, GB17, CB16]. Indeed,
[GB17, CB16] generalize their results providing PCSs for the BCC, and [WU16] also proposes
polar coding strategies to achieve the best-known inner bounds on the secrecy-capacity region
of different multi-user settings. A good overview of the similarities and differences between
the polar codes proposed in [RRS13, WU16, GB17, CB16] for the general wiretap channel
can be found in [CB16] (Figure 1).
This section overviews polar coding for the WTC based mainly on the techniques
introduced in [CB16] due to the following reasons: to guarantee strong secrecy and to provide
polar coding schemes that are implementable in practice. In [WU16], the proposed PCSs
are secrecy-capacity achieving only under the weak secrecy condition. Moreover, the coding
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scheme presented in [RRS13] relies on a construction for which no efficient code is presently
known, and the PCS in [GB17] only relies on the existence (through averaging) of certain
deterministic mappings for the encoding/decoding process.
Consider a DMS (V × X × Y ×Z, pV XY Z) that represents the input and output random
variables involved in the achievable region of the WTC defined in Proposition 1.2, where
V = X = {0, 1}, and pV XY Z such that V −X − Y Z forms a Markov chain.
In this model it is clear that the optimal input distribution is not necessarily uniformly
distributed. Consequently, the previous PCS described for the DWTC will fail to provide
reliability and strong secrecy because the encoder could induce a distribution that is not
sufficiently close to pV nXnY nZn . In this sense, the PCS uses a similar construction of that
for asymmetric settings introduced in [HY13, MUH14].
Furthermore, in this setting the subset property of polar codes, that is Lemma 2.2, does
not hold because the eavesdropper channel is not degraded with respect to the legitimate
receiver one. Thus, H(n)X|Y 6⊆ H
(n)
X|Z and, consequently, D
(n) is not asymptotically negligible in
general. This means that the previous chaining construction does not allow to convey the
problematic elements at negligible rate penalty, and the PCS uses a new chaining construction





any i ∈ [1, L], were known by the receiver because they contained common randomness.
The use of this source was possible because H(n)X|Y ⊆ H
(n)
X|Z and, hence, the secrecy was not
compromised. Now, since H(n)X|Y 6⊆ H
(n)
X|Z in general, these elements required by the receiver
must be secretly conveyed also by means of the chaining construction.
Let (V n, Xn, Y n, Zn) denote an i.i.d. sequence of the DMS (V ×X ×Y ×Z, pV XY Z), and
define the polar transforms Un , V nGn and Tn , XnGn. Now, associated to Un, define
H(n)V ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
U(j)
∣∣U1:j−1 ) ≥ 1− δn} ,
L(n)V ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
U(j)
∣∣U1:j−1 ) ≤ δn} ,
H(n)V |Z ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
U(j)
∣∣U1:j−1Zn ) ≥ 1− δn} ,
L(n)V |Y ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
U(j)
∣∣U1:j−1Y n ) ≤ δn} ;
and associated to the transform Tn, define
H(n)X|V ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
T (j)
∣∣T 1:j−1V n ) ≥ 1− δn} ,
L(n)X|V ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
T (j)
∣∣T 1:j−1V n ) ≤ δn} ,
H(n)X|V Z ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
T (j)
∣∣T 1:j−1V nZn ) ≥ 1− δn} .
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The sets H(n)V and L
(n)




X|V , correspond to the input random variables
V n and Xn, respectively, when considering that channel observations are absent. Since
conditioning does not increase entropy, then H(n)V ⊇ H
(n)










Consider that the transmission takes place over L blocks of size n. The encoder forms Ũn1:L
sequentially from Ũn1 to ŨnL . At block i, the encoder will construct Ũni , which will carry
the confidential message. Then, given Ṽ ni = Ũni Gn, the encoder will perform the polar-
based channel prefixing to construct T̃ni . Finally, it will obtain X̃ni = T̃ni Gn, which will be
transmitted over the WTC inducing the channel outputs (Ỹ ni , Z̃ni ).
Confidential message encoding
Besides the previous sets of indices associated to the polar transform Un, define





For any block i ∈ [1, L], let the uniformly distributed random sequence Ci representing
the local randomness has size
∣∣H(n)V \ H(n)V |Z∣∣. Also, let random message S1 has size ∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣
and, for i ∈ [2, L], let Si has size
∣∣H(n)V |Z \ R(n)∣∣.










= C1. Then, it




distribution pU(j)|U1:j−1(Ũ1|Ũ1:j−11 ). Also, from Ũn1 , the encoder obtains







Φ(V )i = Ũi
[(
H(n)X
)C \ L(n)V |Y ], (2.14)









)C], which is required by the legitimate
receiver to reliably reconstruct Ũn1 by performing SC decoding.
At block i ∈ [2, L], the encoder constructs Ũi
[
H(n)V |Z \R
(n)] = Si and Ũi[H(n)V \H(n)V |Z] = Ci.








)C] from the distribution pU(j)|U1:j−1(Ũi|Ũ1:j−1i ). Also, from Ũni , the encoder obtains
Ψ(V )i and Φ
(V )
i as in (2.13) and (2.14), respectively.
Notice that only Ψ(V )i , for i ∈ [1, L − 1], is reused in the next block. However, Ψ
(V )
L is
required to initialize the decoding process and Φ(V )1:L , which is not uniformly distributed, is







to the receiver by using a uniformly distributed random key
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that is privately shared between receiver and transmitter. This secret-key is asymptotically
negligible in terms of rate because, since L(n)V ⊇ L
(n)











∣∣(H(n)V )C \ L(n)V ∣∣
nL
n→∞−−−−→ H(V |Y )
L
.
Therefore, one can incur an arbitrary rate penalty by choosing a sufficiently large L.
Finally, for any i ∈ [1, L], the encoder computes Ṽ ni = Ũni Gn, which is used for the
polar-based channel prefixing.
Channel prefixing
For i ∈ [1, L], let Ri be a uniformly distributed random sequence with size
∣∣H(n)X|V \ H(n)X|V Z∣∣
that represents the additional randomness introduced by the encoding. Moreover, let F be a
uniformly distributed random sequence with size
∣∣H(n)X|V Z∣∣.















from the distribution pT (j)|T 1:j−1V n(T̃i|T 1:j−1i Ṽ ni ). Finally, it computes X̃n = T̃nGn and
transmits it over the WTC, which induces (Ỹ ni , Z̃ni ).
Notice that the legitimate receiver does not have to estimate X̃n1:L because it does not
carry information, but only contains additional randomness.
2.4.2 Decoding
Consider that Ψ(V )L and Φ
(V )
1:L have reliably been estimated by the legitimate receiver. Then,
the decoder successively forms an estimate of Ũn1:L by going backward, that is, from ÛnL to
Û1, as follows. For i ∈ [1, L], given Ψ(V )i and Φ
(V )




uses the SC decoder in (2.6) to reliably construct Ûni from observations Ỹ ni . Then, it obtains




, which will be used at block i− 1 to reliably estimate Ũni−1.
2.4.3 Performance of the polar coding scheme










+ (L− 1)H(V |Z)−H(V |Y )
L
.
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Thus, the PCS can operate as close to the secrecy-capacity (see Proposition 1.2) as desired









denote the joint distribution of (Ṽ ni , X̃ni , Ỹ ni , Z̃ni ) at block i ∈ [1, L].








, pV nXnY nZn) 6= 0.








and pV nXnY nZn are statistically
close for sufficiently large n. This happens because the encoder introduces uniformly dis-








, and recall that U(j) for j ∈ H(n)V and T (j)
for j ∈ H(n)X|V are defined to be asymptotically independent from U
1:j−1 and (T 1:j−1, V n),







)C] are randomly drawn from the marginal distributions pU(j)|U1:j−1 and
pT (j)|T 1:j−1V n , respectively, of the original DMS.
Having to randomly construct part of Ũni and T̃ni is an important drawback for practical
implementation of polar codes. In this sense, [CB15] proposed a modification of the previous
encoder, where only Ũi
[(
H(n)V
)C \L(n)V ] and T̃i[(H(n)X|V )C \L(n)X|V ] are randomly sampled from
pU(j)|U1:j−1 and pT (j)|T 1:j−1V n , respectively. Hence, the randomness required for SC encoding
is, by applying Theorem 2.1, negligible in terms of rate. By contrast, the elements Ũi(j) such
that j ∈ L(n)V are constructed by performing deterministic SC encoding, that is,
U(j) = arg max
u∈{0,1}
pU(j)|U1:j−1(u|U1:j−1),
and, similarly, the elements T̃i(j) such that j ∈ L(n)X|V are deterministically sampled as
T (j) = arg max
t∈{0,1}
pT (j)|T 1:j−1V n(t|T 1:j−1V n).
For the general DMC, [CB15] showed that part of the random decisions can be exchanged by








, pV nXnY nZn) vanishes for n large
enough. In Section 2.5 we generalize this result for any multi-user channel with arbitrary









, pV nXnY nZn) = εn, where εn
n→∞−−−−→ 0 for any i ∈ [1, L], the reliability
performance can be analyzed by using similar techniques as those in [KU10]. Consider an































. According to [LPW09], this optimal coupling
always exists. Moreover, for i ∈ [1, L], define the error event EΨi , P
[






















∣∣ECΨi ∩ ECUnY n]+ P[EUnY n]+ P[EΨi]
≤ i(nδn + εn),
















, pV nXnY nZn) = εn,
and similar reasoning as in (2.11).
Regarding the secrecy performance, now the information leakage is given by I(S1:L; Z̃n1:L).
Due to the chaining construction, the dependencies between random variables of different
blocks must be considered. Indeed, the Bayesian graph representing these dependencies is
similar to the one in Figure 2.3, where now we have (Ũn1:L, T̃n1:L) instead of only Ũn1:L in
intermediate nodes, Ψ(V )i from Block i is repeated in secure positions of Block i+ 1, and F
does not represent common randomness available to all receivers but is a random sequence
that is sampled by the encoding and is replicated in all blocks for channel prefixing. Thus,

























, pV nXnY nZn) = εn and by applying [CK11]






]∣∣Z̃ni ) ≤ H(Ui[H(n)X|Z]∣∣Zni )+ γεn ,
where γεn
n→∞−−−−→ 0 if εn




and the definition of







) n→∞−−−−→ 0 and the strong secrecy condition is fulfilled.
Regarding the complexity of the previous PCS, notice that the encoding/decoding process
requires a high memory capacity to either the encoding or the decoding. The encoder
constructs Ũn1:L forward, that is, from Ũn1 to ŨnL , and the receiver must wait until Ỹ nL is
available in order to perform SC decoding. This implies the receiver having to keep all the
observations Ỹ n1:L before starting to reconstruct Ũn1:L backward.
Remark 2.3. Notice that the PCSs for the DWTC and WTC require the legitimate receiver
to reliably decode the local randomness. Then, these coding schemes can achieve the capacity
region of the model described in [XC08], which introduces a new message with no secrecy
constraints, by simply exchanging the local randomness for this uniformly distributed message.
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2.5 SC encoding with negligible amount of randomness
In this section, we generalize the results in [CB15] for any multi-user model. Specifically, we
present a generic encoder for multi-user settings that uses a negligible amount of randomness
(in terms of rate) for SC encoding. Also, the distribution induced by this encoding is
statistically close to the one that attains the capacity and is used for the code construction.
Consider a DMS representing the random variables involved in the capacity region of an
arbitrary setting with TV input (encoding) layers and TO receivers, that is,
(V1 × · · · × VTV ×O1 × · · · × OTO , pV1:TVO1:TO ),
where V` ∈ V` = {0, 1} (binary polarization) denotes the random variable associated to
encoding layer ` ∈ [1, TV], the random variable Ok ∈ Ok denotes the channel output associated
to Receiver k ∈ [1, TO], and pV1:TVO1:TO is any arbitrary distribution.
Let (V n1:TV , O
n
1:TO) denote an i.i.d. n-sequence of this DMS, n being any power of two. For
any input random variable V`, ` ∈ [1, TV], define the polar transform Un` , V n` Gn. Associated
to each polar transform, define the following set of indices:
H(n)V`|V1:`−1 ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
U`(j)
∣∣U1:j−1` V n1:`−1) ≥ 1− δn},
L(n)V`|V1:`−1 ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
U`(j)
∣∣U1:j−1` V n1:`−1) ≤ δn},
where δn = 2−n




, and V n0 , ∅. These sets represent the high and the
low entropy sets, respectively, of V n` given the input random sequences V n1:`−1.
Consider an encoder that successively forms Ũn1:TV from Ũ
n
1 to ŨnTV as follows. For








































∣∣Ũ1:j−1` Ṽ n1:`−1) otherwise.





(for instance: information messages, local randomness, repeated sequences
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due to a chaining construction, etc.). Then, it constructs the remaining entries by using
deterministic and random SC encoding. Indeed, if TV  n, by Theorem 2.1 the amount of
randomness that is required for SC encoding is asymptotically negligible in terms of rate.
The following lemma proves that, for sufficiently large n, the joint distribution q̃U1:TnV of
Ũn1:TV induced by the encoding process given in (2.16) is statistically close to the marginal
distribution pUn1:TV of the original DMS.
Lemma 2.3. The joint distributions q̃Un1:TV and pUn1:TV satisfy

















Proof. See Appendix 2.A
Corollary 2.1. If pUn1:TV and q̃Un1:TV are such that U
n
1 −Un2 −· · ·−UnTV and Ũ
n
1 −Ũn2 −· · ·−ŨnTV
form a Markov chain, then it holds that













Proof. The proof follows the same steps of the one for Lemma 2.3 but, in this case, we have
that q̃U`|U1:`−1 is equivalent to q̃U`|U`−1 and pU`|U1:`−1 to pU`|U`−1 .




= pUn1:TVpOn1:TO |Un1:TV , then
V(q̃Un1:TVOn1:TO , pUn1:TVOn1:TO ) = V(q̃Un1:TV , pUn1:TV ).










and pUn1:TV On1:TO are also statistically indistinguishable for n sufficiently large.
Finally, the following lemma relates total variation distance with entropies.











with distribution pUn1:TVOn1:TO .
Let V(q̃Un1:TVOn1:TO , pUn1:TVOn1:TO ) ≤ ε, where ε
n→∞−−−−→ 0. Then, for sufficiently large n,∣∣H(Ũ1[J1] . . . ŨTV [JTV ]∣∣Õn1:TO)−H(U1[J1] . . . UTV [JTV ]∣∣On1:TO)∣∣ ≤ (TV+ 2TO)nε− 2ε log ε.
Proof. See Appendix 2.B
The results provided in this section are crucial for the analysis of the reliability and the
secrecy performance of the PCSs that will be introduced in the following chapters.
Appendix
2.A Proof of Lemma 2.3
Consider another encoder that omits the use of the deterministic arg max function in SC
encoding but, for any ` ∈ [1, TV], it randomly draws those elements whose indices belong to(
H(n)V`|V1:`−1
































∣∣Ǔ1:j−1` V̌ n1:`−1) otherwise.
The following lemma shows that the joint distributions q̌Un1:TV and pUn1:TV of the original
DMS are nearly statistically indistinguishable for sufficiently large n.
























































where (a) holds by (2.17) and [GAG15] (Lemma 10), i.e., D(p1‖p2) = 1−H(p1) if p2 denotes
the uniform distribution; and (b) holds by the definition of H(n)Vi|V1:i−1 . Finally, we obtain




`′nδn by Pinsker’s inequality and because
∣∣H(n)Vi|V1:i−1∣∣ ≤ n.
Now, the following lemma proves that the joint distribution q̃Un1:TV corresponding to
the encoder in (2.16) that uses deterministic SC encoding is asymptotically close to the
distribution q̌Un1:TV in terms of total variation distance.
Lemma 2.6. The joint distributions q̃Un1:TV and q̌Un1:TV satisfy













Proof. Define a coupling [LPW09] for Ǔn1:TV and Ũ
n




)C] = Ũ`[(L(n)V`|V1:`−1)C] . Thus, we have














































where (a) holds by the coupling lemma [LPW09] (Proposition 4.7); (b) holds by the union
bound and the invertibility of Gn; (c) also holds by the union bound; and (d) follows from
(2.16) and (2.17) given that Ǔ`[(L(n)V`|V1:`−1)
C] = Ũ`[(L(n)V`|V1:`−1)
C] and from defining






∣∣Ǔ1:j−1` , V̌ n1:`−1).
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Next, for any j ∈ [n] and sufficiently large n, we have∣∣H(U`(j)∣∣U1:j−1` , V n1:`−1)−H(U`(j)∣∣Ǔ1:j−1` , V̌ n1:`−1)∣∣
(a)
≤
































where (a) holds by the chain rule of entropy and the triangle inequality; (b) holds by
[CK11] (Lemma 2.7), the invertibility of Gn, and because
V(pU`(j)|U1:j−1` Un1:`−1 q̌U1:j−1` Un1:`−1 , pU1:j` Un1:`−1) = V(q̌U1:j−1` Un1:`−1 , pU1:j−1` Un1:`−1);







) ≤ V(q̌Un1:` , pUn1:`),
x 7→ x log x is decreasing for x > 0 small enough, and j − 1 ≤ n. Thus, for any ` ∈ [1, TV]


















































1− pU`(j)|U1:j−1` V n1:`−1
(
u?` (j)
∣∣Ǔ1:j−1` , V̌ n1:`−1))
× log
(
1− pU`(j)|U1:j−1` V n1:`−1
(
u?` (j)






1− pU`(j)|U1:j−1` V n1:`−1
(
u?` (j)







1− pU`(j)|U1:j−1` V n1:`−1
(
u?` (j)
∣∣Ǔ1:j−1` , V̌ n1:`−1))] (2.21)








1:`−1) ≥ 1/2 and log(x) < −x if x ∈ [0, 1/2); and (d) follows
from applying Jensen’s inequality.
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Lastly, by combining Equations (2.19) and (2.21), and because |L(n)V`|V`−1 | ≤ n, we have































Finally, by Lemma 2.5, Lemma 2.6 and by applying the triangle inequality, we obtain
















and the proof is complete.
2.B Proof of Lemma 2.4










































≤ n(TV + 2TO)ε− 2ε log ε
where (a) holds by the chain rule of entropy and the triangle inequality; (b) follows from
applying [CK11] (Lemma 2.7); and (c) holds by Corollary 2.2, by assumption and because
the function x 7→ x log x is decreasing for x > 0 small enough.
3
Polar coding for the degraded wiretap broadcast channel
This section focuses on two different models for the discrete memoryless Degraded Broadcast
Channel (DBC) surveyed in [ZLL+15]: (a) DBC with Non-Layered Decoding and Layered
Secrecy (DBC-NLD-LS) and (b) DBC with Layered Decoding and Non-Layered Secrecy
(DBC-LD-NLS). In these models, the transmitter wishes to send a set of messages through
the DBC, and each message must be reliably decoded by a particular set of receivers and kept
masked from a particular set of eavesdroppers. The degradedness condition of the channel
implies that individual channels can be ordered based on the quality of their received signals.
The layered decoding structure requires receivers with better channel quality to reliably
decode more messages, while the layered secrecy requires eavesdroppers with worse channel
quality to be kept ignorant of more messages.
The secrecy-capacity region of these models was first characterized in [ZLL+15, LLPS14,
EU09]. However, the achievable schemes used by these works rely on random coding arguments
that are nonconstructive in practice. In this sense, this chapter provides two secrecy-capacity
achieving PCSs for each model. As mentioned in [ZLL+15], these settings capture practical
scenarios in wireless systems, in which channels can be ordered based on the quality of the
received signals (for example, Gaussian channels are degraded). Hence, the ultimate goal of
this chapter is not only to prove the existence of two asymptotic secrecy-capacity achieving
PCSs for these models under the strong secrecy condition, but also to discuss their practical
construction and evaluate their performance for a finite blocklength by means of simulations.
The degradedness condition of the channel and the strong secrecy requirement on one side
and the non-necessarily symmetry of individual channels on the other mean that the proposed
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PCSs combine techniques from the coding schemes described in Section 2.3 and Section 2.4 for
the symmetric DWTC and the general WTC, respectively. Although Section 2.3 proposes a
chaining construction to convey the problematic elements to the legitimate receivers, we omit
its use for practical reasons: in order to evaluate their performance for a finite blocklength, it
is desirable that the transmitter could send secret information in just one block of size n. Since
the problematic elements are negligible in terms of rate, the rate cost of additionally make
them accessible to the receiver is also negligible. The omission of the chaining construction is
only possible if a source of common randomness is accessible to all parties and, moreover,
transmitter and legitimate receivers must share a secret-key with size in o(n).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, the channel models
DBC-NLD-LS and DBC-LD-NLS are introduced formally, and their secrecy-capacity regions
are characterized. In Section 3.2 and Section 3.3, two PCSs are proposed for the DBC-NLD-LS
and DBC-LD-NLS, respectively, and we prove that both are asymptotic secrecy-capacity
achieving. In Section 3.4, practical polar code constructions are discussed for both models,
and the performances of the polar codes are evaluated by means of simulations. Finally, the
concluding remarks are presented in Section 3.5.
3.1 System model and secrecy-capacity region
Formally, a DBC (X , pYK ...Y1ZM ...Z1|X ,YK × · · · × Y1 × ZM × · · · × Z1) with K legitimate
receivers and M eavesdroppers is characterized by the probability transition function
pYK ...Y1ZM ...Z1|X , where X ∈ X denotes the channel input, Yk ∈ Yk denotes the output
corresponding to Receiver k ∈ [1,K] and Zm ∈ Zm denotes the channel output corresponding
to Eavesdropper m ∈ [1,M ]. The broadcast channel is assumed to gradually degrade in such
a way that each legitimate receiver has a better channel than any eavesdropper, that is,
X − YK − · · · − Y1 − ZM − · · · − Z1 (3.1)
forms a Markov chain. Although we consider physically degradation, the polar coding schemes
proposed in this paper are also suitable for stochastically degraded channels (see Remark 3.1).
3.1.1 DBC with non-layered decoding and layered secrecy
In this model (see Figure 3.1), the transmitter wishes to send M messages {Wm}Mm=1
to the K legitimate receivers. The non-layered decoding structure requires legitimate Re-
ceiver k ∈ [1,K] to reliably decode all M messages, and the layered secrecy structure
requires Eavesdropper m ∈ [1,M ] to be kept ignorant about messages {Wi}Mi=m. Consider a
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(d2nR1e, . . . , d2nRM e, n) code for the DBC-NLD-LS, whereWm ∈ [d2nRme] for anym ∈ [1,M ].
The reliability condition to be satisfied by this code is measured in terms of the average





(Ŵ1, . . . , ŴM ) 6= (W1, . . . ,WM )
]
= 0. (3.2)
On the other hand, the strong secrecy condition to be satisfied by the code is measured in
terms of the information leakage and is given, for Eavesdropper m ∈ [1,M ], by
lim
n→∞
I(Wm,Wm+1, . . . ,WM ;Znm) = 0. (3.3)
A tuple of rates (R1, . . . , RM ) ∈ RM+ is achievable for the DBC-NLD-LS if there exists a
























Figure 3.1: Channel model DBC-NLD-LS.
Proposition 3.1 (Adapted from [ZLL+15, LLPS14]). The achievable region of the DBC-NLD-
LS is the union of all M -tuples of rates (R1, . . . , RM ) ∈ RM+ satisfying
M∑
i=m
Ri ≤ I(X;Y1)− I(X;Zm), m = 1, . . . ,M,
where the union is taken over all distributions pX .
The proof for the case of only one legitimate receiver in the context of the fading wiretap
channel is provided in [LLPS14]. Due to the degradedness condition of Equation (3.1), by
applying the data processing inequality and Fano’s inequality, an achievable scheme ensuring
the reliability condition in Equation (3.2) for legitimate Receiver 1 will satisfy it for any
legitimate Receiver k ∈ [2,K].
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Corollary 3.1. The achievable subregion of the DBC-NLD-LS without considering rate sharing
is a K-orthotope defined by the closure of all K-tuples of rates (R1, . . . , RM ) ∈ RM+ satisfying
Rm ≤ I(X;Zm+1)− I(X;Zm), m = 1, . . . ,M − 1,
RM ≤ I(X;Y1)− I(X;ZM ).
3.1.2 DBC with layered decoding and non-layered secrecy
In this model (see Figure 3.2), the transmitter wishes to send K messages {W`}K`=1 to the K
legitimate receivers. The layered decoding structure requires Receiver k ∈ [1,K] to reliably
decode the messages {W`}k`=1, and the non-layered secrecy structure requires Eavesdrop-
per m ∈ [1,M ] to be kept ignorant of all K messages. Consider a (d2nR1e, . . . , d2nRK e, n)
code for the DBC-LD-NLS, where W` ∈ [d2nR`e] for any ` ∈ [1,K]. For Receiver k ∈ [1,K],





(Ŵ1, . . . , Ŵk−1, Ŵk) 6= (W1, . . . ,Wk−1,Wk)
]
= 0. (3.4)
On the other hand, for any Eavesdropper m ∈ [1,M ], the strong secrecy condition to be
satisfied by the code is given by
lim
n→∞
I(W1, . . . ,WK ;Znm) = 0. (3.5)
A tuple of rates (R1, . . . , RK) ∈ RK+ is achievable for the DBC-LD-NLS if there exists a
























Figure 3.2: Channel model DBC-LD-NLS.
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Proposition 3.2 (Adapted from [ZLL+15, EU09]). The achievable region of the DBC-LD-NLS






I(V`;Y`|V`−1)− I(Vk, ZM ), k = 1, . . . ,K,
where V0 , ∅ and VK , X, and the union is taken over all distributions pV1...VK such that
V1 − V2 − · · · − VK forms a Markov chain.
The proof for the case of only one eavesdropper is provided in [EU09]. Due to the
degradedness condition of Equation (3.1), note that any achievable scheme ensuring the
strong secrecy condition in Equation (3.5) for the Eavesdropper M will also satisfy it for any
Eavesdropper m ∈ [1,M − 1].
Corollary 3.2. The achievable subregion of the DBC-LD-NLS without considering rate sharing
is a K-orthotope defined by the closure of all K-tuples of rates (R1, . . . , RK) ∈ RK+ satisfying
R` ≤ I(V`;Y`|V`−1)− I(V`;ZM |V`−1), ` = 1, . . . ,K.
3.2 Polar coding scheme for the DBC-NLD-LS
The PCS provided in this section is designed to achieve the supremum of the achievable rates
given in Corollary 3.1. Thus, consider the DMS(
X × YK × · · · × Y1 ×ZM × · · · × Z1, pXYK ...Y1ZM ...Z1
)
that represents the input and output random variables involved in the achievable region of
Corollary 3.1, where X = {0, 1}. Let (Xn, Y nK , . . . , Y n1 , ZnM , . . . , Zn1 ) be an i.i.d. n-sequence of
this source. Define the polar transform Un , XnGn with distribution pUn(un) = pXn(unGn)






3.2.1 Polar code construction
Let δn , 2−n
β , where β ∈ (0, 12 ). Based on pXYK ...Y1ZM ...Z1 , we define the sets of indices
H(n)X ,
{
j ∈ [n] : H
(
U(j)
∣∣U1:j−1) ≥ 1− δn}, (3.7)
L(n)X ,
{
j ∈ [n] : H
(
U(j)
∣∣U1:j−1) ≤ δn}; (3.8)
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and, for any k ∈ [1, L] and m ∈ [1,M ], we also define
L(n)X|Yk ,
{
j ∈ [n] : H
(
U(j)
∣∣U1:j−1, Y nk ) ≤ δn}, (3.9)
H(n)X|Yk ,
{
j ∈ [n] : H
(
U(j)
∣∣U1:j−1, Y nk ) ≥ 1− δn}; (3.10)
H(n)X|Zm ,
{
j ∈ [n] : H
(
U(j)
∣∣U1:j−1, Znm) ≥ 1− δn}. (3.11)
The following proposition particularizes the subset lemma of polar codes (Lemma 2.2) to the
particular sets defined in (3.7)–(3.11).
Proposition 3.3. Consider the sets of indices defined in (3.7)–(3.11). Due to degradedness
condition of the channel in (3.1), it holds that
L(n)X ⊆ L
(n)













X|Y1 ⊇ · · · ⊇ H
(n)
X|YK .
Remark 3.1. According to Lemma 2.2, the subset property also holds if the channels are
stochastically degraded. Therefore, since the construction of the polar codes proposed in the
following sections is based basically on Proposition 3.3, the PCSs are suitable for physically
and stochastically degraded channels.
Based on the sets (3.7)–(3.11) and Proposition 3.3, we define the following partition of










X|Zm+1 , m = 1, . . . ,M − 1, (3.13)
F (n) , H(n)X|Y1 , (3.14)








This partition is graphically represented in Figure 3.3. The distribution of Ũn after the
encoding must be close in terms of statistical distance to the one given in (3.6) corresponding
to the original DMS. Thus, the elements U(j) such that j ∈ H(n)X , that is, U
[
[1, n] \ T (n)
]
,
will be suitable for storing uniformly-distributed random sequences, and U [T (n)] will not.




for any m′ < m. Hence, U [I(n)m ] will be suitable for storing information to
be secured from Eavesdroppers 1–m. Otherwise, C(n) ⊆
(
H(n)X|Z1




)C ⊆ (H(n)X|Zm)C for any m ∈ [1,M ]. Thus, U[C(n)] cannot contain information
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to be secured from any eavesdropper, and it will be used to store the local randomness























1 C(n) T (n)





, which can belong to I(n)m (m ∈ [1,M ]), C(n), F(n) or T (n).
According to Theorem 2.2, legitimate Receiver 1 will be able to reliably infer U [L(n)X|Y1 ]
given Y n1 and U [(L
(n)
X|Y1)
C]. Hence, if the polar coding scheme somehow make the entries U(j)
such that j belongs to F (n) = H(n)X|Y1 and
(
H(n)X|Y1
)C \ L(n)X|Y1 (hatched areas in Figure 3.3)
available to the legitimate Receiver 1, this receiver will be able to reliably infer the entire
sequence Un. In this sense, U [F (n)] will be used to store the uniformly-distributed random
sequence provided by a source of common randomness that will be available to all parties.
Since, by Proposition 3.3, F (n) ⊆ H(n)X|Zm for any m ∈ [1,M ], the knowledge of U [F
(n)]






will contain secret information or elements that cannot be known
directly by all the eavesdroppers without compromising the secrecy. Therefore, the transmitter
somehow will additionally and secretly send it to the legitimate receivers. Nevertheless, as
will be seen later, this additional transmission will incur an asymptotically negligible rate
penalty. Finally, by Proposition 3.3, we have (L(n)X|Y1)
C ⊇ (L(n)X|Yk)
C for any k > 1. Hence,
given U [(L(n)X|Y1)
C], all the legitimate receivers will be able to reliably infer the entire sequence
Un from their own channel observations.
The goal of the polar code construction is to obtain, with as low complexity
as possible, the entropy terms {H(U(j)
∣∣U1:j−1)}nj=1, {H(U(j)∣∣U1:j−1, Y n1 )}nj=1 and
{H(U(j)
∣∣U1:j−1, Znm)}nj=1 for all m ∈ [1,M ] required to define the sets (3.7)–(3.11) and, con-
sequently, to obtain the partition of [1, n] defined in (3.12)–(3.16). Although construction of
polar codes is covered in a large number of references (for instance, see [TV13, VVH15, HY13]),
they only focus on constructions under reliability constraints. In Section 3.4 we discuss further
how to construct polar codes under both reliability and secrecy constraints.
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3.2.2 Polar encoding
The polarization-based encoder aims to construct the sequence Ũn and is summarized in
Algorithm 3.1. Let Wm for all m ∈ [1,M ] and C be uniformly-distributed random vectors
of size |I(n)m | and |C(n)|, respectively, where C represents the local randomness and recall
that Wm represents the message m that is intended for all legitimate receivers. Let F be a
given uniformly-distributed random |F (n)|-sequence, which represents the source of common











∪ C(n) ∪ F (n)
]
from {Wm}Mm=1, C and F .
Algorithm 3.1 Polar encoding for the DBC-NLD-LS
Require: Messages {Wm}Mm=1; common randomness F ; local randomness C; and key κΦ
privately shared between transmitter and all legitimate receivers

















6: for j ∈ T (n) do
7: if j ∈
(
H(n)X





9: else if j ∈ L(n)X then . Deterministic SC encoding


























)C \ L(n)X then Ũ(j) is constructed randomly from the distribution pU(j)|U1:j−1 .
Then, the encoder computes X̃n = ŨnGn and transmits it over the DBC inducing




)C \ L(n)X|Y1]. (3.17)
This sequence Φ must be additionally transmitted to all legitimate receivers keeping it masked
from eavesdroppers. To do so, the transmitter can perform a modulo-two addition between
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Φ and a uniformly distributed secret key κΦ that is privately shared with the legitimate
receivers and somehow additionally send it to them. Nevertheless, by Theorem 2.1, this
additional transmission is asymptotically negligible in terms of rate.








, and the remaining part that is not. The transmitter could
make this uniformly distributed part available to legitimate receivers by using a chaining
structure as the one in Section 2.3 for the DWTC. However, such a scheme will require the
transmission to take place over several blocks of size n. Indeed, since Φ is made available




)C \ L(n)X|Y1 into the set ∪Mm=1I(n)m . Thus, according to the previous encoding,
part of the messages W1:M have been sent by means of this additional transmission.
3.2.3 Polar decoding
Consider that the realization of the source of common randomness F is available to all parties
and the sequence Φ has been successfully received by all legitimate receivers. The decoding




)C]. Since by Proposition 3.3 we have (L(n)X|Y1)C ⊇ (L(n)X|Yk)C for any k > 1,




its channel output observations Ỹ nk . In Section 3.2.4, we show formally that the reliability
condition in Equation (3.2) is satisfied at each legitimate receiver k ∈ [1,K].
Algorithm 3.2 Decoding at Receiver k ∈ [1,K] for the DBC-NLD-LS
Require: Common randomness F ; additional sequence Φ
1: Û [(L(n)X|Y1)
C]← (F,Φ)
2: for j ∈ L(n)X|Y1 do . SC decoding











3.2.4 Performance of the polar coding scheme
The analysis of the polar coding scheme described previously leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Let
(
X , pYK ...Y1ZM ...Z1|X ,YK×· · ·×Y1×ZM ×· · ·×Z1
)
be an arbitrary DBC
such that X ∈ {0, 1} and the distribution pYK ...Y1ZM ...Z1|X satisfies the Markov chain condition
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X−YK −· · ·−Y1−ZM −· · ·−Z1. The polar coding scheme described in Sections 3.2.1–3.2.3
achieves any rate tuple of the region defined in Corollary 3.1.
Corollary 3.3. Since Ũ [I(n)m ] for some m ∈ [1,M ] can contain information to be secured from
Eavesdroppers 1–m, the polar coding scheme described in Sections 3.2.1–3.2.3 can achieve
the entire region considering rate sharing of Proposition 3.1 by storing part of any message
Wm′ such that m′ < m into Ũ [I(n)m ] instead of part of Wm.
The proof of Theorem 3.1 follows in four steps, and is provided hereafter. First, we prove
that the PCS approaches the corner point of the region defined in Corollary 3.1. Second,
























of the original DMS from which the polarization sets were defined. In
steps three and four, we prove that the corresponding average error probability at Re-
ceiver k ∈ [1,K] and the information leakage for Eavesdropper m ∈ [1,M ] vanishes for
sufficiently large n and, consequently, the PCS satisfy the reliability and the strong secrecy
conditions given in (3.2) and (3.3). On the other hand, the proof of Corollary 3.3 is immediate.
Transmission Rates
















∣∣∣H(n)X|Zm ∣∣∣− limn→∞ 1n ∣∣∣H(n)X|Zm+1∣∣∣
(c)= H(X|Zm+1)−H(X|Zm),
where (a) follows from the definition of the set I(n)m in Equation (3.13); (b) holds because, by
Proposition 3.3, H(n)X|Zm ⊇ H
(n)
X|Zm+1 ; and (c) follows from Theorem 2.1. Similarly, according







∣∣I(n)M ∣∣ = limn→∞ 1n ∣∣∣H(n)X|ZM \ H(n)X|Y1∣∣∣ = I(X;Y1)− I(X;ZM ).
Distribution of the DMS after the Polar Encoding
Let q̃Un be the distribution of Ũn after the encoding in Section 3.2.2. The following lemma
shows that q̃Un and the distribution pUn in Equation (3.6) of the original DMS are nearly
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Lemma 3.1. Let δn = 2−n


















) = V(q̃Un , pUn) ≤ δ(n)nld-ls,













Proof. For the first claim, see Lemma 2.3 taking TV , 1. The second claim holds by












Remark 3.3. The first term of δ(n)nld-ls bounds the impact on the total variation distance of




, while the second term bounds the
impact of storing uniformly-distributed random sequences (messages, local randomness and





As will be seen in the following subsections, an encoding process satisfying Lemma 3.1 is
crucial for the reliability and the secrecy performance of the polar code.
Reliability Performance
Consider the probability of incorrectly decoding all messages {Wm}Mm=1 at legitimate Re-


































, {(X̃n, Ỹ nk ) 6= (Xn, Y nk )} or, equivalently, EXnY nk , {(Ũ
n, Ỹ nk ) 6= (Un, Y nk )}
because of the invertibility of Gn. Thus, for the legitimate Receiver k ∈ [1,K], we obtain
P
[














































≤ nδn + δ(n)nld-ls, (3.18)
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where (a) holds by Theorem 2.2 because recall that (F,Φ) = Ũ
[(
L(n)X|Y1
)C] is available to
all legitimate receivers and, by Proposition 3.4, we have
(
L(n)X|Y1
)C ⊇ (L(n)X|Yk)C for any
k ∈ [1,K]; and (b) holds by the optimal coupling and Lemma 3.1. Therefore, the probability






and the PCS satisfies the reliability condition given in Equation (3.2).
Secrecy performance
Recall that the secrecy condition in (3.3) requires Eavesdropper m ∈ [1,M ] to be kept
ignorant about messages (Wm,Wm+1, . . . ,WM ). Due to the existence of the source of
common randomness, the information leakage at Eavesdropper m ∈ [1,M ] is given by
I(WmWm+1 . . .WM ; Z̃nF ). Hence, for n large enough we have























∣∣I(n)i ∣∣+ ∣∣F (n)∣∣−H(U[ ∪Mi=m I(n)i ]U[F (n)]∣∣Znm)+ 3nδ(n)nld-ls − 2δ(n)nld-ls log δ(n)nld-ls
(d)





where (a) follows from independence between {Wi}Mi=m and F , and from the encoding in
Algorithm 3.1; (b) holds by the uniformity of {Wi}Mi=m and F ; (c) follows from applying
Lemma 2.4 (taking TV = TO = 1) and Lemma 3.1; and (d) holds because by definition
we have F (n), I(n)m′ ⊆ H
(n)
V |Zm for m ∈ [1,M ] and m
′ ∈ [m,M ]. Thus, the corresponding





) n→∞−−−−→ 0 for Eavesdropper m ∈ [1,M ], and the PCS
satisfies the strong secrecy condition in (3.3) and the proof of Theorem 3.1 is concluded.
3.3 Polar coding scheme for the DBC-LD-NLS
The PCS provided in this section is designed to achieve the supremum of the achievable
rates given in Corollary 3.2 (secrecy-capacity without rate sharing). In this model, there are
K input random variables {V`}K`=1, where VK , X, each one corresponding to a different
superposition encoding layer. Consider the DMS(
V1 × · · · × VK × YK × · · · × Y1 ×ZM × · · · × Z1, pV1...VKYK ...Y1ZM ...Z1
)
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that represents the random variables involved in the achievable region, where V` , {0, 1} for
` ∈ [1,K]. Let (V n1 , . . . , V nK , Y nK , . . . , Y n1 , ZnM , . . . , Zn1 ) be an i.i.d. n-sequence of this source.
Define K polar transforms Un` , V n` Gn, ` ∈ [1,K]. Since V1−V2−· · ·−VK and, consequently,
U1 − U2 − · · · − UK (by the invertibility of Gn) form a Markov chain, we have
pUn1 ...UnK (u
n












∣∣u1:j−1` , un`−1Gn). (3.20)
3.3.1 Polar code construction
Based on pV1...VKYK ...Y1ZM ...Z1 , the construction is carried out similarly at each superposition
layer. Consider the polar construction at layer ` ∈ [1,K]. Let δn , 2−n





For the polar transform Un` = V n` Gn associated with the `-th layer, we define the sets
H(n)V`|V`−1 ,
{
j ∈ [n] : H
(
U`(j)
∣∣U1:j−1` , V n`−1) ≥ 1− δn}, (3.21)
L(n)V`|V`−1 ,
{
j ∈ [n] : H
(
U`(j)
∣∣U1:j−1` , V n`−1) ≤ δn}, (3.22)
L(n)V`|V`−1Yk ,
{
j ∈ [n] : H
(
U`(j)
∣∣U1:j−1` , V n`−1, Y nk ) ≤ δn}, k = `, . . . ,K, (3.23)
H(n)V`|V`−1Yk ,
{
j ∈ [n] : H
(
U`(j)
∣∣U1:j−1` , V n`−1, Y nk ) ≥ 1− δn}, k = `, . . . ,K, (3.24)
H(n)V`|V`−1Zm ,
{
j ∈ [n] : H
(
U`(j)
∣∣U1:j−1` , V n`−1, Znm) ≥ 1− δn}, m = 1, . . . ,M, (3.25)
where recall that V0 = ∅ when ` = 1 and VK , X when ` = K.
Proposition 3.4. Consider the sets of indices defined in (3.21)–(3.25). For any ` ∈ [1,K],
due to degradedness condition of the channel in (3.1), it holds that
L(n)V`|V`−1 ⊆ L
(n)













V`|V`−1Y1 ⊇ · · · ⊇ H
(n)
V`|V`−1YK .
At each layer ` ∈ [1,K], based on these previous sets, we define the following partition of



















which is graphically represented in Figure 3.4. The way we define this partition at the `-th
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layer follows similar reasoning as the one to define the partition in Section 3.2.1 for the DBC-


















will be suitable for storing information to be secured
from all eavesdroppers. Otherwise, we have C(n)` ⊆
(
H(n)V`|V`−1ZM
)C. Therefore, U`[C(n)` ] cannot
contain information to be secured from all eavesdroppers, but it will be used to store the
local randomness required to confuse them about all confidential messages.





given Y nk and U`
[(
L(n)V`|V`−1Yk
)C]. Moreover, by Proposition 3.4, we have(
L(n)V`|V`−1Y`
)C ⊇ (L(n)V`|V`−1Yk)C for any ` < k. Consequently, given U`[(L(n)V`|V`−1Y`)C], legiti-
mate Receivers `–K will be able to reliably reconstruct Un` from its own channel observations.






)C \ L(n)V`|V`−1Y` (hatched areas in Figure 3.3) available to Receivers `–K. In
this sense, the random sequence provided by a source of common randomness that is available




. Since, by Proposition 3.4, F (n)` ⊆ H
(n)
V`|V`−1Zm for






will contain secret information or elements that cannot be
known directly by eavesdroppers without compromising the secrecy. Hence, the transmitter























Figure 3.4: Polar code construction for the DBC-LD-NLS at the `-th layer. The hatched area represents














As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, the goal of the polar construction is to obtain, with as low
complexity as possible, the entropy terms associated with the sets in Equations (3.21)–(3.25)
and then define the partition of [1, n] given in Equations (3.26)–(3.29).
3.3.2 Polar encoding
The polarization-based encoder consists of K encoding blocks operating sequentially at each
superposition layer, the block at layer ` ∈ [1,K] being responsible for the construction of Ũn` .
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In order to construct Ũn` for some ` ∈ [2,K], the encoder block needs Ṽ n`−1 = Ũn`−1Gn, which
has been constructed previously by the encoding block operating at the (`− 1)-th layer.
Consider the encoding procedure at layer ` ∈ [1,K], which is summarized in Algorithm 3.3.
Let W` and C` be uniformly-distributed random vectors of size
∣∣I(n)` ∣∣ and ∣∣C(n)` ∣∣, respectively,
where W` represents the message intended for Receivers `–K, and C` the local randomness
required at the `-th layer to confuse all eavesdroppers about this message. Moreover, let F`
be a uniformly-distributed random
∣∣F (n)` ∣∣-sequence, which represents the source of common













from W`, C` and F`.
Algorithm 3.3 Polar encoding for the DBC-LD-NLS
Require: Messages {W`}K`=1; common randomness {F`}K`=1; local randomness {C`}K`=1; and
secret keys {κΦ`}K`=1.
1: Ṽ n0 ← ∅
















6: for j ∈ T (n)` do
7: if j ∈
(
H(n)V`|V`−1
)C \ L(n)V`|V`−1 then






9: else if j ∈ L(n)V`|V`−1 then
10: Ũ`(j)← arg maxu∈V` pU`(j)|U1:j−1` V n`−1
(
u
∣∣Ũ1:j−1` , Ṽ n`−1)
11: end if
12: end for
13: Ṽ n` = Ũn` Gn




15: Send Φ` ⊕ κΦ` to legitimate Receivers `–K.
16: end for









as follows. If j ∈ L(n)V`|V`−1 , it constructs
Ũ`(j) deterministically by using SC encoding. Otherwise, if j ∈
(
H(n)V`|V`−1
)C \ L(n)V`|V`−1 then
Ũ`(j) is constructed randomly from the distribution pU`(j)|U1:j−1` V n`−1 . After constructing Ũ
n
` ,
the `-th encoding block computes the sequence Ṽ n` = Ũn` Gn and delivers it to the next
encoding block. If ` = K, then Ṽ nK , X̃n, and the encoder transmits it over the DBC, which
induces the channel output observations (Ỹ nK , . . . , Ỹ n1 , Z̃nM , . . . , Z̃n1 ).
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)C \ L(n)V`|V`−1Y`], (3.30)
which must be additionally transmitted to legitimate Receivers `–K keeping it masked from
all eavesdroppers. To do so, the transmitter performs a modulo-two addition between Φ`
and a uniformly distributed secret key κΦ` that is privately shared with the legitimate
Receivers `–K and somehow additionally send it to them. If K  n, by Theorem 2.1, we
know that the cost of the overall transmission is asymptotically negligible in terms of rate.
As for the previous model (see Remark 3.2), the uniformly-distributed part of any Φ` could
be made available to the corresponding legitimate receivers by using a chaining structure
as in [SV13]. In this model, notice that the encoding block operating at superposition
layer ` ∈ [1,K] would be responsible for the chaining construction that conveys Φ`.
3.3.3 Polar decoding
Suppose that {F`}K`=1 are available to all parties and the sequences {Φ`}K`=1 have been
successfully received by the corresponding legitimate receivers. The decoding process at
legitimate Receiver k ∈ [1,K] constructs the estimates {Ûnk }Kk=1 of {Ũnk }Kk=1 in a sequential
manner, from Ûn1 to Ûnk , and is summarized in Algorithm 3.4.




)C]. Since, by Proposition 3.4, (L(n)V`|V`−1Y`)C ⊇ (L(n)V`|V`−1Yk)C for any




its channel output observations Ỹ nk . In Section 3.3.4, we show formally that the reliability
condition in Equation (3.4) is satisfied for all legitimate receivers.
Algorithm 3.4 Decoding at Receiver k ∈ [1,K] for the DBC-LD-NLS
Require: Common randomness {F`}k`=1; additional sequences {Φ`}k`=1
1: V̂0 ← ∅





4: for j ∈ L(n)V`|V`−1Y` do . SC decoding
5: Û`(j)← arg maxu∈V` pU`(j)|U1:j−1` V n`−1Y nk
(
u|Û1:j−1` V̂ n`−1Ỹ nk
)
6: end for




8: V̂ n` ← Ûn` Gn
9: end for
10: return {Ŵ`}k`=1
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3.3.4 Performance of the polar coding scheme
The analysis of the previous polar coding scheme leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. Let
(
X , pYK ...Y1ZM ...Z1|X ,YK×· · ·×Y1×ZM ×· · ·×Z1
)
be an arbitrary DBC
such that X ∈ {0, 1} and the distribution pYK ...Y1ZM ...Z1|X satisfies the Markov chain condition
X−YK −· · ·−Y1−ZM −· · ·−Z1. The polar coding scheme described in Sections 3.3.1–3.3.3
achieves any rate tuple of the achievable region defined in Corollary 3.2.
Corollary 3.4. Since Ũ`[I(n)` ] for some ` ∈ [1,K] can contain any information to be reliably
decoded by the legitimate receivers `–K, the coding scheme in Sections 3.3.1–3.3.3 can achieve
the entire region considering rate sharing of Proposition 3.2 by storing part of any message
W`′ such that `′ > ` into Ũ`[I(n)` ] instead of part of W`.
First, we prove that the PCS approaches the corner point of the region defined
in Corollary 3.2. Second, we show that the joint distribution q̃V n1 ...V nKY nK ...Y n1 ZnM ...Zn1 of(












induced by the encoder described in Section 3.3.2
is statistically close to the distribution pV n1 ...V nKY nK ...Y n1 ZnM ...Zn1 of the original DMS from
which the polarization sets were defined. Finally, in steps three and four, we prove that the
PCS satisfy the reliability and the strong secrecy conditions given in Equation (3.4) and
Equation (3.5), respectively. On the other hand, the proof of Corollary 3.4 is immediate.
Transmission Rates












∣∣H(n)V`|V`−1ZM ∣∣− limn→∞ 1n ∣∣H(n)V`|V`−1Y` ∣∣
(c)= I(V`;Y`|V`−1)− I(V`;ZM |V`−1),
where (a) follows from the definition of the set I(n)` in Equation (3.26), (b) holds because, by
Proposition 3.4, H(n)V`|V`−1ZM ⊇ H
(n)
V`|V`−1Y` for any ` ∈ [1,K], and (c) holds by Theorem 2.1.
Distribution of the DMS after the polar encoding
Let q̃Un1 ...UnK be the distribution of (Ũ
n
1 , . . . , Ũ
n
K) after the encoding in Section 3.3.2. The
following lemma shows that q̃Un1 ...UnK and pUn1 ...UnK of the original DMS given in Equation (3.20)
are nearly statistically indistinguishable for sufficiently large n and, consequently, so are the
overall distributions q̃V n1 ...V nKY nK ...Y n1 ZnM ...Zn1 and pV n1 ...V nKY nK ...Y n1 ZnM ...Zn1 .
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Lemma 3.2. Let δn = 2−n





V(q̃Un1 ...UnK , pUn1 ...UnK ) ≤ δ
(n)
ld-nls,
V(q̃V n1 ...V nKY nK ...Y n1 ZnM ...Zn1 , pV n1 ...V nKY nK ...Y n1 ZnM ...Zn1 ) = V(q̃Un1 ...UnK , pUn1 ...UnK ) ≤ δ
(n)
ld-nls,













Proof. For the first claim, see Lemma 2.3 and Corollary 2.1 taking TV , K. The second claim
holds by Corollary 2.2 because q̃V n1 ...V nKY nK ...Y n1 ZnM ...Zn1 ≡ q̃V n1 ...V nKpY nK ...Y n1 ZnM ...Zn1 |Xn .
Remark 3.4. The first term of δ(n)ld-nls models the impact on the total variation distance of using




. The second term bounds the impact of storing















be marginals of q̃V n1 ...V nKY nK ...Y n1 ZnM ...Zn1 and pV n1 ...V nKY nK ...Y n1 ZnM ...Zn1 ,


































k ) 6= (Un` , Y nk )}
due to the invertibility of Gn. Furthermore, for all ` ∈ [1, k], we define the error event
EV̂ n
`
, {V̂ n` 6= Ṽ n` }, and EV̂ n0 , ∅. Hence, for any ` ∈ [1, k], the average probability of
incorrectly decoding the message W` at the k-th receiver can be upper-bounded as
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)C] is available to legitimate Receiver k and (L(n)V`|V`−1Y`)C ⊇ (L(n)V`|V`−1Yk)C,
and we have assumed V̂ n`−1 = Ṽ n`−1; (c) holds by the optimal coupling and by Lemma 3.2;
and (d) holds by induction. Thus, by the union bound, we obtain
P
[














Consequently, if K  n, the PCS satisfies the reliability condition in (3.4) because the







The secrecy condition in Equation 3.5 requires Eavesdropper m ∈ [1,M ] to be kept ignorant
about all messages {Wm}Mm=1. Due to the existence of the source of common randomness
for each encoding layer, the information leakage at Eavesdropper m ∈ [1,M ] is given by
I
(
W1 . . .WK ; Z̃nmF1 . . . FK
)
. Hence, for sufficiently large n we have
I
(
































∣∣I(n)` ∪ F (n)` ∣∣−H(U1[I(n)1 ∪ F (n)1 ] . . . UK[I(n)K ∪ F (n)K ]∣∣Znm)











where (a) holds by independence between {Wk}Kk=1 and {Fk}Kk=1; (b) follows from the
encoding in Algorithm 3.3; (c) holds by the uniformity of {Wk}Kk=1 and {Fk}Kk=1; (d) follows
from applying Lemma 2.4 (taking TV , K and TO , 1) and by Lemma 3.2; and (e) holds
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and then by the definition of I(n)` and F
(n)
` , which according to Proposition 3.4 are subsets
of HV`|V`−1Zm for any ` ∈ [1,K] and m ∈ [1,M ].





) n→∞−−−−→ 0 for Eaves-
dropper m ∈ [1,M ]. Consequently, the PCS satisfies the strong secrecy condition given in
Equation (3.5), and the proof of Theorem 3.2 is concluded.
3.4 Polar construction and performance evaluation
In this section, we discuss further how to construct the polar codes for the DBC-NLD-LS
and DBC-LD-NLS proposed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. Moreover, we evaluate
the reliability and the secrecy performance of both PCSs according to different parameters
involved in the polar code construction. As mentioned previously, although the construction
of polar codes has been covered in a large number of references (for instance, see [TV13,
VVH15, HY13]), they only focus on polar codes under reliability constraints.
For the DBC-NLD-LS, we consider the Binary Erasure Broadcast Channel (BE-BC),
where each individual channel is a BEC. On the other hand, for the DBC-LD-NLS, we consider
the Binary Symmetric Broadcast Channel (BS-BC), where each individual channel is a Binary
Symmetric Channel (BSC). Throughout this section, as in [Ari09], we say that a channel or
a distribution pY |X(y|x) with x ∈ X , {0, 1} and y ∈ Y , {0, . . . , |Y| − 1} is symmetric if
the columns of the probability transition matrix PY |X ,
[
pY |X(0|0) · · · pY |X(|Y| − 1|0)
pY |X(0|1) · · · pY |X(|Y| − 1|1)
]
can be grouped into sub-matrices such that for each sub-matrix, each row is a permutation
of each other row and each column is a permutation of each other column. Consequently,
notice that the individual channels of both the BE-BC and the BS-BC are symmetric.
Due to the symmetry of BE-BC, we will see that the distribution induced by the
encoding described in Section 3.2.2 for the DBC-NLD-LS will approach exactly the optimum
distribution of the original DMS used in the polar code construction. Consequently, the
performance of the polar code will depend only on the parameters involved in this construction.
On the other hand, despite the symmetry of the BS-BC, due to the superposition-based
structure, the encoding described in Section 3.3.2 for the DBC-LD-NLS only approaches
the target distribution asymptotically. Hence, this encoding will impact the reliability and
secrecy performance of the polar code when we consider a finite blocklength.
3.4.1 DBC-NLD-LS
For this model, we consider BE-BC with two legitimate receivers (K = 2) and two eaves-
droppers (M = 2). Therefore, each individual channel is a BEC with X , {0, 1} and
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Yk = Zm , {0, 1, E}, E being the erasure symbol and k,m ∈ {1, 2}. The individual channels
are defined simply by their erasure probability, which is denoted by εYk for the corresponding
legitimate Receiver k (P[Yk = E] = εYk) and εZm for the Eavesdropper m (P[Zm = E] = εZm).
Due to the degradedness condition of the broadcast channel given in Equation (3.1), we
have εY2 < εY1 < εZ2 < εZ1 . By properly applying [BB11] (Proposition 3.2), it is easy to
shown that the secrecy-capacity achieving distribution p?X for this model is the uniform,
i.e., p?X(x) = 12 ∀x ∈ {0, 1}. For the simulations, we consider a BE-BC such that εY2 = 0.01,
εY1 = 0.04, εZ2 = 0.2 and εZ1 = 0.35. For this setting, the corner point (R?1, R?2) of the
secrecy-capacity region of Corollary 3.1 is such that R?1 = 0.15 and R?2 = 0.16.
Practical polar code construction
According to [Ari09] (Proposition 5) the Bhattacharyya parameters associated with the sets
in Equations (3.7)–(3.11) can be computed exactly because each individual channel is a BEC.
Moreover, by Lemma 2.1, this Bhattacharyya parameters match exactly with the entropy
terms due to the symmetry of the BEC.
Given the blocklength n and the distribution p?XY2Y1Z2Z1 , the goal of the polar code
construction is to obtain the partition of the universal set [1, n] defined in (3.12)–(3.16)
and graphically represented in Figure 3.3. Hence, we need to define first the required sets
of indices defined in Equations (3.7)–(3.11), which means having to compute the entropy
terms {H(U(j)|U1:j−1)}nj=1, {H(U(j)|U1:j−1Y n1 )}nj=1 and {H(U(j)|U1:j−1Znm)}nj=1 for all
m ∈ {1, 2} associated with the polar transform Un = XnGn. Since each individual channel
is a symmetric BEC, we can compute exactly the previous terms with very low complexity.
To do so, we use the recursive algorithm [VVH15] (PCC-0) adapted to the BEC, which,
for instance, will obtain {H(U(j)|U1:j−1Y n1 )}nj=1 from the initial value H(X|Y1) = εY1 .
Regarding {H(U(j)|U1:j−1)}nj=1, since p?X is uniform, it is clear that H(U(j)|U1:j−1) = 1
for all j ∈ [1, n], which means H(n)X = [1, n]. Consequently, the set T (n) of the partition
in (3.12)–(3.16) is empty (T (n) = ∅) and, hence, according to Algorithm 3.1 neither random
nor deterministic SC encoding will be needed.
In order to compare the performance of the PCS according to different parameters and









, where δ(r)n , 2−n
β(r) and δ(s)n , 2−n





Let (R′1, R′2) such that R′1 ≤ R?1 and R′2 ≤ R?2 denote the target rates that the PCS must
approach. Since the PCS must operate at particular rates (R′1, R′2), and not necessarily





j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
U(j)
∣∣U1:j−1Y n1 ) ≤ 1− δ(s)n }, where one can notice that we have
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used δ(s)n . Then, we form I(n)2 by taking the dnR′2e indices j ∈
(
H(n)X|Y1
)C that correspond to
the highest entropy terms {H(U(j)|U1:j−1Zn2 )}nj=1 associated to Eavesdropper 2. Second,
we form I(n)1 by taking the dnR′1e indices j ∈
(
H(n)X|Y1
)C \ I(n)2 that correspond to the




)C \ (I(n)1 ∪ I(n)2 ) and F (n) = H(n)X|Y1 . Furthermore, in order to evaluate the
reliability performance, we define L(n)X|Y1 ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
U(j)
∣∣U1:j−1Y n1 ) ≤ δ(r)n }, where
one can notice that we have used δ(r)n . Since the additional secret sequence Φ corresponds to
those entries whose indices belong to
(
H(n)X|Y1
)C \ L(n)X|Y1 , its length will depend on (δ(r)n , δ(s)n ).
According to the polar code construction proposed in this section, notice that δ(s)n must be
small enough to guarantee that 1n
∣∣(H(n)X|Y1)C∣∣ ≥ R′1 +R′2.
Performance evaluation










T (n) = ∅ (we do not use SC encoding) and the encoder will store uniformly-distributed
sequences into entries U(j) that satisfy H(U(j)|U1:j−1) = 1 for all j ∈ H(n)X = [1, n].









) = 0, and the performance only
depends on the code construction.
To evaluate the reliability performance, we obtain an upper-bound P ub(1)b on the average















∣∣U1:j−1Y n1 ), (3.34)
where we have used the fact that U
[(
L(n)X|Y1
)C] is available to legitimate Receiver 1,
[Ari10] (Theorem 2) to tight the bound in (3.18), and Lemma 2.1. Because of the de-
gradedness condition of the BE-BC and, consequently, by Proposition 3.3, the average bit
error probability at legitimate Receiver 2 will be always less than the one at legitimate
Receiver 1. Since SC decoding requires both legitimate receivers to estimate all the entries
belonging to L(n)X|Y1 regardless of
(
H(n)X|Y1
)C and the target rates (R′1, R′2), the reliability
performance for the proposed code construction only depends on the pair (n, δ(r)n ).
In order to evaluate the secrecy performance, from Equation (3.19), we compute an
upper-bound Iub(W1W2; Z̃n1 F ) on the information leakage corresponding to Eavesdropper 1:
Iub(W1W2; Z̃n1 F ) ,
2∑
i=1
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where we have applied the chain rule and the fact that conditioning does not increase
the entropy to tight the bound in Equation (3.19). Similarly, we compute an upper-bound
Iub(W2; Z̃n2 F ) on the information leakage corresponding to Eavesdropper 2:
Iub(W2; Z̃n2 F ) ,






According to the proposed polar code construction, the secrecy performance will depend on
(n, δ(s)n ) and the rates (R′1, R′2), but not on δ
(r)
n .





∣∣∣(H(n)X|Y1)C \ L(n)X|Y1∣∣∣, (3.37)
which will depend on the triple (n, δ(r)n , δ(s)n ), but not on (R′1, R′2).








. In Figure 3.5A,B, we evaluate the upper-bounds on the information leakage
defined in Equations (3.35) and (3.36), respectively, as a function of the blocklength n for
different values of ρR. To do so, we set β(r) = 0.16 and β(s) = 0.30, which defines a particular
pair (δ(r)n , δ(s)n ) for each value of n (recall that δ(r)n does not impact on the secrecy performance
of the polar code). As we proved in Section 3.2.4, for large enough n, the secrecy performance
improves as n increases.
Moreover, to achieve a particular secrecy performance level, notice that the polar code
will require a larger blocklength n as the rates approach the capacity. This happens because,
given (n, δ(s)n ) and, consequently,
(
H(n)X|Y1
)C, the parameter ρR only determines the amount





)C. Since, by construction, we take those
indices corresponding to the highest entropy terms associated with the eavesdroppers, taking
more elements always increases the corresponding leakage.
For rates approaching the capacity and small values of n, notice that we obtain a secrecy
performance that is getting worse as n increases (for instance, for ρR = 0.94, we obtain
that the information leakage is increasing from n = 29 to n = 212). This behavior is
mainly explained because the elements of Un have not polarized enough for small values
of n. Consequently, for a given value of β(s), not all the entropy terms associated with the
eavesdroppers corresponding to the sets I(n)1 and I
(n)
2 are sufficiently close to one. Since, for
a given ρR, the cardinality of I(n)1 and I
(n)
2 increases with n, then the information leakage
can increase with n when it is not large enough. Moreover, since operating at lower rates
means taking a fewer number of indices in I(n)1 and I
(n)
2 , but taking those that are closest to
one, this behavior appears only for large values of ρR.
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ρR = 0.94 ρR = 0.90 ρR = 0.80 ρR = 0.70
Figure 3.5: Secrecy performance of the polar coding scheme for the DBC-NLD-LS over the BE-BC as a
function of the blocklength n and the normalized target rate ρR when we set β(r) = 0.16 and β(s) = 0.30.
(A) Upper-bound on the information about (W1,W2) leaked to Eavesdropper 1 defined as in Equation (3.35).
(B) Upper-bound on the information about W2 leaked to Eavesdropper 2 defined as in Equation (3.36).
The impact of δ(s)n on the secrecy performance is graphically represented in Figure 3.6A,B,
where the former plots the upper-bound defined in Equation (3.35) and the latter the bound
in Equation (3.36) as a function of the blocklength n for different values of β(s). Now, for
the simulations we set the parameters β(r) = 0.16 and ρR = 0.90.





































β(s) = 0.10 β(s) = 0.20 β(s) = 0.30
Figure 3.6: Secrecy performance of the polar coding scheme for the DBC-NLD-LS over the BE-BC as a
function of the blocklength n and β(s), which defines δ(s)n for each n, when we set β(r) = 0.16 and ρR = 0.90.
(A) Upper-bound on the information about (W1,W2) leaked to Eavesdropper 1 defined as in Equation (3.35).
(B) Upper-bound on the information about W2 leaked to Eavesdropper 2 defined as in Equation (3.36).
As can be seen in Figure 3.6, the secrecy performance improves as the value of β(s)
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increases (or equivalently, as δ(s)n decreases). This behavior is as expected because notice that
δ
(s)
n defines the value of the highest term H
(
U(j)
∣∣U1:j−1Y n1 ) that will belong to (H(n)X|Y1)C,
that is the set containing the possible candidates for I(n)1 ∪I
(n)
2 . Since the polar construction
chooses the indices that will belong to I(n)1 and I
(n)
2 by taking the ones corresponding to




∣∣U1:j−1Zn1 ) ≥ H(U(j)∣∣U1:j−1Zn2 ) ≥ H(U(j)∣∣U1:j−1Y n1 ) for any j ∈ [1, n], the sums
in Equations (3.35) and (3.36) over the indices j ∈ I(n)1 ∪ I
(n)
2 will be larger as β(s) increases
(as δ(s)n decreases), while their cardinality remains the same for a given ρR. Furthermore, note
that δ(s)n also defines F (n) = H(n)X|Y1 = {j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
U(j)
∣∣U1:j−1Y n1 ) > 1− δ(s)n }. Thus, the
larger is the value of β(s) (the lower is δ(s)n ), the smaller is the cardinality of F (n) and the
higher are the entropy terms associated with the eavesdroppers that will belong to this set.
Figure 3.7 plots the upper-bound on the average bit error probability at the legitimate
Receiver 1 defined in Equation (3.34) as a function of the blocklength n for different values
of β(r) (which defines a particular δ(r)n for each n). For this figure, we set β(s) = 0.30 and
ρR = 0.90. As can be seen in Figure 3.7, the higher is the value of β(r) (the smaller is the value
of δ(r)n ), the better is the reliability performance of the polar code. This is because δ(r)n defines
the higher entropy term associated with the legitimate Receiver 1 whose corresponding index
will belong to the set L(n)X|Y1 (recall that this set contains the indices of those entries that
the legitimate receivers have to estimate by using SC encoding). Hence, it is clear that the
upper-bound in Equation (3.34) is decreasing as δ(r)n decreases (as β(r) increases). Moreover,
as we have proven in Section 3.2.4, we can see that the reliability performance is always
improving as the blocklength n increases.





















β(r) = 0.08 β(r) = 0.16 β(r) = 0.26 β(r) = 0.36
Figure 3.7: Reliability performance of the polar coding scheme for the DBC-NLD-LS over the BE-BC as a
function of the blocklength n and β(r), which defines δ(r)n for each n, when we set β(s) = 0.30 and ρR = 0.90.
That is, the bound Pub(1)b on the average bit error probability at the legitimate Receiver 1 in Equation (3.34).
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Finally, how the values of the pair (β(r), β(s)), or equivalently, the values of (δ(r)n , δ(s)n ),
impact on the rate of the additional secret sequence Φ given in Equation (3.37) is represented
graphically in Figure 3.8. In Figure 3.8A, we set ρR = 0.90 and β(r) = 0.16, and we represent
the rate of Φ as a function of the blocklength n for different values of β(s). Otherwise, in
Figure 3.8B, we evaluate the rate of Φ as a function of n for different values of β(r) when
ρR = 0.90 and β(s) = 0.30. Recall that, by Theorem 2.1, this rate tends to be negligible for
sufficiently large n. Moreover, according to the polar code construction proposed previously,
for a fixed n, the cardinality of the set
(
H(n)X|Y1
)C \ L(n)X|Y1 will be higher for larger values
of (β(r), β(s))—or smaller values of (δ(r)n , δ(s)n ). Clearly, this behavior can be seen in Figure 3.8.




































Figure 3.8: Rate of the additional secret sequence Φ computed as in Equation (3.37) for the DBC-NLD-LS
over the BE-BC as a function of the blocklength n for different values of (β(r), β(s)), which defines (δ(r)n , δ
(s)
n )
for each n. (A) Rate of Φ for different values of β(s) when β(r) = 0.16 and ρR = 0.90. (B) Rate of Φ for
different values of β(r) when β(s) = 0.30 and ρR = 0.90.
In conclusion, Figures 3.5–3.8 show that, for a particular value of the blocklength n,
there is a trade-off between the reliability or the secrecy performance of the polar code
and the length of the additional secret sequence Φ, which can be controlled by the value of
β(r) or β(s), respectively, in the polar code construction. Moreover, for sufficiently large n,
the performance of the polar coding scheme always is improving as n increases. Indeed,
these figures show that one can transmit at rates very close to the capacity providing good
reliability and secrecy performance levels.
3.4.2 DBC-LD-NLS
For this model, we consider a BS-BC with two legitimate receivers (K = 2) and two
eavesdroppers (M = 2). Thus, each individual channel is a BSC where X = Yk = Zm = {0, 1},
and k,m ∈ {1, 2}. The individual channels are defined by their crossover probability, which
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is denoted by αYk for the corresponding legitimate Receiver k, that is
αYk , P[Yk = 0|X = 1] = P[Yk = 1|X = 0],
and αZm for the corresponding Eavesdropper m, that is
αZm , P[Zm = 0|X = 1] = P[Zm = 0|X = 1].
Due to the degradedness condition of the broadcast channel given in Equation (3.1), we have
αY2 < αY1 < αZ2 < αZ1 . Due to the symmetry of the channel, it is easy to prove by using
similar reasoning as in [CT12] (Example 15.6.5) and by properly applying [BB11] (Proposi-
tion 3.2) that the secrecy-capacity achieving distribution p?V X satisfies p?V (v) = p?X(x) = 12 for
all v, x ∈ {0, 1}, and consequently, p?X|V is symmetric. Thus, the input distribution p?X|V can
be characterized simply by the crossover probability αX|V , p?X|V (0|1) = p?X|V (1|0), where
0 ≤ αX|V ≤ 12 . Indeed, the overall rate in Proposition 3.2, that is, R1 + R2, is maximized
when αX|V = 12 , which implies that R1 = 0. Then, by taking αX|V <
1
2 , we can transfer
part of the rate associated with the message W2 to the rate R1, where R2 = 0 and R1 is
maximum if αX|V = 0. For the simulations, we consider a BS-BC with αY2 = 0.01, αY1 = 0.04,
αZ2 = 0.2 and αZ1 = 0.35. We set αX|V = 0.1084, which corresponds to the distribution that
maximizes ln(R1) + ln(R2) for this particular channel (proportional fair allocation). Thus,
according to Corollary 3.2, the maximum achievable rates are R?1 = 0.2507 and R?2 = 0.3254.
From [Ari09] (Proposition 5), we know that the previous method used for the DBC-NLD-
LS to compute the exact values of the entropy terms for a BEC provides an upper-bound on
the entropy terms of the BSC. Although this method can be useful to construct polar codes
under reliability constraints [TV13, VVH15, HY13], it fails when the code must guarantee
some secrecy condition based on the information leakage. Indeed, in order to upper-bound
the information leakage in Equation (3.33), notice that we need a lower-bound on the entropy
terms. Hence, for this model, we focus more on proposing a new polar code construction.
Practical polar code construction
Given the blocklength n and the distribution p?V XY2Y1Z2Z1 , the goal of the polar code cons-
truction is to obtain the partition of the universal set [1, n] defined in Equations (3.26)–(3.29)
and graphically represented in Figure 3.4. Hence, we need to define first the sets in Equa-
tions (3.21)–(3.25), which means having to compute the entropy terms {H(U1(j)|U1:j−11 )}nj=1,




2 )}nj=1 associated with the polar transform
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{H(U2(j)|U1:j−12 V nY n2 )}nj=1 and {H(U2(j)|U
1:j−1
2 V
nZn2 )}nj=1 associated with the polar
transform Un2 = XnGn for the second layer. In the following, we propose an adaptation
of the Monte Carlo method [VVH15] (PCC-1), which is based on the butterfly algorithm
described in [Ari09] for SC decoding, to directly estimate these entropy terms.
Monte-Carlo method to estimate the entropy terms. First, consider the entropy terms
associated to the first layer. As for the previous model, since p?V (v) = 12 for all v ∈ {0, 1},





and {H(U1(j)|U1:j−11 Znm)}nj=1 for some k,m ∈ {1, 2}, we run the Monte Carlo simulation as
follows. First, due to the symmetry of the channel and the symmetry of p?X|V , as in [VVH15]
(PCC-1), we can set vn = un1 = 0n at each iteration. For the realization τ ∈ [1, Nτ ], Nτ
being the number of realizations, we randomly generate yn(τ)k and z
n(τ)




, respectively (by abuse of notation, we use (τ) in any sequence an(τ) to emphasize







j=1 by using the algorithm [VVH15] (PCC-1). For instance,
consider {L(τ)Yk|V (j)}
n


























∀j ∈ [1, n],
where (a) follows from the fact that p?U1(j)(u) =
1
2 for u ∈ {0, 1} because H(U1(j)|U
1:j−1
1 ) = 1.
Hence, we can obtain p?
U1(j)|U1:j−11 Y nk
(0|0j−1yn(τ)k ) from L
(τ)
Yk|V (j), and since






(0|u1:j−11 , ynk )
)]
,
then, after Nτ realizations, we can estimate H(U1(j)|U1:j−11 , Y nk ) by computing the empirical
mean, that is,












Now, consider the Monte Carlo method to estimate {H(U2(j)|U1:j−12 V n)}nj=1,
{H(U2(j)|U1:j−12 V nY nk )}nj=1 and {H(U2(j)|U
1:j−1
2 V
nZnm)}nj=1 for any k,m ∈ {1, 2} asso-
ciated with the second layer. To obtain {H(U2(j)|U1:j−12 V n)}nj=1, we can see X and V as the
input and output random variables respectively of a symmetric channel with distribution p?V |X .
Now, although p?X is uniform and, consequently, H(U2(j)|U
1:j−1
2 ) = 1 for all j ∈ [1, n], notice
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that H(n)X|V 6= [1, n] and T
(n)
2 6= ∅ because H
(n)
X|V and its complementary set depend on p
?
X|V .




we can see (V, Yk) or (V,Zm) as the output of a symmetric channel with distribution p?V Yk|X
or p?V Zm|X , respectively, where notice that p
?











because V − X − Yk − Zm forms a Markov chain. Hence, due to the symmetry of the
previous distributions, we can set xn = un2 = 0n at each iteration. Then, for the realiza-
tion τ ∈ [1, Nτ ], we draw vn(τ), yn(τ)k and z
n(τ)
m from the distributions p?V n|Xn , pY nk |Xn and











j=1 by using [VVH15] (PCC-1). Similarly to the previous encoding layer,










from the corresponding log-likelihood ratios. Finally, after Nτ realizations, we can estimate
the corresponding entropy terms by computing the empirical mean of the binary entropy
function associated with each of the above probabilities.
Partition of the universal set. In order to provide more flexibility on the design, now we
introduce (δ(1,r)n , δ(1,s)n ) for the first layer, where δ(1,r)n , 2−n
β(1,r) and δ(1,s)n , 2−n
β(1,s) for




n ) and (δ(2,L)n , δ(2,H)n ),
where δ(2,r)n , 2−n
β(2,r) , δ(2,s)n , 2−n
β(2,s) , δ(2,L)n , 2−n
β(2,L) and δ(2,H)n , 2−n
β(2,H) for some
β(2,r), β(2,s), β(2,L), β(2,H) ∈ (0, 12 ).
Consider the partition of [1, n] for the first layer (` = 1 in Equations (3.26)–(3.29)). As
mentioned before, since p?V (v) = 12 , we have H
(n)
V = [1, n] and T
(n)
1 = ∅. Let R′1 ≤ R?1
denotes the target rate of message W1 that the PCS must approach. Since this PCS does not
necessarily operate at the secrecy-capacity, we obtain the partition in (3.26)–(3.29) as follows.
First, we define (H(n)V |Y1)
C , {j ∈ [1, n] : H(U1(j)|U1:j−11 Y n1 ) ≤ 1− δ
(1,s)
n }. Then, we choose
I(n)1 by taking the dnR′1e indices j ∈ (H
(n)
V |Y1)
C that correspond to the highest entropy terms
















V |Y1 . To evaluate




1 ) ≤ δ
(1,r)
n }.
Consider the partition of [1, n] for the second layer (` = 2 in Equations (3.26)–(3.29)).
Since H(n)X|V 6= [1, n] and T
(n)
2 6= ∅, let H
(n)
X|V , {j ∈ [1, n] : H(U2(j)|U
1:j−1
2 V
n) ≥ 1− δ(2,H)n }
and L(n)X|V , {j ∈ [1, n] : H(U2(j)|U
1:j−1
2 V
n) ≤ δ(2,L)n }, where we have used δ(2,H)n and
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δ
(2,L)
n , respectively. Let R′2 ≤ R?2 denote the target rate corresponding to W2. We define
(H(n)X|V Y2)
C , {j ∈ H(n)X|V : H(U2(j)|U
1:j−1
2 , V
n, Y n2 ) ≤ 1 − δ
(2,s)
n }. Then, we choose I(n)2 by





)C that correspond to the highest entropy terms





n must guarantee |H(n)X|V | ≥ |(H
(n)
X|V Y2)






and F (n)2 , H
(n)
X|V Y2 . Finally, in order to evaluate the reliability performance, we define
L(n)X|V Y2 , {j ∈ [n] : H(U2(j)|U
1:j−1
2 V




The encoding at the first layer will induce a distribution q̃V n ≡ pV n . For the second layer,
the entries U2[H(n)X|V ] of the original DMS only are almost independent of V
n because
H(U2(j)|U1:j−12 V n) ≤ 1 − δ
(2,H)
n for j ∈ H(n)X|V . Nevertheless, the encoder will construct
Ũ2[H(n)X|V ] by storing uniformly-distributed sequences that are totally independent of V
n.
On the other hand, since L(n)X|V ⊆ T
(n)
2 6= ∅, the encoder will use deterministic SC encoding
to construct Ũ2[L(n)X|V ]. Therefore, according to Lemma 3.2 and Remark 3.4, we will have
Vq̃p? , V(q̃V nXnY n2 Y n1 Zn2 Zn1 , p
?







) 6= 0 for a finite n. As seen in Section 3.3.4,
this total variation distance impacts on the performance. Hence, we define the following


















Consider dub(L)TV , which corresponds to the analytic bound found in Lemma 2.6. For the
simulations, we can use the Monte Carlo method and compute the empirical mean to obtain
















∣∣ǔ1:j−1(τ ′)2 v̌n(τ ′))), (3.38)
where (v̌n(τ ′), ǔn(τ
′)
2 ) must be drawn at each iteration τ ′ ∈ [1, Nτ ′ ] according to (2.17),
the set L(n)X|V has been obtained previously in the polar code construction and, according




n(τ ′)). Due to the
symmetry of p?V |X , the probabilities p?U2(j)|U1:j−12 V n
can be obtained with low complexity by
means of the butterfly algorithm described in [Ari09].
Consider now dub(H)TV , which corresponds to the analytic bound found in Lemma 2.5. We
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can compute exactly the Kullback-Leibler divergence as in (2.18) from the corresponding
















According to the polar code construction,
∣∣L(n)X|V ∣∣ and ∣∣H(n)X|V ∣∣ will depend only on the values of
δ
(2,L)






















∣∣(H(n)X|V )C \ L(n)X|V ∣∣ increases with (β(2,L), β(2,H)), and the encoder
described in Algorithm (3.3) will require more randomness to form Ũ2
[(
H(n)X|V
)C \ L(n)X|V ].
To evaluate the reliability performance, from Equation (3.31) we obtain the following













∣∣U1:j−11 Y n1 ). (3.40)



















∣∣U1:j−12 V nY n2 )∣∣L(n)X|V Y2 ∣∣ . (3.41)
To evaluate the secrecy performance, from Equation (3.33) we compute a tight upper-bound
Iub(W1W2; Z̃n2 F1F2) on the information leakage for Eavesdropper 2:












∣∣U1:j−1` V n` Zn` )), (3.42)
Due to the degradedness condition of the BS-BC, the information leakage corresponding to
Eavesdropper 1 will be always less than the one of Eavesdropper 2.








∣∣(H(n)V |Y1)C \ L(n)V |Y1∣∣+ 1n ∣∣(H(n)X|V Y2)C \ L(n)X|V Y2∣∣). (3.43)
The performance of the polar coding scheme is graphically shown in Figure 3.9. As for
the previous model, let ρR be the normalized target rate in which the PCS operates, that is








. In Figure 3.9A, we evaluate the upper-bound on the information leakage
defined in Equation (3.42) when we consider dubTV = 0, as a function of the blocklength n
for different values of ρR. For this plot, we set β(1,s) = 0.30 and β(2,s) = 0.36. Notice that
(β(1,r), β(2,r)), and (β(2,L), β(2,H)) if we consider dubTV = 0, will not impact on the information
leakage. As we have showed in Section 3.3.4, the secrecy performance is improving as n
increases. Moreover, to satisfy a particular secrecy performance level, the polar code will
need higher values of n as the target rates approach the capacity.


































































































Figure 3.9: Performance of the PCS for the DBC-LD-NLS over the BS-BC as a function of the blocklength n
when β(1,r) = β(2,r) = 0.24, β(1,s) = 0.30, β(2,s) = 0.36 and β(2,L) = β(2,H) = 0.36. (A) Upper-bound on the
information about (W1,W2) leaked to Eavesdropper 2 defined as in Equation (3.42) for different normalized
target rates ρR when we set dubTV = 0. (B) Upper-bounds on the average error probability at legitimate
Receivers 1 and 2 defined as in Equations (3.40) and (3.41), respectively, when dubTV = 0. (C) Overall rate of
{Φ1,Φ2} computed as in Equation (3.43). (D) Terms dub(H)TV and d
ub(L)
TV that contribute to the bound on the
total variation distance dubTV defined as in Equations (3.38) and (3.39), respectively.
In Figure 3.9B, we evaluate the upper-bounds P ub(1)b and P
ub(2)
b , which correspond
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to the bounds on the average bit error probability for the legitimate Receivers 1 and 2,
respectively, when we set dubTV = 0, as a function of the blocklength n. For this plot, we set
β(1,r) = β(2,r) = 0.24 and, according to the polar code construction, recall that the reliability
performance will not depend on the values of (β(1,s), β(2,s)) and ρR. If we set dubTV = 0,
then it is clear that it will not depend on (β(2,L), β(2,H)) either. As shown theoretically in
Section 3.3.4, the error probability becomes lower as the blocklength n increases.
Figure 3.9C plots the overall rate of the additional secret sequences computed as in
Equation (3.43) when we set β(1,r) = β(2,r) = 0.24, β(1,s) = 0.30 and β(2,s) = 0.36. We can
see that this rate tends to be negligible for n sufficiently large.
Finally, Figure 3.9D plots the upper-bounds dub(L)TV and d
ub(H)
TV defined in Equa-
tions (3.38) and (3.39), respectively, when we set β(2,L) = β(2,H) = 0.36. As we have
proven theoretically in Lemma 3.2, notice that the total variation distance will decay with the
blocklength n. Precisely, notice that dub(L)TV is lower than d
ub(H)
TV and, indeed, the bound on the
total variation distance is practically governed by dub(H)TV (dubTV ≈ d
ub(H)
TV ). This happens be-
cause although we can compute exactly the Kullback-Leibler divergence as in Equation (2.18)
from the entropy terms estimated in the polar code construction, Pinsker’s inequality to
obtain dub(H)TV as in Equation (3.39) can be too loose for n not large enough. Consider the
impact of dubTV on the reliability performance of the code. The average error probability
bounds in Equations (3.40) and (3.41) are modeled as the sum of two terms, one depending
directly on dubTV and the other depending on the polar construction (which has been plotted
in Figure 3.9B). Since dub(H)TV is too loose, we obtain that the reliability performance of the
code will be governed practically by the bound dubTV for small values of the blocklength n.
Now, consider the impact of dubTV on the secrecy performance of the code. The bound on
the information leakage in Equation (3.42) is modeled as the sum of two terms, one also
depending only on the polar code construction (which has been plotted in Figure 3.9A)
and the other depending on dubTV. However, in this situation, dubTV impacts the information
leakage approximately as ndubTV, which means that this term will totally govern the secrecy
performance. Recall that this term follows from Lemma 2.4, which bounds the impact of the
encoding described in Algorithm 3.3 on the information leakage as a function of the total
variation distance.
3.5 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we have described two polar coding schemes for two different models over the
degraded broadcast channel: DBC-NLD-LS and DBC-LD-NLS. For both models, we have
proven that the proposed PCSs are asymptotically secrecy-capacity achieving, providing
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reliability and strong secrecy. Then, we have discussed how to construct these polar codes
in practice, and we have evaluated their performance for finite blocklength by means of
simulations. Although several polar code constructions methods have been proposed in the
literature, as far as we know it is the the first attempt to discuss practical constructions
for polar codes that must satisfy both reliability and secrecy constraints. In addition, we
have evaluated the secrecy performance of the polar code by evaluating the strong secrecy
condition, which has been possible by obtaining an upper-bound on the corresponding
information leakage at the eavesdroppers. Indeed, we have shown that the proposed PCSs
can perform well in practice for a finite blocklength.
For convenience, we have described a PCS that provides reliability and strong secrecy
in one block of size n, which is only possible if the system model provides a source of
common randomness and an additional medium for which transmitter can secretly convey a
problematic sequence of the encoding to legitimate receivers. Fortunately, we have showed that
this additionally transmission incurs a negligible rate penalty. It may be worth mentioning
that if one consider a system where transmission takes places over several blocks of size n
then the source of common randomness could be reused at each block without worsening
the performance, and the rate of the previous additional transmission could be reduced
by using a chaining construction in a similar manner as in Section 2.3 for the symmetric
DWTC. As mentioned in Remark 3.2, recall that only the part of the problematic sequence
that is uniformly distributed could be repeated by means of the chaining construction.
Moreover, notice in both models that the legitimate receivers have to reliably decode the
local randomness; therefore, we can substitute this randomness by a uniformly distributed
common message without any secrecy requirement.
The PCSs described for both models aim to minimize the amount of random decisions
for SC encoding. The use of common randomness may seem contradictory with the previous
objective, but notice that these two types of randomness have different implications on the
practical design: while the common randomness is uniformly distributed and can be provided
by the communication system, the randomness for SC encoding is not and must be drawn by
the encoder, which implies a significant increase of the encoding complexity.
Despite the good performance of the PCSs showed in Section 3.4, some issues still persist.
How to avoid sending the additional secret sequences is a problem that remains open. Despite
this transmission is negligible in terms of rate, it can be problematic in practical scenarios.
Furthermore, despite the rate of the amount of randomness required for SC encoding is
negligible, how to replace the random decisions entirely by deterministic ones is a problem
that still remains unsolved. Lastly, in order to design polar codes based on the proposed
performance evaluation of Section 3.4, it might seem necessary to find tighter upper-bounds
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on the total variation distance between the distribution induced by the encoder and the
original distribution used in the code construction. Also, for the secrecy performance analysis,
it would be interesting to find a tighter upper-bound to measure the impact of the distortion
introduced by the encoding on the information leakage.
Finally, as pointed out in Section 1.1, one of the main drawbacks of information-theoretic
security is the requirement of transmitter having to know the statistics of eavesdropper
channels. Nevertheless, for the polar code construction, one can consider virtual eavesdroppers
with some target channel qualities. For DBC-LD-NLS, one can design a polar code according
to the statistics of a virtual eavesdropper, and due to the degradedness condition of the
channel, this code will perform well if the real eavesdroppers have worse channel quality
(worst-case design). On the other hand, for the DBC-NLD-LS, one can simply consider
different levels of secrecy depending on different target channel qualities. Depending on the
channel quality of the real eavesdropper with respect to the virtual ones considered for the
design, the polar coding scheme will provide a particular secrecy performance level.

4
Polar coding for common message only wiretap broadcast
channel
This chapter provides a polar coding scheme that allows to transmit strongly confidential
common information to two legitimate receivers over the Wiretap Broadcast Channel (WTBC).
The PCS is based mainly on the one introduced in [CB16] for the BCC and described in
Section 2.4 for the general WTC. Since no degradedness condition is assumed for the
channel model, the transmission will take place over several blocks and the use of a chaining
construction is required to convey non-negligible problematic elements to the legitimate
receivers. Also, the PCS aims to use the optimal amount of randomness in the encoding and,
consequently, it uses deterministic SC encoding. In order to construct an explicit PCS that
provides strong secrecy, the distribution induced by the encoder must be close in terms of
statistical distance to the original one considered for the code construction.
The particularization of the PCS described in [CB16] is not straightforward for the model
proposed in this chapter. Specifically, we propose a new chaining construction that is crucial
to secretly transmit common information to different legitimate receivers when the channel
of one of them is not degraded with respect to the other. This construction introduces new
bidirectional dependencies between encoding random variables of adjacent blocks that must
be considered carefully in the secrecy analysis. Indeed, we need to make use of an additional
secret key of negligible size in terms of rate that is privately shared between transmitter and
legitimate receivers, which will be used to prove that dependencies between blocks can be
broken and, therefore, the strong secrecy condition will be satisfied.
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 introduces the channel
model formally. Section 4.2 describes the proposed PCS, and Section 4.3 proves that this
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PCS achieves the best known inner-bound on the secrecy-capacity of this model. Finally, the
concluding remarks are presented in Section 4.4.
4.1 Channel model and achievable region
Formally, a WTBC (X , pY(1)Y(2)Z|X ,Y(1)×Y(2)×Z) with 2 legitimate receivers and an external
eavesdropper is characterized by the probability transition function pY(1)Y(2)Z|X , where X ∈ X
denotes the channel input, Y(k) ∈ Y(k) denotes the channel output corresponding to the
legitimate Receiver k ∈ [1, 2], and Z ∈ Z denotes the channel output corresponding to the
eavesdropper. We consider a model, namely Common Information over the Wiretap Broadcast
Channel (CI-WTBC), in which the transmitter wishes to send a private message W and a
confidential message S to both legitimate receivers. A code
(
d2nRW e, d2nRSe, d2nRRe, n
)
for













(needed to confuse the
eavesdropper about the confidential message S), an encoding function f :W ×S ×R → Xn
that maps (w, s, r) to a codeword xn, and two decoding functions g(1) and g(2) such that
g(k) : Yn(k) → W × S (k ∈ [1, 2]) maps the k-th legitimate receiver observations yn(k) to the
estimates (ŵ(k), ŝ(k)). The reliability condition to be satisfied by this code is measured in





(W,S) 6= (Ŵ (k), Ŝ(k))
]
= 0, k ∈ [1, 2]. (4.1)
The strong secrecy condition is measured in terms of the information leakage and is given by
lim
n→∞
I (S;Zn) = 0. (4.2)
This model is graphically illustrated in Figure 4.1. A triple of rates (RW , RS , RR) ∈ R3+ will
be achievable for the CI-WTBC if there exists a sequence of (d2nRW e, d2nRSe, d2nRRe, n)












Figure 4.1: Channel model: CI-WTBC.
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The achievable rate region is defined as the closure of the set of all achievable rate triples
(RW , RS , RR). The following proposition defines an inner-bound on this region.
Proposition 4.1 (Adapted from [CEG12, WO15]). The region RCI-WTBC defined by the union
over the triples of rates (RW , RS , RR) ∈ R3+ satisfying
RW +RS ≤ min
{





I(V ;Y(1)), I(V ;Y(2))
}
− I(V ;Z),
RW +RR ≥ I(X;Z),
RR ≥ I(X;Z|V ),
where the union is taken over all distributions pV X such that V −X − (Y(1), Y(2), Z) forms a
Markov chain, defines an inner-bound on the achievable region of the CI-WTBC.
In this model, the private message W introduces part of the randomness required to
confuse the eavesdropper about the confidential message S, and the randomization sequence
R denotes the additional randomness that is required for channel prefixing.
4.2 Polar coding scheme
Let (V ×X ×Y(1)×Y(2)×Z, pV XY(1)Y(2)Z) denote the DMS that represents the input (V,X)
and output (Y(1), Y(2), Z) random variables of the CI-WTBC, where |V| = |X | , 2. Without
loss of generality, and to avoid the trivial case RS = 0 in Proposition 4.1, we assume that
H(V |Z) > H(V |Y(1)) ≥ H(V |Y(2)). (4.3)
If H(V |Y(1)) < H(V |Y(2)), one can simply exchange the role of Y(1) and Y(2) in the PCS
described in Section 4.2. We propose a PCS that achieves the following rate triple,
(RW , RS , RR) = (I(V ;Z), I(V ;Y(1))− I(V ;Z), I(X;Z|V )), (4.4)
which corresponds to the one of the region in Proposition 4.1 such that the private and the
confidential message rate are maximum and the amount of randomness is minimum.
For the input random variable V , we define the polar transform An , V nGn and the sets
H(n)V ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
A(j)
∣∣A1:j−1) ≥ 1− δn}, (4.5)
H(n)V |Z ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
A(j)
∣∣A1:j−1Zn) ≥ 1− δn}, (4.6)
L(n)V |Y(k) ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
A(j)
∣∣A1:j−1Y n(k)) ≤ δn}, k = 1, 2. (4.7)
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For the input random variable X, we define Tn , XnGn and the associated sets
H(n)X|V ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
T (j)
∣∣T 1:j−1V n) ≥ 1− δn}. (4.8)
H(n)X|V Z ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
T (j)
∣∣T 1:j−1V nZn) ≥ 1− δn}. (4.9)









pT (j)|T 1:j−1V n(t(j)|t1:j−1, anGn)
)
.
Consider that the encoding takes place over L blocks indexed by i ∈ [1, L]. At the i-th
block, the encoder will construct Ãni , which will carry the private and the confidential messages
intended for both legitimate receivers. Additionally, the encoder will store into Ãni some
elements from Ãni−1 (if i ∈ [2, L]) and Ãni+1 (if i ∈ [1, L− 1]) so that both legitimate receivers
are able to reliably reconstruct Ãn1:L. Then, given Ṽ ni = Ãni Gn, the encoder will perform the
polar-based channel prefixing to construct T̃ni . Finally, it will obtain X̃ni = T̃ni Gn, which will
be transmitted over the WTBC inducing the channel output observations (Ỹ n(1),i, Ỹ n(2),i, Z̃ni ).
Consider the construction of Ãn1:L. Besides sets in (4.5)–(4.7), define the partition of H
(n)
V :
G(n) , H(n)V |Z , (4.10)





Moreover, we also define the following partition of the set G(n):
G(n)0 , G(n) ∩ L
(n)
V |Y(1) ∩ L
(n)
V |Y(2) , (4.12)
G(n)1 , G(n) ∩
(
L(n)V |Y(1)
)C ∩ L(n)V |Y(2) , (4.13)







G(n)1,2 , G(n) ∩
(
L(n)V |Y(1)
)C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(2))C, (4.15)
and the following partition of the set C(n):
C(n)0 , C(n) ∩ L
(n)
V |Y(1) ∩ L
(n)
V |Y(2) , (4.16)
C(n)1 , C(n) ∩
(
L(n)V |Y(1)
)C ∩ L(n)V |Y(2) , (4.17)







C(n)1,2 , C(n) ∩
(
L(n)V |Y(1)
)C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(2))C; (4.19)
These sets are graphically represented in Figure 4.2. Roughly speaking, A[H(n)V ] is the nearly
4.2. Polar coding scheme 71
uniformly distributed part of An. Thus, Ãi[H(n)V ], i ∈ [1, L], is suitable for storing uniformly
distributed random sequences. The sequence A[H(n)V |Z ] is almost independent of Z
n and,
hence, Ãi[G(n)] is suitable for storing information to be secured from the eavesdropper,
whereas Ãi[C(n)] is not. Sets in (4.12)–(4.19) with subscript 1 (sets inside the red curve in
Figure 4.2) form H(n)V ∩
(
L(n)V |Y(1)




)C. From Theorem 2.2, recall that Ãi[H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C] is the nearly
uniformly distributed part of the sequence Ãni required by legitimate Receiver k to reliably









Figure 4.2: Graphical representation of the sets in (4.10)–(4.19). The indices inside the soft and dark gray
area form G(n) and C(n) respectively. The indices that form H(n)V ∩ (L
(n)
V |Y(1)
)C are those inside the red curve,




For sufficiently large n, assumption (4.3) imposes the following restriction on the size of
the previous sets: ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ ≥ ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ > ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. (4.20)
The left-hand inequality in (4.20) holds from the fact that∣∣C(n)1 ∪ G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∪ G(n)2 ∣∣
=
∣∣∣H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C \ H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(2))C∣∣∣− ∣∣∣H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(2))C \ H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣∣− ∣∣∣H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(2))C∣∣∣ ≥ 0,
where the positivity holds by Theorem 2.1 because, for any k ∈ [1, 2], we have
1
n
∣∣∣H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C∣∣∣ = 1n ∣∣H(n)V |Y(k) ∣∣+ 1n ∣∣∣H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C \ H(n)V |Y(k) ∣∣∣ n→∞−−−−→ H(V |Y(k))
Similarly, the right-hand inequality in (4.20) holds by Theorem 2.1 and the fact that∣∣G(n)0 ∪ G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∪ C(n)1,2 ∣∣ = ∣∣∣H(n)V |Z \ H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣∣− ∣∣∣H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C \ H(n)V |Z∣∣∣
=
∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣− ∣∣∣H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣∣.
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Thus, according to (4.20), we must consider four cases:




2 | > |C
(n)
1 | and |G
(n)
0 | ≥ |C
(n)
1,2 |;




2 | > |C
(n)
1 | and |G
(n)
0 | < |C
(n)
1,2 |;




2 | ≤ |C
(n)
1 | and |G
(n)
0 | > |C
(n)
1,2 |;




2 | < |C
(n)
1 | and |G
(n)
0 | > |C
(n)
1,2 |.
4.2.1 General polar-based encoding
The generic encoding process for all cases is summarized in Algorithm 4.1. For i ∈ [1, L], let
Wi be a uniformly distributed vector of length |C(n)| that represents the private message.
The encoder forms Ãi[C(n)] by simply storing Wi. Indeed, if i ∈ [1, L− 1], notice that the
encoder forms Ãi+1[C(n)] before constructing Ãni entirely. From Ãi[C(n)], i ∈ [1, L], we define
Ψ(V )i , Ãi[C
(n)
2 ], (4.21)
Γ(V )i , Ãi[C
(n)
1,2 ], (4.22)
Θ(V )i , Ãi[C
(n)
1 ]. (4.23)
Notice that [Ψ(V )i ,Γ
(V )




1,2 ] is required by legitimate Receiver 2 to reliably




i ], if i ∈ [1, L− 1], conveniently in
Ãi+1[G(n)] (the function form_AG is responsible of the chaining construction and is described
later). On the other hand, [Θ(V )i ,Γ
(V )




1,2 ] is required by legitimate Receiver 1.
Nevertheless, in order to satisfy the strong secrecy condition in (4.2), [Θ(V )i ,Γ
(V )
i ], i ∈ [2, L], is
not repeated directly into Ãi−1[G(n)], but the encoder copies instead Θ̄(V )i and Γ̄
(V )
i obtained
as follows. Let κ(V )Θ and κ
(V )
Γ be uniformly distributed keys with length |C
(n)
1 | and |C
(n)
1,2 |
respectively that are privately shared between transmitter and both legitimate receivers. For
any i ∈ [2, L], we define the sequences










Since these secret keys are reused in all blocks, their size becomes negligible in terms of rate
for L large enough.
The function form_AG in Algorithm 4.1 constructs sequences Ã1:L[G(n)] differently de-
pending on which case, among cases A, B, C or D described before, characterizes the given
CI-WTBC. This part of the encoding is described in detail in Section 4.2.2 and Algorithm 4.2.
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Algorithm 4.1 Generic encoding scheme
Require: Private and confidential messages W1:L and S1:L; randomization sequences R1:L;





















3: Ψ(V )1 ,Γ
(V )
1 ← Ã1[C(n)]
4: for i = 1 to L do



















































13: if j ∈
(
H(n)V





15: else if j ∈ L(n)V then






19: Φ(V )(1),i ← Ãi
[(
H(n)V
)C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C]
20: Φ(V )(2),i ← Ãi
[(
H(n)V
















⊕ κ(V )ΥΦ(k) to Receiver k ∈ [1, 2]
24: return X̃n1:L
Then, given Ãi[C(n)∪G(n)], the encoder forms the remaining entries of Ãni , i.e., Ãi[(H
(n)
V )C],




j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
A(j)
∣∣A1:j−1) ≤ δn}, it constructs Ãi(j)
deterministically by using SC encoding, and only the part Ãi[(H(n)V )C \ L
(n)
V ] of Ãni is
constructed randomly.
Finally, given Ṽ ni = Ãni Gn, a randomization sequence Ri and a uniformly distributed
random sequence Λ(V )0 , the encoder performs the polar-based channel prefixing (function







. This part of the encoding is described in detail in Section 4.2.3.
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Furthermore, the encoder obtains the sequence
Φ(V )(k),i , Ãi
[(
H(n)V
)C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C] (4.26)
for any k ∈ [1, 2] and i ∈ [1, L], which is required by legitimate Receiver k to reliably estimate
Ãni entirely. Since Φ
(V )
(k),i is not nearly uniform, the encoder cannot make it available to the
legitimate Receiver k by means of the chaining structure. Also, the encoder obtains












The sequence Υ(V )(k) is required by legitimate Receiver k ∈ [1, 2] to initialize the decoding






⊕ κ(V )ΥΦ(k) to legitimate
Receiver k, where κ(V )ΥΦ(k) is a uniformly distributed key with size
L
∣∣∣(H(n)V )C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C∣∣∣
that is privately shared between transmitter and the corresponding receiver. In Section 4.3.1
we show that the length of κ(V )ΥΦ(1) and κ
(V )
ΥΦ(2) is asymptotically negligible in terms of rate.
4.2.2 Function form_AG
The function form_AG encodes the confidential messages S1:L and builds the chaining construc-






















































































For i ∈ [1, L], let Si denote a uniformly distributed vector that represents the confidential
message. The message S1 has size
∣∣I(n)∪G(n)1 ∪G(n)1,2 ∣∣; for i ∈ [2, L−1], Si has size ∣∣I(n)∣∣; and SL
has size
∣∣I(n) ∪ G(n)2 ∣∣. Also, for i ∈ [1, L], we write Ψ(V )i , [Ψ(V )1,i ,Ψ(V )2,i ], Γ(V )i , [Γ(V )1,i ,Γ(V )2,i ],
Θ̄(V )i ,
[




and Γ̄(V )i ,
[




, where we define Ψp,i, Γp,i, Θ̄p,i and Γ̄p,i, for
any p ∈ [1, 2], accordingly in each case.
This function, which is used in Case A to Case D, is described in Algorithm 4.2.
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Algorithm 4.2 Function form_AG

























Λ (depending on the case)
2: if i = 1 then Ã1[I(n) ∪ G(n)1 ∪ G
(n)
1,2 ]← S1
3: if i ∈ [2, L− 1] then Ãi[I(n)]← Si
4: if i = L then ÃL[I(n) ∪ G(n)2 ]← SL




i−1 (depending on the case)




i−1 (depending on the case)




i+1 (depending on the case)




i+1 (depending on the case)










11: if i ∈ [1, L− 1] then
12: Ãi[R(n)1 ]← Θ̄
(V )
1,i+1




15: if i ∈ [2, L] then
16: Ãi[R(n)2 ]← Ψ
(V )
1,i−1
17: Ãi[R′(n)2 ]← Γ
(V )
2,i−1
18: Ãi[R(n)S ]← Π
(V )
i−1




21: Π(V )i ← Ãi[I(n) ∩ G
(n)
2 ]
22: Λ(V )i ← Ãi[R
(n)
Λ ]












2 | > |C
(n)
1 | and |G
(n)
0 | ≥ |C
(n)
1,2 |. We define





















R(n)1,2 exist. Also, by (4.20), the set I(n) exists, and so will R
(n)
S because∣∣G(n)1 \ (R(n)2 ∪R′(n)2 )∣∣− ∣∣I(n) ∩ G(n)2 ∣∣ = ∣∣G(n)1 \ (R(n)2 ∪R′(n)2 )∣∣− ∣∣(G(n)2 \ R(n)1 ∪R′(n)1 )∣∣
=
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ ≥ 0.
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These sets that form the partition of G(n) in Case A can be seen in Figure 4.3, which









Block 1 Block 2
Block 3 Block 4
Figure 4.3: For Case A, graphical representation of the encoding that leads to the construction of Ã1:L[H(n)V ]








Λ are those areas filled with yellow squares,
blue circles, blue and yellow diamonds, pink crosses, and gray pentagons, respectively, and the set I(n) is the
green filled area. At Block i ∈ [1, L], Wi is represented by symbols of the same color (e.g., red symbols at




i are represented by squares, circles and triangles respectively. Also, Θ̄
(V )
i
and Γ̄(V )i are denoted by squares and triangles, respectively, with a line through them. At Block i ∈ [2, L− 1],
the diamonds denote Γ(V )1,i−1 ⊕ Γ̄
(V )
1,i+1. In Block i ∈ [1, L], Si is stored into those entries whose indices
belong to the green area. For i ∈ [1, L − 1], Π(V )i is denoted by crosses (e.g., purple crosses at Block 2),
and is repeated in Ãi+1[R(n)S ]. The sequence Λ
(V )
1 is represented by gray pentagons and is replicated in
all blocks. The sequences Υ(V )(1) and Υ
(V )
(2) are those entries inside the red at Block 1 and the blue curve at
Block L, respectively.






















From (4.18), we have C(n)2 ⊆ L
(n)
V |Y(1) \ L
(n)







needed by legitimate Receiver 2 to reliably reconstruct Ãni−1, but can be reliably inferred by
legitimate Receiver 1 given Ãi−1
[
(L(n)V |Y(1))
C]. Hence, according to Algorithm 4.2, the encoder
repeats the entire sequence Ψ(V )1,i−1 in Ãi
[
R(n)2 ] ⊆ Ãi[L
(n)





Similarly, from (4.17), we have C(n)1 ⊆ L
(n)
V |Y(2) \ L
(n)
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Hence, the encoder repeats the sequence Θ̄(V )1,i+1 in Ãi[R
(n)
1 ] ⊆ Ãi
[





Finally, from (4.19), C(n)1,2 ⊆ (L
(n)
V |Y(2))
C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))








are needed by both receivers to form Ãni−1 and Ãni+1 respectively.


















Since Γ(V )1,0 = Γ̄
(V )
1,L+1 = ∅, only Γ̄
(V )
1,2 is repeated at Block 1 and Γ
(V )
1,L−1 at Block L.
Moreover, part of secret message Si, i ∈ [1, L], is stored into some entries of Ãni whose
indices belong to G(n)2 . Thus, in any Block i ∈ [2, L], the encoder repeats





in Ãi[R(n)S ] ⊆ Ãi[L
(n)
V |Y(2) \ L
(n)
V |Y(1) ]. Also, it repeats





in Ãi[R(n)Λ ]. Hence, notice that Λ
(V )
1 is replicated in all blocks.
Case B
In this case,
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣ > ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣, ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ > ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ and ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣. We define R(n)1 and R(n)2 as
in (4.32) and (4.33) respectively, and R′(n)1,2 , ∅. Now, since
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣, only a part of
Γ(V )i−1 and Γ̄
(V )




. Thus, we define R(n)1,2 , G
(n)
0 and





∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, (4.37)





∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. (4.38)




2 . By (4.20),




1,2 = ∅, then I(n) ⊆ G
(n)
2 . Again by the
property in (4.20), R′(n)2 exists and so does R
(n)
S because∣∣G(n)1 \ (R(n)2 ∪R′(n)2 )∣∣− ∣∣(G(n)2 \ R(n)1 ∪R′(n)1 )∣∣
=
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− (∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣)− (∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− (∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣))
=
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ ≥ 0.
Indeed, since I(n) ⊆ G(n)2 , notice that
∣∣R(n)S ∣∣ = ∣∣I(n)∣∣. These sets that form the partition of
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Block 1 Block 2
Block 3 Block 4
Figure 4.4: For Case B, graphically representation of the encoding that leads to the construction of
Ã1:L[H
(n)















those areas filled with yellow squares, yellow triangles, blue circles, blue triangles, blue and yellow diamonds,
pink crosses, and gray pentagons, respectively, and I(n) is the green filled area with purple crosses. At
Block i ∈ [1, L], Wi is represented by symbols of the same color (e.g., red symbols at Block 2), and Θ(V )i ,
Ψ(V )i and Γ
(V )





by squares and triangles, respectively, with a line through them. At Block i ∈ [2, L− 1], the diamonds denote
Γ(V )1,i−1 ⊕ Γ̄
(V )
1,i+1. In Block i ∈ [1, L], Si is stored into those entries whose indices belong to the green area.
For i ∈ [2, L− 1], Π(V )i = Si and, therefore, Si is repeated entirely into Ãi+1[R
(n)
S ]. The sequence Λ
(V )
1 from
S1 is represented by gray pentagons and is repeated in all blocks. The sequences Υ(V )(1) and Υ
(V )
(2) are the
entries inside the red curve at Block 1 and the blue curve at Block L, respectively.










2,i , ∅; and we
define Γ(V )1,i and Γ̄
(V )




i , respectively, with size
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, and Γ(V )2,i and
Γ̄(V )2,i as the remaining parts with size
















since I(n) ⊆ G(n)2 , notice that Π
(V )
i = Si for any i ∈ [2, L− 1].
Case C
In this case, recall that
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣ ≥ ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣, ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ ≤ ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ and ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ > ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣. Hence, we define
R(n)2 and R
(n)






1,2 , ∅. On the
other hand, since
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ ≤ ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣, now for i ∈ [1, L− 1] only a part of Θ̄(V )i+1 can be repeated





. Consequently, we define
R(n)1 , the union of G
(n)





∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣. (4.39)
It is clear that R(n)2 and R
(n)
1,2 exist. By (4.20), R
(n)
1 also exists and so does I(n). Since
R(n)1 ⊇ G
(n)
2 , then I(n) ∩G
(n)
2 = ∅ and R
(n)
S = ∅. These sets that form G(n) are represented in





Block 1 Block 2
Block 3 Block 4
Figure 4.5: For Case C, graphically representation of the encoding that leads to the construction of
Ã1:L[H
(n)








Λ are those areas filled with yellow
squares, blue circles, blue and yellow diamonds, and gray pentagons, respectively, and I(n) is the green filled
area. At Block i ∈ [1, L], Wi is represented by symbols of the same color (e.g., red symbols at Block 2), and









are denoted by squares and triangles, respectively, with a line through them. At Block i ∈ [2, L − 1], the
diamonds denote Γ(V )1,i−1 ⊕ Γ̄
(V )
1,i+1. For i ∈ [1, L], Si is stored into those entries belonging to the green area.
The sequence Λ(V )1 is represented by gray pentagons and is repeated in all blocks. The sequences Υ
(V )
(1) and
Υ(V )(2) are the entries inside the red curve at Block 1 and the blue curve at Block L, respectively.





















2,i , ∅. Moreover, note that Π
(V )




In this case, recall that
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣, ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ and ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ > ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣. The sets that
form the partition of G(n) in Case D are defined below and can be seen in Figure 4.6, which
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Block 1 Block 2
Block 3 Block 4













Λ are those areas filled
with yellow squares, blue circles, blue and yellow diamonds, yellow squares overlapped by blue circles, and
gray pentagons, respectively, and the set I(n) is the green filled area. At Block i ∈ [1, L], Wi is represented





by squares, circles and triangles respectively. Also, Θ̄(V )i and Γ̄
(V )
i are denoted by squares and triangles,
respectively, with a line through them. At Block i ∈ [2, L− 1], Γ(V )1,i−1 ⊕ Γ̄
(V )
1,i+1 is represented by diamonds,
and Ψ(V )2,i−1 ⊕ Θ̄
(V )
2,i+1 by squares overlapped by circles. At Block i ∈ [1, L], Si is stored into those entries that
belong to the green area. Sequence Λ(V )1 is denoted by gray pentagons and is repeated in all blocks. Sequences
Υ(V )(1) and Υ
(V )
(2) are the entries inside the red curve at Block 1 and the blue curve at Block L, respectively.





As in Case A and Case C, since
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ > ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ then we define the set R(n)1,2 as in (4.34)
and R′(n)1 = R
′(n)
2 , ∅. On the other hand, since |G
(n)
1 | < |C
(n)
2 |, now for i ∈ [2, L] only a
part of Ψ(V )i−1 can be repeated entirely in Ãi[G
(n)










∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣. (4.40)
By (4.20), it is clear that R′(n)1,2 exists. Now, despite
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ as in Case C, the set
R(n)1 is not defined as in (4.39), but
R(n)1 , the union of G
(n)








∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− (∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣), (4.41)
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which exists because, by the assumption in (4.20), we have∣∣G(n)0 \ (R(n)1,2 ∪R′(n)1,2 )∣∣− ∣∣R(n)1 ∣∣
=
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− (∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣)
=
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ ≥ 0.










2,i , ∅. Also,
we define Ψ(V )1,i as any part of Ψ
(V )
i with size
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣, and Ψ(V )2,i as the remaining part with size∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣. Lastly, we define Θ̄(V )1,i as any part Θ̄(V )i with size ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− (∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣),
and Θ̄(V )2,i as the remaining part with size
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣.
Thus, according to Algorithm 4.2, instead of repeating Ψ(V )2,i−1, that is, the part of Ψ
(V )
i−1



















, where Θ̄(V )2,i+1 denotes part of those elements of Θ̄
(V )









For i ∈ [1, L], let Ri be a uniformly distributed vector of length
∣∣H(n)X|V \ H(n)X|V Z∣∣ that
represents the randomization sequence. Also, let Λ(X)0 be a uniformly distributed random
sequence of size
∣∣H(n)X|V Z∣∣. The channel prefixing aims to construct X̃ni = T̃ni Gn and is
summarized in Algorithm 4.3.
Algorithm 4.3 Function pb_ch_pref



















4: if j ∈
(
H(n)X|V
)C \ L(n)X|V then
5: T̃i(j)← pT (j)|T 1:j−1V n
(
T̃i(j)
∣∣T̃ 1:j−1i Ṽ ni )
6: else if j ∈ L(n)X|V then
7: T̃i(j)← arg maxt∈X pT (j)|T 1:j−1V n
(
t
∣∣T̃ 1:j−1i Ṽ ni )
8: end if
9: end for
10: X̃ni ← T̃ni Gn






12: return X̃ni and Λ
(X)
i
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, and given the sequence Ṽ ni , Ãni Gn,
the encoder forms the remaining entries of T̃ni , that is, T̃i
[(
H(n)X|V
)C] as follows. If j ∈ L(n)X|V ,
where L(n)V |X ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
T (j)
∣∣T 1:j−1V n) ≤ δn}, it constructs T̃i(j) deterministically
by using SC encoding. Otherwise, if j ∈
(
H(n)X|V )
C \ L(n)X|V , the encoder randomly draws T̃i(j)








, for all k ∈ [1, 2], is available to the k-th legitimate receiver.







This receiver forms the estimates Ân1:L by going forward, i.e., from Ân1 to ÂnL, and this process
is summarized in Algorithm 4.4.
Algorithm 4.4 Decoding at legitimate Receiver 1



















3: for i = 1 to L− 1 do
4: Ψ̂(V )i ← Âi[C
(n)
2 ]
5: Γ̂(V )i ← Âi[C
(n)
1,2 ]








7: Θ̂(V )i+1 ←
ˆ̄Θ(V )i+1 ⊕ κ
(V )
Θ








9: Γ̂(V )i+1 ←
ˆ̄Γ(V )i+1 ⊕ κ
(V )
Γ
10: Π̂(V )i ← Âi[I(n) ∩ G
(n)
2 ]
11: Υ̂′(V )(1),i+1 ←
(





















In all cases (among Case A to Case D), Receiver 1 constructs Ân1 as follows. Given Υ
(V )
(1)
(all the elements inside the red curve at Block 1 in Figures 4.3–4.6) and Φ(V )(1),1, notice that
Receiver 1 knows Ã1
[(
L(n)V |Y(1)
)C]. Therefore, from (Υ(V )(1) ,Φ(V )(1),1) and channel observations
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Ỹ n(1),1, Receiver 1 performs SC decoding to form Ân1 . Moreover, since Λ
(V )
1 has been replicated




(gray pentagons in all blocks).
For i ∈ [1, L− 1], consider the construction of Âni+1. First, since Ân1:i have already been






(e.g., red circles at Block 2 in





Also, from Âni , Receiver 1 obtains Θ̂
(V )
i+1 as follows. At Block 1, in all cases it gets






(all the red squares with a line through them at Block 1 in
Figures 4.3–4.6). At Block i ∈ [2, L− 1], we distinguish two situations:




(e.g., yellow squares with a line through
them at Block 2 in Figure 4.6) and Ψ̂(V )2,i−1 ⊕





a line through them overlapped by blue circles). Since Ψ̂(V )2,i−1 ⊂ Âni−1 (blue circles)







squares with a line through them).





with a line through them at Block 2 in Figures 4.3–4.5).
Then, given ˆ̄Θ(V )i+1 =
[ ˆ̄Θ(V )1,i+1, ˆ̄Θ(V )2,i+1], in all cases Receiver 1 recovers Θ̂(V )i+1 = ˆ̄Θ(V )i+1 ⊕ κ(V )Θ .
From Âni , Receiver 1 also obtains Γ̂
(V )
i+1 as follows. At Block 1, in all cases it gets






directly (e.g., all red triangles with a line through them at Block 1 in
Figures 4.3–4.6). At Block i ∈ [2, L−1], in all cases it obtains Γ̂(V )1,i−1⊕





blue and yellow diamonds with a line through them at Block 2). Since Γ̂(V )1,i−1 ⊂ Âni−1 (blue




⊕ Γ̂(V )1,i−1 (yellow




(remaining yellow triangles with a line through them at Block 2 in Figure 4.4). Then, given
ˆ̄Γ(V )i+1 =
[ˆ̄Γ(V )1,i+1, ˆ̄Γ(V )2,i+1], in all cases Receiver 1 recovers Γ̂(V )i+1 = ˆ̄Γ(V )i+1 ⊕ κ(V )Γ .





crosses at Block 2 in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4).
Finally, define the sequence Υ̂′(V )(1),i+1 ,
[



















(elements inside red curve at Block i+ 1 in Figures 4.3–4.6).





channel output observations Ỹ n(1),i+1.
Legitimate receiver 2
This receiver forms the estimates Ân1:L by going backward, i.e., from ÂnL to Ân1 , and this
process is summarized in Algorithm 4.5.
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Algorithm 4.5 Decoding at legitimate Receiver 2



















3: for i = L to 2 do
























8: Π̂(V )i−1 ← Âi[R
(n)
S ]
9: Υ′(V )(2),i−1 ←










In all cases (among Case A to Case D), Receiver 2 constructs ÂnL as follows. Given Υ
(V )
(2) (all




)C]. Hence, from (Υ(V )(2) , Φ(V )(2),L) and channel output observations Ỹ n(2),L,
Receiver 2 performs SC decoding to form ÂnL. Since Λ
(V )
1 has been replicated in all blocks,






(gray pentagons at all blocks).
For i ∈ [2, L], consider the construction of Âni−1. First, since Âni:L have already been






(e.g., yellow squares at
Block 3 in Figures 4.3–4.6). Given Θ̂(V )i , it computes















triangles with a line through them).
Also, from Âni , Receiver 2 obtains Ψ̂
(V )
i−1 as follows. At block L, in all cases it gets






directly (all yellow circles at Block L in Figures 4.3–4.6). At
Block i ∈ [2, L− 1], we distinguish two situations:




(e.g., red circles at Block 3 in
Figure 4.6) and Ψ̂(V )2,i−1 ⊕




(cyan squares with a line through them
overlapped by red circles). Since ˆ̄Θ(V )2,i+1 (cyan squares with a line through them) has




⊕ ˆ̄Θ(V )2,i+1 (red circles).





at Block 3 in Figures 4.3–4.5).
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From Âni , Receiver 2 also obtains Γ̂
(V )
i−1 as follows. At block L, in all cases it gets






(e.g., all yellow triangles at Block L in Figures 4.3–4.6). At
Block i ∈ [2, L− 1], in all cases Receiver 2 obtains Γ̂(V )1,i−1 ⊕





cyan diamonds with a line through them at Block 3). Since ˆ̄Γ(V )1,i+1 (cyan triangles with a line









(remaining red triangles at Block 3 in Figure 4.4).




(e.g., purple crosses at Block 3 in Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4).
Finally, define the sequence Υ′(V )(2),i−1 ,
[ ˆ̄Θ(V )1,i , ˆ̄Γ(V )2,i , Ψ̂(V )i−1, Γ̂(V )i−1, Π̂(V )i−1, Λ̂(V )i−1]. Notice that






(elements inside blue curve at Block i− 1 in Figures 4.3–4.6).







4.3 Performance of the polar coding scheme
The analysis of the polar coding scheme of Section 4.2 leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Let (X , pY(1)Y(2)Z|X ,Y(1) × Y(2) × Z) be an arbitrary WTBC such that
X ∈ {0, 1}. The PCS described in Section 4.2 achieves the corner point in Equation (4.4)
of the region RCI-WTBC defined in Proposition 4.1.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 follows in four steps and is provided in the following subsections.
In Section 4.3.1 we show that the PCS approaches the rate tuple in (4.4). In Section 4.3.2
we prove that the joint distribution of (Ṽ ni , X̃ni , Ỹ n(1),i, Ỹ n(2),i, Z̃ni ), for all i ∈ [1, L], is asymp-
totically indistinguishable of the one of the original DMS that is used for the polar code
construction. Finally, in Section 4.3.3 and Section 4.3.4 we show that the polar coding scheme
satisfies the reliability and the secrecy conditions (4.1) and (4.2) respectively.
4.3.1 Transmission rates
We prove that the polar coding scheme described in Section 4.2 approaches the rate tuple in





and κ(V )ΥΦ(2) , and the additional randomness used in the encoding (besides the randomization
sequences) are asymptotically negligible in terms of rate.
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Private message rate




. According to the definition of C(n) in (4.11), and since
H(n)V |Z ⊆ H
(n)








∣∣H(n)V ∩ (H(n)V |Z)C∣∣ = 1n ∣∣H(n)V ∣∣− 1n ∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣ n→∞−−−−→ H(V )−H(V |Z)
where the limit holds by Theorem 2.1. Therefore, the private message rate achieved by the
polar coding scheme is RW = I(V ;Z) as in (4.4).
Confidential message rate
From Section 4.2.2, in all cases we have S1 = Ã1
[




; for i ∈ [2, L− 1], we




























∣∣G(n) \ G(n)0 ∣∣
(a)= 1
n
(∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣R(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣R′(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣R(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣R′(n)1 ∣∣)+ 1nL ∣∣G(n) \ G(n)0 ∣∣
(b)= 1
n








(∣∣H(n)V |Z ∩ L(n)V |Y(1)∣∣− ∣∣(H(n)V |Z)C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣)+ 1nL ∣∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣∣− 1nL ∣∣∣(L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣∣
= 1
n
∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣− 1n ∣∣(L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣+ 1nL ∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣− 1nL ∣∣(L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣






L→∞−−−−→ H(V |Z)−H(V |Y(1))
where (a) holds by the definition of I(n) in (4.29); (b) holds because, in all cases, we have∣∣R(n)1,2 ∣∣+ ∣∣R′(n)1 ∣∣ = ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ and ∣∣R(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣R′(n)1,2 ∣∣ = ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣; (c) follows from the partition of H(n)V
defined in (4.12)–(4.19); (d) follows from applying elementary set operations and because,
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by assumption, H(V |Y(1)) ≥ H(V |Y(2)), which means that
∣∣(L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣ ≥ ∣∣(L(n)V |Y(2))C∣∣ (by
Theorem 2.1); and the limit when n goes to infinity holds also by Theorem 2.1. Hence, the
PCS operates as close to the rate RS in (4.4) as desired by choosing a sufficiently large L.
Randomization sequence rate













∣∣∣H(n)X|V ∩ (H(n)X|V Z)C∣∣∣ = 1n ∣∣H(n)X|V ∣∣− 1n ∣∣H(n)X|V Z∣∣ n→∞−−−−→ H(X|Z)−H(X|V Z)
where the limit holds by Theorem 2.1. Thus, the randomization sequence rate used by the
PCS is RR = I(X;Z|V ) as in (4.4).
Private-shared sequence rate





ΥΦ(k) . Hence, the overall rate is
1
nL










∣∣(H(n)V )C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C∣∣+ ∣∣H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C∣∣)
(a)= 1
nL




















2H(V |Y(1)) +H(V |Y(2))
)
L→∞−−−−→ 0,
where (a) follows from the definition of C(n)1 and C
(n)
1,2 in (4.17) and (4.19) respectively;
(b) follows from standard set properties and because
(
H(n)V |Z
)C ⊆ (H(n)V |Y(k))C for any k ∈ [1, 2];
and the limit when n goes to infinity holds by Theorem 2.1.
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Rate of the additional randomness
Besides the randomization sequences R1:L, the encoder uses the random sequence Λ(X)0 ,
with size
∣∣H(n)X|V ∣∣, for the polar-based channel prefixing. Moreover, for i ∈ [1, L], the encoder
randomly draws those elements Ãi(j) such that j ∈
(
H(n)V
)C \ L(n)V , and those elements T̃i(j)
such that j ∈
(
H(n)X|V
)C \ L(n)X|V . Nevertheless, we have
1
nL





where the limit when n approaches to infinity follows from applying Theorem 2.1.
4.3.2 Distribution of the DMS after the polar encoding




denote the distribution of (Ãni , T̃ni ) after the encoding. The fol-




and the marginal distribution pAnTn of the original DMS










and pV nXnY n(1)Y n(2)Zn . This result is crucial for the reliability and secrecy
performance of the polar coding scheme.















, pV nXnY n(1)Y
n
(2)Z
n) ≤ δ(∗)n ,












+ δn + 2
√
nδn ln 2.
Proof. For the first claim, see Lemma 2.3 taking TV , 2. The second holds by Corollary 2.2



















In this section we prove that both legitimate receivers can reliably reconstruct the private
and the confidential messages (W1:L, S1:L) with arbitrary small error probability.
For i ∈ [1, L] and k ∈ [1, 2], let q̃V n
i
Y n(k),i
and pV nY n(k) be marginals of q̃V ni Xni Y n(1),iY n(2),iZni
and pV nXnY n(1)Y n(2)Zn respectively, and define an optimal coupling [LPW09] (Proposi-
tion 4.7) between q̃V n
i
Y n(k),i











, pV nY n(k)
)
, where












V n, Y n(k)
)}






)C] 6= Ãi[(L(n)V |Y(k))C]}.
Recall that (Υ(V )(k) ,Φ
(V )
(k),1:L) is available to Receiver k ∈ [1, 2]. Thus, P[E(1),1] = P[E(2),L] = 0
because given Υ(V )(1) and Φ
(V )
(1),1 legitimate Receiver 1 knows Ã1
[(
L(n)V |Y(1)
)C], and given Υ(V )(2)
and Φ(V )(2),L legitimate Receiver 2 knows ÃL
[(
L(n)V |Y(2)
)C]. Moreover, due to the chaining





)C] is repeated in Ãni−1 for


















Hence, the probability of incorrectly decoding (Wi, Si) at the Receiver k ∈ [1, 2] is
P
[












































































where (a) holds by Theorem 2.1; (b) follows from the optimal coupling and Lemma 4.1; and


















and for sufficiently large n the PCS satisfies the reliability condition in (4.1).
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4.3.4 Secrecy analysis
Since encoding in Section 4.2 takes place over L blocks of size n, we need to prove that
lim
n→∞
I(S1:L, Z̃n1:L) = 0.












which denotes the entire sequence depending on Ãni that is repeated at Block i+ 1. Also, let





which represents the sequence depending on Ãni that is repeated at Block i− 1. Furthermore,




Γ ]. Then, a Bayesian graph describing the dependencies between
all the variables involved in the PCS of Section 4.2 is given in Figure 4.7.































Figure 4.7: Graphical representation (Bayesian graph) of the dependencies between random variables
involved in the PCS. Independent random variables are indicated by white nodes, whereas those that are
dependent are indicated by gray nodes.















two separate nodes in the Bayesian graph because, by crypto lemma [G.D03], Γ(V )i and
Γ̄(V )i are statistically independent. Furthermore, for convenience, we have considered that
dependencies only take place forward (from Block i to Block i + 1), which is possible by
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= Wi. Consequently, we can write Wi , [W1,i,W2,i], where W1,i , Ãi[C(n)1 ∪ C
(n)
1,2 ]
and W2,i , Ãi[C(n)2 ∪ C
(n)












⊕ κ(V )Γ , we
regard Ω̄(V )i as an independent random sequence generated at Block i−1 that is stored properly
into some part of Ãi−1[G(n)]. Then, we consider that the encoder obtains W1,i , Ω̄(V )i ⊕κ
(V )
Ω ,
which is stored into Ãi[C(n)1 ∪ C
(n)
1,2 ] at Block i. On the other hand, the remaining part W2,i is
independently generated at Block i. Recall that the secret-key κ(V )Ω is reused in all blocks.
The following lemma shows that strong secrecy holds for any Block i ∈ [1, L].














and δ(∗)n defined as in Lemma 4.1.






















∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣+ ∣∣H(n)X|V Z∣∣−H(Ãi[H(n)V |Z]T̃i[H(n)X|V Z]∣∣Z̃ni )
(c)
≤
∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣+ ∣∣H(n)X|V Z∣∣−H(A[H(n)V |Z]T [H(n)X|V Z]∣∣Zni )+ 4nδ(∗)n − 2δ(∗)n log δ(∗)n
(d)
≤ 2nδn + 4nδ(∗)n − 2δ(∗)n log δ(∗)n









; (c) follows from applying Lemma 2.4 (where TV , 2 and TO , 1)
































∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣(1− δn) + ∣∣H(n)X|V Z∣∣(1− δn)
where we have used the fact that conditioning does not increase entropy, the invertibility of
Gn, and the definition of H(n)V |Z and H
(n)
X|V Z in (4.6) and (4.9) respectively.
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Next, the following lemma shows that eavesdropper observations Z̃ni are asymptotically
statistically independent of observations Z̃n1:i−1 from previous blocks.








where δ(S)n is defined as in Lemma 4.2.



































































∣∣SiΞ(V )i−1Λ(X)i−1)+ I(S1:i−1Z̃n1:i−1; Z̃ni ∣∣SiΞ(V )i−1Λ(X)i−1W1,i)












= δ(S)n + I
(
Ãn1:i−1;W1,i
∣∣SiΞ(V )i−1Λ(X)i−1)+ I(Z̃n1:i−1;W1,i∣∣Ãn1:i−1SiΞ(V )i−1Λ(X)i−1)













where (a) holds by independence between Si+1:L and any random variable from Blocks 1 to i;
(b) holds by Lemma 4.2; (c) follows from applying d-separation [Pea09] over the Bayesian
graph in Figure 4.7 to obtain that Z̃ni and (S1:i−1, Z̃n1:i−1) are conditionally independent given
(Si,Ξ(V )i−1,Λ
(X)
i−1,W1,i); (d) also follows from applying d-separation to obtain that W1,i and




i−1); (e) holds by definition;




i−1) and any random variable
from Block 1 to (i− 2), and because from applying crypto-lemma [G.D03] we obtain that
Ω̄(V )i ⊕ κ
(V )
Ω is independent of Ãni−1.
































where (a) follows from applying the chain rule; (b) holds by Lemma 4.3; (c) holds by inde-
pendence between S2:L and any random variable from Block 1; and (d) holds by Lemma 4.2.
Thus, for sufficiently large n the PCS satisfies the strong secrecy condition in (4.2).
Remark 4.1. We conjecture that the use κ(V )Ω is not needed for the PCS to satisfy the strong
secrecy condition. However, the key is required in order to prove this condition by means of
analyzing a causal Bayesian graph similar to the one in Figure 4.7.
Remark 4.2. Although backward dependencies between random variables of different blocks
appear in [CY18], a secret seed as κ(V )Ω is not necessary for the PCS to provide strong secrecy.
This is because random sequences that are repeated in adjacent blocks are stored only into
those corresponding entries whose indices belong to the “high entropy set given eavesdropper
observations”, i.e., the equivalent sets of H(n)V |Z and H
(n)
X|V Z in our PCS. By contrast, notice































(similar to Lemma 4.3). Thus, one can minimize the length of this secret-key depending on
whether
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ or vice versa.
4.4 Concluding remarks
A strongly secure PCS has been proposed for the WTBC with two legitimate receivers and
one eavesdropper. This polar code achieves the best known inner-bound on the achievable
region of the CI-WTBC model, where transmitter wants to send common information (private
and confidential) to both receivers. Due to the non-degradedness assumption of the channel,
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the encoder builds a chaining construction that induces bidirectional dependencies between
adjacent blocks, which need to be taken carefully into account in the secrecy analysis.
These bidirectional dependencies involve elements from adjacent blocks whose indices
belong to the “low entropy sets given eavesdropper observations”. Consequently, in order to
prove that the PCS satisfies the strong secrecy condition, we have introduced a secret-key
whose length becomes negligible in terms of rate as the number of blocks grows indefinitely.
In the proposed PCS, this key has been used to randomize part of these elements from
any block that are repeated in the previous (or next) one. In this way, we can analyze the
dependencies between all random variables involved in the secrecy analysis by means of a
causal Bayesian graph and apply d-separation to prove that the PCS induces eavesdropper’s
observations that are statistically independent of one another.
Despite the good performance of the PCSs, some issues still persist. As we have concluded
in Chapter 3 (Section 3.5), how to avoid the additional secret transmission (that is negligible
in terms of rate) required by the legitimate receivers as well as how to replace the random
decisions entirely by deterministic ones in SC encoding are problems that still remains
unsolved. Additionally, we conjecture that the previous secret-keys that are used to prove
independence between blocks are not necessary. However, how to prove these independence
without using them seems a difficult problem to address at this point.
5
Polar coding for the wiretap broadcast channel with
multiple messages
This chapter focuses on a channel model over the WTBC where transmitter wants to reliably
send different confidential (and non-confidential) messages to different legitimate receivers
with the presence of an eavesdropper. This model generalizes the one described in Chapter 4,
where only common information is intended for both receivers.
There are two different inner-bounds on the achievable region of this model in the literature.
On the one hand, the inner-bound found in [BP15] considers confidential information only,
while the one in [EU13] consider confidential and non-confidential messages. The random
coding techniques used in [BP15] and [EU13] are Marton’s coding and rate splitting in
conjunction with superposition coding and binning. The only difference between them is that
the first uses joint decoding, while the second uses successive decoding. Indeed, if we consider
confidential information transmission only, the inner-bound in [BP15] includes the one in
[EU13], but is not straightforward to show that whether the first inner-bound is strictly larger
or not: for a given input distribution, the inner-bound in [BP15] is strictly larger; nevertheless,
we do not know if the rate points that are only included in this inner-bound for a particular
distribution may be in the inner-bound found in [EU13] under another distribution.
We provide a PCS that achieves the inner-bound in [BP15] and, additionally, allows
transmitting different non-confidential messages to both legitimate receivers. Our PCS is
based in part on the one described in [MHSU15] that achieves Marton’s region of broadcast
channels without secrecy constraints, and the one described in Chapter 4 for the CI-WTBC.
In Marton’s coding we have three different layers: one inner-layer that must be reliably
decoded by both legitimate receivers, and two outer-layers such that each one conveys
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information intended only for one receiver. Due to the non-degradedness condition of the
channels, the PCS requires the use of a chaining construction which induces bidirectional
dependencies between adjacent blocks. Moreover, we show that joint and successive decoding
have their counterpart in polar coding, and jointly decoding allows to enlarge the achievable
region for a particular input distribution. Indeed, due to the polar-based jointly decoding, our
PCS needs to build a chaining construction that introduces dependencies between different
encoding layers of adjacent blocks.
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 introduces the channel
model formally as well as an enlarged version of the inner-bound found in [BP15] that
considers the transmission of private messages. In Section 5.2 we describe a PCS that
achieves this inner-bound. Then, Section 5.3 evaluates the performance of this PCS. Finally,
the concluding remarks are presented in Section 5.4.
5.1 Channel model and achievable region
A WTBC (X , pY(1)Y(2)Z|X ,Y(1) × Y(2) × Z) with 2 legitimate receivers and an external
eavesdropper, as we have seen in the previous chapter, is characterized by the probability
transition function pY(1)Y(2)Z|X , where X ∈ X denotes the channel input, Y(k) ∈ Y(k) denotes
the channel output corresponding to the legitimate receiver k ∈ [1, 2], and Z ∈ Z denotes the
channel output corresponding to the eavesdropper. Now, we consider a model, namely Multiple
Information over the Wiretap Broadcast Channel (MI-WTBC), in which the transmitter
wishes to send two private messages W1 and W2, and two confidential messages S1 and
S2, where W1 and S1 are intended to legitimate Receiver 1, and W2 and S2 are intended
to legitimate Receiver 2. A code
(
d2nRW(1) e, d2nRS(1) e, d2nRW(2) e, d2nRS(2) e, n
)
for the MI-









for k ∈ [1, 2],
an encoding function f :W(1) × S(1) ×W(2) × S(2) → Xn that maps (w(1), w(2), s(1), s(2)) to
a codeword xn, and two decoding functions g(1) and g(2) such that g(k) : Yn(k) →W(k) × S(k)
(k ∈ [1, 2]) maps the k-th legitimate receiver observations yn(k) to the estimates (ŵ(k), ŝ(k)).





(W(k), S(k)) 6= (Ŵ(k), Ŝ(k))
]
= 0, k ∈ [1, 2]. (5.1)
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This model is plotted in Figure 5.1. A tuple of rates (RW(1) , RS(1) , RW(2) , RS(2)) ∈ R4+ is
achievable for the MI-WTBC if a sequence of
(
d2nRW(1) e, d2nRS(1) e, d2nRW(2) e, d2nRS(2) e, n
)
codes that satisfy the reliability and secrecy conditions (5.1) and (5.2) respectively exists.












Figure 5.1: Channel model: MI-WTBC.
References [BP15] and [EU13] define two different inner-bounds on the capacity region of
this model. Indeed, the inner-bound in [BP15] only consider the case where RW(1) = RW(2) , 0,
that is, when only confidential messages are transmitted over the broadcast channel. In
this situation, [BP15] (Remark 3) points out that this inner-bound includes the one defined
in [EU13], but it does not specify whether this bound is strictly larger or not.
Definition 5.1 (Adapted from [BP15]). The region R(S)MI-WTBC defined by the union over all
the pairs of rates (RS(1) , RS(2)) ∈ R2+ satisfying
RS(1) ≤ I(V U(1);Y(1))− I(V U(1);Z)
RS(2) ≤ I(V U(2);Y(2))− I(V U(2);Z)
RS(1) +RS(2) ≤ I(V U(1);Y(1)) + I(V U(2);Y(2))− I(U(1);U(2)|V )
− I(V U(1)U(2);Z)−max{I(V ;Y(1)), I(V ;Y(2)), I(V ;Z)}
for some distribution pV U(1)U(2)XY(1)Y(2)Z such that (V U(1)U(2))−X − (Y(1), Y(2), Z) forms a
Markov chain and I(U(1);Y(1)|V ) + I(U(2);Y(2)|V ) ≥ I(U(1);U(2)|V ), defines an inner-bound
on the achievable region of the MI-WTBC when RW(1) = RW(2) , 0.
Remark 5.1. Since the previous inner-bound on the achievable region of the MI-WTBC
cannot be enlarged by considering general distributions pX|V U(1)U(2) , the channel input X can
be restricted to be any deterministic function of random variables (V U(1)U(2)).
Remark 5.2. If Z , ∅ then region R(S)MI-WTBC reduces to well-known Marton’s region for the
broadcast channel without secrecy constraints [Mar79].
Proposition 5.1. When RW(1) = RW(2) , 0, for a particular distribution pV U(1)U(2)XY(1)Y(2)Z ,
R
(S)
MI-WTBC in Proposition 5.1 is strictly larger than the inner-bound in [EU13] (Theorem 1).
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Proof. Consider R(S)MI-WTBC when pV U(1)U(2)XY(1)Y(2)Z is such that I(V ;Y(1)) < I(V ;Y(2)).
In this case, it is easy to check that the inner-bound in [EU13] (Theorem 1) imposes that
RS(2) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) + I(U(2);Y(2)|V )− I(V U(2);Z), which is strictly less than the bound on
RS(2) in Proposition 5.1. Similarly, the upper-bound on RS(1) in Proposition 5.1 is also strictly
larger than the one in [EU13] (Theorem 1) when I(V ;Y(2)) < I(V ;Y(1)).
Remark 5.3. In general, we cannot affirm that the inner-bound in Proposition 5.1 is strictly
larger than the one in [EU13]: the rate tuples that are included only in Proposition 5.1 for a
particular distribution may be in the inner-bound of [EU13] under another distribution.
Remark 5.4. The region in [EU13] imposes that I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(k)) for any k ∈ [1, 2].
Nevertheless, Proposition 5.1 does not restrict pV U(1)U(2)XY(1)Y(2)Z to satisfy this condition.
Remark 5.5. As mentioned in [BP15] (Remark 3), the coding techniques used in [BP15]
and [EU13] to obtain the inner-bounds are almost the same and the only difference are the
decoding strategies: joint decoding in [BP15] and successive decoding for [EU13]. Indeed, we
will see that these strategies have a connection on the PCS that is described in Section 5.2 and
joint decoding enlarges the inner-bound on the achievable region for a particular distribution.
For compactness of notation, let k ∈ [1, 2], and k̄ , [1, 2] \ k. The following proposition
defines an inner-bound on the achievable region for the MI-WTBC when considering also
the transmission of the private messages W(1) and W(2).









bound on the achievable region of the MI-WTBC, where Conv(·) denotes the convex hull of a








RS(k) ≤ I(V U(k);Y(k))− I(V U(k);Z)
RS(k̄) ≤ I(V U(k̄);Y(k̄))− I(U(k̄);U(k)|V )− I(U(k̄);Z|V U(k))
−max{I(V ;Y(1)), I(V ;Y(2)), I(V ;Z)}
RS(k) +RW(k) ≤ I(V U(k);Y(k))
RS(k̄) +RW(k̄) ≤ I(V U(k̄);Y(k̄))− I(U(k̄);U(k)|V )
−max{I(V ;Y(1)), I(V ;Y(2)), I(V ;Z)}+ I(V ;Z),

,
and P contains all distributions pV U(1)U(2)XY(1)Y(2)Z such that (V U(1)U(2))−X−(Y(1), Y(2), Z)
forms a Markov chain and I(U(1);Y(1)|V ) + I(U(2);Y(2)|V ) ≥ I(U(1);U(2)|V ).
In Section 5.2 we describe a PCS that achieves the corner point of R(k)MI-WTBC, where
k ∈ [1, 2], and then we discuss how to achieve any rate tuple of the entire region RMI-WTBC.
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5.2 Polar coding scheme
Notice that RMI-WTBC of Proposition 5.2 is not affected by switching subindices 1 and 2.Thus,
we can assume without loss of generality that I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)). Otherwise, the coding
scheme that is described later will also be suitable by simply exchanging the roles of Receiver 1
and Receiver 2. Consequently, the PCS must contemplate three different situations:
Situation 1 : when I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)),
Situation 2 : when I(V ;Y(1)) < I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)),
Situation 3 : when I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)) < I(V ;Z).
Under the previous assumption, in order to proof that RMI-WTBC is entirely achiev-
able by using polar codes for any of the situations mentioned before, it suffices to pro-
vide a PCS that achieves the corner points (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)




, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)
) ⊂ R(2)MI-WTBC, where
R?kS(k) , H(V U(k)|Z)−H(V U(k)|Y(k)), (5.3)
R?kS(k̄) , H(U(k̄)|V U(k)Z)−H(U(k̄)|V Y(k̄))
−
(
H(V |Y(k̄))−min{H(V |Y(1)), H(V |Z)}
)
, (5.4)
R?kW(k) , H(V U(k))−H(V U(k)|Z), (5.5)
R?kW(k̄) , H(U(k̄)|V U(k))−H(U(k̄)|V U(k)Z). (5.6)
for any k ∈ [1, 2], and recall that k̄ = [1, 2] \ k. We have expressed (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)




in terms of entropies for convenience. Indeed, (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
) corresponds to the
case where, for a given distribution pV U(1)U(2)XY(1)Y(2)Z , we set the maximum rate for the
confidential and private messages intended for Receiver k, and then we set the maximum
possible rates of the remaining messages associated to Receiver k̄.
Remark 5.6. For distributions such that I(V ;Y(1)) < I(V ;Y(2)), the inner-bound in [EU13]
does not include the corner point (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)
). In this section we will see that
polar-based joint decoding is necessary for the PCS to approach this rate tuple.
Moreover, distributions pV U(1)U(2)XY(1)Y(2)Z such that satisfy Situations 2 and 3, that is
when I(V ;Y(k)) < I(V ;Z) for some k ∈ [1, 2], are not considered in the definition of the
inner-bound in [EU13]. We will see that polar-based joint decoding is also needed in these
situations for the PCS to approach (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
) for any k ∈ [1, 2].
Let (V × U(1) × U(2) × X × Y(1) × Y(2) × Z, pV U(1)U(2)XY(1)Y(2)Z) denote the DMS that
represents the input (V,U(1), U(2), X) and output (Y(1), Y(2), Z) random variables of the
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MI-WTBC, where |V| = |U(1)| = |U(2)| = |X | , 2. For the input random variable V , we
define the polar transform An , V nGn and the associated sets
H(n)V ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
A(j)
∣∣A1:j−1) ≥ 1− δn}, (5.7)
L(n)V ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
A(j)
∣∣A1:j−1) ≤ δn}, (5.8)
H(n)V |Z ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
A(j)
∣∣A1:j−1Zn) ≥ 1− δn}, (5.9)
L(n)V |Y(k) ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
A(j)
∣∣A1:j−1Y n(k)) ≤ δn}, k = 1, 2. (5.10)
For the random variable U(k), where k ∈ [1, 2], we define the polar transform Tn(k) , Un(k)Gn. In
this model, due to the polar-based Marton’s coding strategy similar to the one in [MHSU15],
the polar code constructions corresponding to Tn(1) and Tn(2) are different depending on
the corner point that the PCS must approach. To achieve (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)




construction of Tn(1) only depends on V n, while Tn(2) depends on V n and Tn(1). Otherwise,
to achieve (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)
), the construction of Tn(2) only depends on V n, while




, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
) ⊆ R(k)MI-WTBC, where k ∈ [1, 2]. Associated to U(k), define
H(n)U(k)|V ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
T(k)(j)
∣∣T 1:j−1(k) V n) ≥ 1− δn}, (5.11)
L(n)U(k)|V ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
T(k)(j)
∣∣T 1:j−1(k) V n) ≤ δn}, (5.12)
H(n)U(k)|V Z ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
T(k)(j)
∣∣T 1:j−1(k) V nZn) ≥ 1− δn}, (5.13)
L(n)U(k)|V Y(k) ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
T(k)(j)
∣∣T 1:j−1(k) V nY n(k)) ≤ δn}. (5.14)
Also, define the following sets associated to the polar transform U(k̄):
H(n)U(k̄)|V U(k) ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
T(k̄)(j)
∣∣T 1:j−1(k̄) V nUn(k)) ≥ 1− δn}, (5.15)
L(n)U(k̄)|V U(k) ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
T(k̄)(j)
∣∣T 1:j−1(k̄) V nUn(k)) ≤ δn}, (5.16)
H(n)U(k̄)|V U(k)Z ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
T(k̄)(j)
∣∣T 1:j−1(k̄) V nUn(k)Zn) ≥ 1− δn}, (5.17)
L(n)U(k̄)|V Y(k̄) ,
{
j ∈ [1, n] : H
(
T(k̄)(j)
∣∣T 1:j−1(k̄) V nY n(k̄)) ≤ δn}. (5.18)
Consider that the encoding takes place over L blocks indexed by i ∈ [1, L]. In order to
approach the corner point (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
), where k ∈ [1, 2], at Block i ∈ [1, L] the
encoder will construct Ãni , which will carry part of the confidential and private message that is
intended for legitimate Receiver k. Additionally, the encoder will store into Ãni some elements
from Ãni−1 (if i ∈ [2, L]) and Ãni+1 (if i ∈ [1, L− 1]) so that both legitimate receivers are able
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to reliably reconstruct Ãn1:L (chaining construction). Then, the encoder first constructs T̃n(k),i,
which will depend on Ṽ ni = Ãni Gn and will carry the remaining parts of the confidential and
private messages intended for Receiver k. Indeed, it could also depend on Ṽ ni−1 and/or Ṽ ni+1
if polar-based jointly decoding is considered because some elements of Ṽ ni−1 and/or Ṽ ni+1 may
be stored in T̃n(k),i. Then, the encoder forms T̃n(k̄),i, which depends on
(





as before, if polar-based jointly decoding is considered then the chaining construction may
store some elements of Ṽ ni−1 and/or Ṽ ni+1 in T̃n(k̄),i. Finally, it will obtain Ũ
n
(k),i = T̃n(k),iGn
for k ∈ [1, 2] and deterministically form X̃ni (see Remark 5.1). The codeword X̃n then is
transmitted over the WTBC inducing the channel outputs (Ỹ n(1),i, Ỹ n(2),i, Z̃ni ).
For better readability and understanding, the methods of constructing the inner-layer
Ãn1:L and the outer-layers T̃n(1),1:L and T̃n(2),1:L are described independently in the following
subsections. Nevertheless, if we consider the encoding moving from Block 1 to Block L, and
since dependencies only occur between adjacent blocks, the encoder is able to form T̃n(1),i
and T̃n(2),i once Ãni+1 (i ∈ [1, L− 1]) is constructed.
5.2.1 Construction of the inner-layer
The method of forming Ãn1:L is very similar to the one described in Chapter 4. Besides
the sets in (5.7)–(5.10), we define G(n) , H(n)V |Z and C
(n) , H(n)V ∩
(
H(n)V |Z
)C, which form a
partition of H(n)V . Moreover, we also define the following partition of the set G(n):
G(n)0 , G(n) ∩ L
(n)
V |Y(1) ∩ L
(n)
V |Y(2) , (5.19)
G(n)1 , G(n) ∩
(
L(n)V |Y(1)
)C ∩ L(n)V |Y(2) , (5.20)







G(n)1,2 , G(n) ∩
(
L(n)V |Y(1)
)C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(2))C, (5.22)
and the following partition of the set C(n):
C(n)0 , C(n) ∩ L
(n)
V |Y(1) ∩ L
(n)
V |Y(2) , (5.23)
C(n)1 , C(n) ∩
(
L(n)V |Y(1)
)C ∩ L(n)V |Y(2) , (5.24)







C(n)1,2 , C(n) ∩
(
L(n)V |Y(1)
)C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(2))C. (5.26)
These sets are graphically represented in Chapter 4 (Figure 4.2).
Recall that Ãi[H(n)V ], i ∈ [1, L], is suitable for storing uniformly distributed random
sequences, and Ãi[G(n)] is suitable for storing information to be secured from the eavesdropper.
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elements of Ãni corresponding to this set of indices are required by Receiver k to reliably
reconstruct Ãni entirely by performing SC decoding.
As mentioned before, the PCS must consider three different situations. In Situation 1 we
have the condition I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y1) ≤ I(V ;Y2). As seen in Chapter 4, for n sufficiently
large this condition imposes the following restriction on the size of previous sets:∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ ≥ ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ ≥ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣; (5.27)
Similarly, Situation 2, where I(V ;Y(1)) < I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y2), imposes that∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ ≥ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ > ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣; (5.28)
and Situation 3, where I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y2) < I(V ;Z), imposes that∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ > ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ ≥ ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣. (5.29)
Thus, according to (5.27)–(5.29), we must consider six different cases:




2 | > |C
(n)
1 | and |G
(n)
0 | ≥ |C
(n)
1,2 | (only for Situation 1),




2 | > |C
(n)
1 | and |G
(n)
0 | < |C
(n)
1,2 | (for all situations),




2 | ≤ |C
(n)
1 | and |G
(n)
0 | > |C
(n)
1,2 | (only for Situations 1 and 2),




2 | < |C
(n)
1 | and |G
(n)
0 | > |C
(n)
1,2 | (for all situations),




2 | < |C
(n)
1 | and |G
(n)
0 | < |C
(n)
1,2 | (only for Situations 2 and 3),




2 | < |C
(n)
1 | and |G
(n)
0 | < |C
(n)
1,2 | (only for Situation 3).
The inner-layer encoding process to achieve (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
), for any k ∈ [1, 2],
in all cases is summarized in Algorithm 5.1. For i ∈ [1, L], letW (V )(k),i be a uniformly distributed
vector of length |C(n)| that represents part of the private message intended to legitimate


























and is explained in detail




, i ∈ [1, L], the encoder forms the remaining entries of Ãni




, and random for Ãi
[










)C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C]













C], respectively. Recall that (Υ(V )(k) ,Φ(V )(k),i) is required by
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Algorithm 5.1 Inner-layer encoding to achieve (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)




Require: Parts W (V )(k),1:L and S
(V )

















L+1 ← ∅ . For notation purposes
2: Ã1[C(n)]←W (V )(k),1
3: Ψ(V )1 ← Ã1[C
(n)





4: for i = 1 to L do
5: if i 6= L then
6: Ãi+1[C(n)]←W (V )(k),i+1
7: Ψ(V )i+1 ← Ãi+1[C
(n)


















i , . . .
























12: if j ∈
(
H(n)V





14: else if j ∈ L(n)V then






18: Ṽ ni = Ãni Gn
19: Φ(V )(k),i ← Ãi
[(
H(n)V
)C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C] for k ∈ [1, 2]













23: Send Π(1),1:L and ∆
(V )
(1),1:L to the encoding responsible for the construction of T̃
n
(1)









⊕ κ(V )ΥΦ(k) to Receiver k ∈ [1, 2]
26: return Ṽ n1:L





⊕ κ(V )ΥΦ(k) to legitimate Receiver k, where κ
(V )
ΥΦ(k) is a uniformly distributed key
with size L
∣∣(H(n)V )C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C∣∣+ ∣∣H(n)V ∩ (L(n)V |Y(k))C∣∣.
The function form2_AG is summarized in Algorithm 5.2. For any i ∈ [1, L], this function





, as well as different elements of Ãni−1 (i ∈ [2, L]) and Ãni+1 (i ∈ [1, L− 1]) due to the












is required by Receiver 2 to
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is required by Receiver 1.
Notice in Algorithm 5.2 that if the PCS operates to achieve the corner point of R(1)MI-WTBC
then, for i ∈ [1, L − 1], sequences Θ(V )i+1 and Γ
(V )




















Γ are uniformly distributed keys with length |C
(n)
1 | and |C
(n)
1,2 | respectively that are privately
shared between transmitter and both receivers. Otherwise, to achieve the corner point of
R
(2)















Γ , where κ
(V )
Ψ is a distributed key with length |C
(n)
2 |. Since these keys are
reused in all blocks, clearly their size become negligible in terms of rate for L large enough.
























1,2 will depend on the particular case (among A to F) and situation
(among 1 to 3), as well as on the corner point the PCS must approach. Then, we define









∣∣G(n)2 \ (R(n)1 ∪R′(n)1 )∣∣. (5.30)




, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)































and if (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)





































will belong to I(n) or R(n)Λ depending on whether the
PCS approaches the first or the second corner point, respectively. Based on these sets, define















Indeed, note that Π(V )(1),i 6= ∅ only when the PCS must approach the corner point of R
(2)
MI-WTBC.
Also, let S(V )(k),i be a uniform random sequence representing the part of the confidential
message intended for Receiver k ∈ [1, 2] that is carried in the inner-layer. Then, S(V )(k),1 has size∣∣I(n) ∪ G(n)1,2 ∪ G(n)1 ∣∣; for i ∈ [2, L− 1], S(V )(k),i has size ∣∣I(n)∣∣; and S(V )(k),L has size ∣∣I(n) ∪ G(n)2 ∣∣.
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, Ψ̄(V )i ,
[















, Θ̄(V )i ,
[


































any p ∈ [1, 2, 3], accordingly in each case. For notation purposes, let
∆(V )(1),i ,
[

















and ∆(V )(2),i ,
[




(if k = 2). (5.39)
According to Algorithm 5.1, recall that Π(V )(1),1:L and ∆
(V )
(1),1:L are sent to the outer-layer
associated to Receiver 1, while ∆(V )(2),1:L is sent to the outer-layer associated to Receiver 2.
Algorithm 5.2 Function form2_AG to achieve (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)











































3: if i ∈ [2, L− 1] then Ãi[I(n)]← S(V )(k),i
4: if i = L then ÃL[I(n) ∪ G(n)2 ]← S
(V )
(k),L












































9: if i ∈ [1, L− 1] then















13: if i ∈ [2, L] then














16: Ãi[R(n)S ]← Π
(V )
(2),i−1




19: Π(V )(1),i ← Ãi[I
(n) ∩ G(n)1 ] and Π
(V )
(2),i ← Ãi[I
(n) ∩ G(n)2 ]
20: Λ(V )i ← Ãi[R
(n)
Λ ]
21: if k = 1 then ∆(V )(1),i ←
(
















else ∆(V )(2),i ←
(
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Case A when I(V ; Z) ≤ I(V ; Y(1)) ≤ I(V ; Y(2))




2 | > |C
(n)
1 | and |G
(n)
0 | ≥ |C
(n)
1,2 |.
1. Achievability of (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)





is the same as the one in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.2, Case A). Hence, define
















1,2 , ∅. Therefore, according to (5.30)–(5.32), we have






























From condition (5.27), all previous sets exist. Also, for i ∈ [1, L], define Ψ(V )1,i , Ψ
(V )
i ,


















p,i , ∅, where





∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣, Π(V )(1),i = Ãi[I(n) ∩ G(n)1 ] = ∅, and ∆(V )(1),i = ∆(V )(2),i = ∅.
According to Algorithm 5.2, recall that, for i ∈ [2, L], the chaining construction repeats
Ψ(V )i−1 and Γ
(V )







































. The inner-layer carries confidential information S(V )(1),1:L intended for Receiver 1,
and for i ∈ [2, L] the encoder repeats Π(V )(2),i−1 in Ãi[R
(n)
S ]. Finally, for i ∈ [2, L], it
repeats Λ(V )i−1 in Ãi[R
(n)
Λ ] and, therefore, notice that Λ
(V )
1 is replicated in all blocks. This
particular encoding procedure is graphically represented in Chapter 4 (Figure 4.3).
2. Achievability of (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)











1,2 as for the previous corner point. According to (5.30), (5.33) and (5.34):
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p,i , ∅, where p ∈ [2, 3]. Then, according to





∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣,





∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣−∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣−(∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣−∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣), and ∆(V )(1),i = ∆(V )(2),i = ∅.
According to Algorithm 5.2, now the inner-layer carries confidential information S(V )(2),1:L









contained part of Λ(V )i , now store part of S
(V )
(2),i. As before, for i ∈ [2, L], Π
(V )
(2),i−1 is




Λ ]. Now, as will be seen in Section 5.2.2, for
i ∈ [1, L− 1] the sequence Π(V )(1),i+1 will be repeated in the outer-layer T̃(1),i associated to
Receiver 1. This particular encoding procedure is graphically represented in Figure 5.2.
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
Figure 5.2: Case A when I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)): inner-layer encoding to achieve the corner
point of R(2)MI-WTBC that leads to the construction of Ã1:L[H
(n)









Λ are those areas filled with yellow squares, blue circles, blue and yellow
diamonds, pink crosses, and gray pentagons, respectively; and I(n) is the green filled area. At Block i ∈ [1, L],
W
(V )







are represented by squares, circles and triangles respectively. Also, Ψ̄(V )i and Γ̄
(V )
i are denoted by circles and
triangles, respectively, with a line through them. At Block i ∈ [2, L−1], the diamonds denote Γ̄(V )i−1 ⊕ Γ
(V )
i+1. In
Block i ∈ [1, L], S(V )(2),i is stored into those entries whose indices belong to the green filled area. For i ∈ [2, L],
Π(V )(2),i−1 is denoted by crosses (e.g., purple crosses at Block 2), and is repeated in Ãi[R
(n)
S ]. For i ∈ [1, L− 1],
the sequence Π(V )(1),i+1 is denoted by hexagons, and it will be send to the outer-layer T̃(1),i associated to
Receiver 1. At Block 1, Λ(V )1 is denoted by gray pentagons, and is repeated in all blocks. Finally, Υ
(V )
(1) and
Υ(V )(2) are those entries inside the red curve at Block 1 and the blue curve at Block L, respectively.
Case B when I(V ; Z) ≤ I(V ; Y(1)) ≤ I(V ; Y(2))




2 | > |C
(n)
1 | and |G
(n)
0 | < |C
(n)
1,2 |.
1. Achievability of (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)





is the same as the one described in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.2, Case B). Now,
since
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣, only a part of Γ(V )i−1 (i ∈ [2, L]) and Γ̄(V )i+1 (i ∈ [1, L − 1]) can be






















∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣,





∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣,
and R′(n)1,2 , ∅. Therefore, according to (5.30)–(5.32), we have









∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− (∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣),



























and Ψ(V )p,i = Θ̄
(V )










∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ(V )2,i and Γ̄(V )2,i as the remaining parts with size ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣−∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣,
and Γ(V )3,i = Γ̄
(V )







∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ − (∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣), Π(V )(1),i = Ãi[I(n) ∩ G(n)1 ] = ∅, and we have
∆(V )(1),i = ∆
(V )
(2),i = ∅.
According to Algorithm 5.2, for i ∈ [1, L], Γ(V )1,i−1 ⊕ Γ̄
(V )





Γ(V )1,0 = Γ̄
(V )
1,L = ∅. On the other hand, now Γ
(V )
2,i−1 (i ∈ [2, L]) and Γ̄
(V )
2,i+1 (i ∈ [1, L− 1])








respectively. The inner-layer carries confidential
information S(V )(1),1:L intended for Receiver 1, and for i ∈ [2, L] the encoder repeats Π
(V )
(2),i−1
in Ãi[R(n)S ]. Indeed, since I(n) ⊆ G
(n)




(1),i for i ∈ [1, L]. Finally, for
i ∈ [2, L], the encoder repeats Λ(V )i−1 in Ãi[R
(n)
Λ ] and, hence, Λ
(V )
1 is replicated in all blocks.
This particular encoding procedure is graphically represented in Chapter 4 (Figure 4.4).
2. Achievability of (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)









and R′(n)1,2 as for the previous corner point, and R
′(n)
1 , ∅. From (5.30), (5.33) and (5.34):
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p,i , ∅ for p ∈ [2, 3].
Also, we define Γ̄(V )1,i as any part of Γ̄
(V )
i with size
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ̄(V )2,i as the remaining part
with size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, and Γ(V )3,i , ∅. On the other hand, now we define Γ(V )1,i as
any part of Γ(V )i with size
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ(V )2,i , ∅ and Γ(V )3,i as the remaining part with size∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. According to (5.36)–(5.39), for i ∈ [1, L] we have Π(V )(2),i = Ãi[I(n) ∩ G(n)2 ]
with size
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− (∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣), sequence Π(V )(1),i = Ãi[I(n) ∩ G(n)1 ] with size∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− (∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣), ∆(V )(1),i = Γ(V )3,i with size ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ and ∆(V )(2),i = ∅.
According to Algorithm 5.2, the inner-layer carries confidential information S(V )(2),1:L
intended for Receiver 2. For i ∈ [2, L], Π(V )(2),i−1 is repeated in Ãi[R
(n)
S ] and Λ
(V )
i−1 in




(1),i+1 will be repeated in outer-layer
T̃(1),i associated to Receiver 1. This particular encoding is represented in Figure 5.3.
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
Figure 5.3: Case B when I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)): inner-layer encoding to achieve the corner point
of R(2)MI-WTBC that leads to the construction of Ã1:L[H
(n)











Λ are those areas filled with yellow squares, blue circles, blue triangles, blue
and yellow diamonds, pink crosses, and gray pentagons, respectively; and I(n) is the green filled area. At
Block i ∈ [1, L], W (V )(2),i is represented by symbols of the same color (e.g., red symbols at Block 2), and Θ
(V )
i ,
Ψ(V )i and Γ
(V )





by circles and triangles, respectively, with a line through them. At Block i ∈ [2, L− 1], the diamonds denote
Γ̄(V )1,i−1 ⊕ Γ
(V )
1,i+1. For i ∈ [1, L − 1], the elements of Γ
(V )
i+1 that do not belong to Γ
(V )
1,i+1 are not repeated in
Ãi[G(n)], but ∆(V )(1),i+1 = Γ
(V )
3,i+1 will be sent to the outer-layer T̃(1),i. In Block i ∈ [1, L], S
(V )
(2),i is stored into
those entries whose indices belong to the green filled area. For i ∈ [2, L], Π(V )(2),i−1 is denoted by crosses and
is repeated in Ãi[R(n)S ]. For i ∈ [1, L− 1], the sequence Π
(V )
(1),i+1 is denoted by hexagons, and it will be send
also to T̃(1),i. At Block 1, Λ
(V )
1 is denoted by gray pentagons and is repeated in all blocks. Finally, Υ
(V )
(1) and
Υ(V )(2) are those entries inside the red curve at Block 1 and the blue curve at Block L, respectively.
Case B when I(V ; Y(1)) < I(V ; Z) ≤ I(V ; Y(2))
1. Achievability of (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊂ R(1)MI-WTBC. In this situation, according to
condition (5.28),
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. Therefore, for i ∈ [1, L− 1], sequence
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. Thus, we define





















∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣,
and R′(n)1,2 , ∅. Therefore, according to (5.30)–(5.32), we have R
(n)






















p,i , ∅ for p ∈ [2, 3].
Also, we define Γ(V )1,i as any part of Γ
(V )
i with size
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ(V )2,i as the remaining part with
size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣−∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ and Γ(V )3,i , ∅; and Γ̄(V )1,i as any part of Γ̄(V )i with size ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ̄(V )2,i as any
part of Γ̄(V )i that is not included in Γ̄
(V )
1,i with size
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣−∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣, and Γ̄(V )3,i as the remaining
part of Γ̄(V )i with size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣−∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣−(∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣−∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣). Thus, according to (5.36)–(5.39), for








= ∅, ∆(V )(1),i = Γ̄
(V )
3,i
and ∆(V )(2),i = ∅. According to Algorithm 5.2, since I





carry confidential information S(V )(1),2:L−1. For i ∈ [1, L− 1], ∆
(V )
(1),i+1 will be repeated in
outer-layer T̃n(1),i. This particular encoding is graphically represented in Figure 5.4.
2. Achievability of (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)





the same as the one to achieve this rate tuple when I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)).
Case B when I(V ; Y(1)) ≤ I(V ; Y(2)) < I(V ; Z)
1. Achievability of (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊂ R(1)MI-WTBC. In this situation, define





















and R′(n)1,2 , ∅. Thus, according to (5.30)–(5.32), R
(n)





In this situation we have defined R′(n)1 and R
′(n)
2 as above because, according to
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Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
Figure 5.4: Case B when I(V ;Y(1)) < I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)): inner-layer encoding to achieve the corner
point of R(1)MI-WTBC that leads to the construction of Ã1:L[H
(n)











Λ are those areas filled with yellow squares, yellow triangles, blue
circles, blue triangles, blue and yellow diamonds, and gray pentagons, respectively. At Block i ∈ [1, L], W (V )(1),i





represented by squares, circles and triangles respectively. Also, Θ̄(V )i and Γ̄
(V )
i are denoted by squares and
triangles, respectively, with a line through them. At Block i ∈ [2, L− 1], the diamonds denote Γ(V )i−1 ⊕ Γ̄
(V )
i+1.
For i ∈ [2, L− 1], Ãi[G(n)] does not carry confidential information S(V )(1),i, but only Ã1[G
(n)] and ÃL[G(n)]
does (into the green area). The elements of Γ̄(V )2,i+1 that do not fit in Ãi[R
′(n)
1 ] will be sent to outer-layer
T̃n(1),i. At Block 1, Λ
(V )
1 is denoted by gray pentagons, and is repeated in all blocks. Finally, sequences Υ
(V )
(1)
and Υ(V )(2) are those entries inside the red curve at Block 1 and the blue curve at Block L, respectively.
condition (5.29),
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ and ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣.
Therefore, neither Γ(V )i−1 (for i ∈ [2, L]) nor Γ̄
(V )




























p,i , ∅ for p ∈ [2, 3];
we define Γ(V )1,i as any part of Γ
(V )
i with size
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ(V )2,i as any part of Γ(V )i that
is not included in Γ(V )1,i with size
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣, and Γ(V )3,i as the remaining part of
Γ(V )i with size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ − (∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣); and we define Γ̄(V )1,i as any part of
Γ̄(V )i with size
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ̄(V )2,i as any part of Γ̄(V )i that is not included in Γ̄(V )1,i with size∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣−∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣, and Γ̄(V )3,i as the remaining part with size ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣−∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣−(∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣−∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣).















3,i . According to




does not carry confidential information
S
(V )
(1),2:L−1. For i ∈ [1, L − 1], ∆
(V )





i ∈ [2, L], will be repeated in T̃n(2),i. This particular encoding is represented in Figure 5.5.
2. Achievability of (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)




is almost the same as that to achieve the previous corner point of region R(1)MI-WTBC: to
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Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
Figure 5.5: Case B when I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)) < I(V ;Z): inner-layer encoding to achieve the corner
point of R(1)MI-WTBC that leads to the construction of Ã1:L[H
(n)











Λ are those areas filled with yellow squares, yellow triangles, blue
circles, blue triangles, blue and yellow diamonds, and gray pentagons, respectively. At Block i ∈ [1, L],
W
(V )









i are denoted by
squares and triangles, respectively, with a line through them. The diamonds at Block i ∈ [2, L− 1] denote
Γ(V )1,i−1 ⊕ Γ̄
(V )
1,i+1. For i ∈ [2, L− 1], Ãi[G
(n)] does not carry confidential information S(V )(1),i, but only Ã1[G
(n)]















(1),i, respectively. At Block 1, Λ
(V )
1 is denoted
by gray pentagons and is replicated in all blocks. Finally, sequences Υ(V )(1) and Υ
(V )
(2) are those entries inside
the red curve at Block 1 and the blue curve at Block L, respectively.
Case C when I(V ; Z) ≤ I(V ; Y(1)) ≤ I(V ; Y(2))




2 | ≤ |C
(n)
1 | and |G
(n)
0 | > |C
(n)
1,2 |.
1. Achievability of (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)




in this case is the same as that in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.2, Case C). Since
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ ≤ ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣,









R(n)1 , the union of G
(n)





∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣,








1,2 , ∅. Hence, according to (5.30)–(5.32), we have R
(n)
S = ∅ and












From condition (5.27), all previous sets exist. For i ∈ [1, L], we define Ψ(V )1,i , Ψ
(V )
i ,
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p,i , ∅ for









= ∅, and ∆(V )(1),i = ∆
(V )
(2),i = ∅. According to Algorithm 5.2, the
inner-layer carries confidential information S(V )(1),1:L intended for Receiver 1. For i ∈ [2, L],
the encoder repeats Λ(V )i−1 in Ãi[R
(n)
Λ ] and, therefore, Λ
(V )
1 is replicated in all blocks. This
particular encoding procedure is graphically represented in Chapter 4 (Figure 4.5).
2. Achievability of (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)













2 . Thus, according to


































for p ∈ [2, 3]. Now, we define Θ(V )1,i as any part of Θ
(V )
i with size
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣, Θ(V )2,i , ∅, and
Θ(V )3,i as the remaining part of Θ
(V )
i with size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣. According to (5.36)–(5.39),








with size∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣, ∆(V )(1),i = Θ(V )3,i , and ∆(V )(2),i = ∅. Now, the inner-layer carries confidential





will be repeated in outer-layer T̃n(1),i. This particular encoding is represented in Figure 5.6.
Case C when I(V ; Y(1)) < I(V ; Z) ≤ I(V ; Y(2))
1. Achievability of (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊂ R(1)MI-WTBC. In this situation, according
to (5.28),
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. Hence, for i ∈ [1, L − 1], Θ̄(V )i+1 cannot be






























1,2 , ∅. Then, according to (5.30)–(5.32), R
(n)



























for p ∈ [2, 3]. Also, we define Θ̄(V )1,i as any part of Θ̄
(V )
i with size
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣+(∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣−∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣),
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Θ̄(V )2,i = ∅ and Θ̄
(V )
3,i as the remaining part with size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− (∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣).









= ∅, ∆(V )(1),i = Θ̄
(V )
3,i , and ∆
(V )
(2),i = ∅. Since I





does not carry confidential information S(V )(1),2:L−1. For i ∈ [1, L − 1],
sequence ∆(V )(1),i+1 will be repeated in outer-layer T̃
n
(1),i associated to Receiver 1.
2. Achievability of (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)




is the same as that to achieve this rate tuple when I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)).
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
Figure 5.6: Case C when I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)): inner-layer encoding to achieve the corner
point of R(2)MI-WTBC that leads to the construction of Ã1:L[H
(n)







Λ are those areas filled with yellow squares, blue circles, blue and yellow diamonds, and
gray pentagons, respectively, and I(n) is the green filled area. At Block i ∈ [1, L], W (V )(2),i is represented by




i are represented by squares,
circles and triangles respectively. Also, Ψ̄(V )i and Γ̄
(V )
i are denoted by circles and triangles, respectively,
with a line through them. At Block i ∈ [2, L− 1], the diamonds denote Γ̄(V )1,i−1 ⊕ Γ
(V )
1,i+1. For i ∈ [1, L− 1],
the elements of Θ(V )i+1 that do not belong to Θ
(V )
1,i+1 are not repeated in Ãi[G
(n)], but ∆(V )(1),i+1 = Θ
(V )
3,i+1 will
be sent to the outer-layer T̃(1),i. For i ∈ [1, L], confidential information S
(V )
(2),i is stored into those entries
belonging to the green area. For i ∈ [1, L− 1], sequence Π(V )(1),i+1 is denoted by hexagons, and it will be send
also to T̃(1),i. At Block 1, Λ
(V )
1 is denoted by gray pentagons and is replicated in all blocks. Finally, Υ
(V )
(1)
and Υ(V )(2) are those entries inside the red curve at Block 1 and the blue curve at Block L, respectively.
Case D when I(V ; Z) ≤ I(V ; Y(1)) ≤ I(V ; Y(2))




2 | < |C
(n)
1 | and |G
(n)
0 | > |C
(n)
1,2 |.
1. Achievability of (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)





is the same as the one described in Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.2, Case D).
Since |G(n)1 | < |C
(n)
2 |, now for i ∈ [2, L] only a part of Ψ
(V )
i−1 can be repeated entirely in
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∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣,
R(n)1 , the union of G
(n)








∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− (∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣);
and R′(n)1 = R
′(n)
2 , ∅. Hence, according to (5.30)–(5.32), we have R
(n)
S = ∅ and

















and Γ̄(V )p,i = Γ
(V )
p,i , ∅ for p ∈ [2, 3]. On the other hand, define Ψ
(V )




∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣, Ψ(V )2,i as the remaining part with size ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣, and Ψ(V )3,i , ∅; and
Θ̄(V )1,i as any part of Θ̄
(V )
i with size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣−(∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣), Θ̄(V )2,i as the remaining part
with size
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣, and Θ̄(V )3,i , ∅. Thus, from (5.36)–(5.39), for i ∈ [1, L] we have








= ∅, and ∆(V )(1),i = ∆
(V )
(2),i = ∅.
According to Algorithm 5.2, the inner-layer carries confidential information S(V )(1),1:L
intended for Receiver 1. Also, instead of repeating Ψ(V )2,i−1 (the part of Ψ
(V )
i−1 that does



















, where Θ̄(V )2,i+1 denotes the elements of Θ̄
(V )





. Finally, for i ∈ [2, L], Λ(V )i−1 is repeated in Ãi[R
(n)
Λ ] and, hence, Λ
(V )
1 is
replicated in all blocks. This particular encoding is represented in Chapter 4 (Figure 4.6).
2. Achievability of (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)














according to (5.30), (5.33) and (5.34), we have R(n)S = ∅ and




















p,i , ∅ for p ∈ [2, 3]; and
define Ψ̄(V )1,i as any part Ψ̄
(V )
i with size
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣, Ψ̄(V )2,i as the remaining part with size∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣, and Ψ̄(V )3,i , ∅. On the other hand, define Θ(V )1,i as any part of Θ(V )i with
size
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣, Θ(V )2,i as any part of Θ(V )i that is not included in Θ(V )1,i with size ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣−∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣,
and Θ(V )3,i as the remaining part of Θ
(V )
i with size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ − (∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣).
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= ∅, ∆(V )(1),i = Θ
(V )
3,i , and ∆
(V )
(2),i = ∅. Now, the inner-layer carries
confidential information S(V )(2),1:L intended for Receiver 2. For i ∈ [1, L− 1], sequence
∆(V )(1),i+1 will be repeated in outer-layer T̃
n
(1),i. This particular encoding procedure is
graphically represented in Figure 5.7.
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
Figure 5.7: Case D when I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)): inner-layer encoding to achieve the corner
point of R(2)MI-WTBC that leads to the construction of Ã1:L[H
(n)









Λ are those areas filled with yellow squares, blue circles, blue and yellow diamonds, yellow
squares overlapped by blue circles, and gray pentagons, respectively, and I(n) is the green filled area. At







by squares, circles and triangles respectively. Also, Ψ̄(V )i and Γ̄
(V )
i are denoted by circles and triangles,
respectively, with a line through them. At Block i ∈ [2, L− 1], the diamonds denote Γ̄(V )1,i−1 ⊕ Γ
(V )
1,i+1, while
the yellow squares overlapped by blue circles denote Ψ̄(V )2,i−1 ⊕Θ
(V )
2,i+1. For i ∈ [1, L− 1], the elements of Θ
(V )
i+1
that are included neither in Θ(V )1,i+1 nor Θ
(V )
2,i+1 are not repeated in Ãi[G
(n)], but ∆(V )(1),i+1 = Θ
(V )
3,i+1 will be
sent to outer-layer T̃(1),i. For i ∈ [1, L], S
(V )
(2),i is stored into those entries belonging to the green area. At





are those entries inside the red curve at Block 1 and the blue curve at Block L, respectively.
Case D when I(V ; Y(1)) < I(V ; Z) ≤ I(V ; Y(2))
1. Achievability of (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊂ R(1)MI-WTBC. In this situation, according
to (5.28),
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. Hence, for i ∈ [1, L − 1], Θ̄(V )i+1 cannot be








. Therefore, define R(n)2 , G
(n)
1 ,
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and R′(n)1 = R
′(n)
2 , ∅. Then, from (5.30)–(5.32), R
(n)















p,i , ∅ for p ∈ [2, 3]; and
define Ψ(V )1,i as any part Ψ
(V )
i with size
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣, Ψ(V )2,i as the remaining part with size∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣, and Ψ(V )3,i , ∅. On the other hand, we define Θ̄(V )1,i as any part of
Θ̄(V )i with size
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ + ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ − (∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ + ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣), Θ̄(V )2,i as any part of Θ̄(V )i
that is not included in Θ̄(V )1,i with size
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣, and Θ̄(V )3,i as the remaining part
with size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ − (∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ + ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣). According to (5.36)–(5.39), for i ∈ [1, L]








= ∅, ∆(V )(1),i = Θ̄
(V )
3,i ,
and ∆(V )(2),i = ∅. Since I




does not carry confidential information
S
(V )
(1),2:L−1. For i ∈ [1, L− 1], sequence ∆
(V )
(1),i+1 will be repeated in outer-layer T̃
n
(1),i.
2. Achievability of (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)




is the same as that to achieve this rate tuple when I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)).
Case D when I(V ; Y(1)) ≤ I(V ; Y(2)) < I(V ; Z)
1. Achievability of (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊂ R(1)MI-WTBC. In this situation, from (5.29),
we have
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ and ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣. Therefore:



















2 , ∅. Then, from (5.30)–(5.32), we have













Γ̄(V )p,i = Γ
(V )
p,i , ∅ for p ∈ [2, 3]. Also, we define Θ̄
(V )




Θ̄(V )2,i as any part of Θ̄
(V )
i that is not included in Θ̄
(V )
1,i with size
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣, and
Θ̄(V )3,i as the remaining part of Θ̄
(V )
i with size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− (∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣). On the
other hand, define Ψ(V )1,i as any part of Ψ
(V )
i with size
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣, Ψ(V )2,i as any part of Ψ(V )i
that is not included in Ψ(V )1,i with size
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣, and Ψ(V )3,i as the remaining part
with size
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− (∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣). According to (5.36)–(5.39), for i ∈ [1, L] we








= ∅, ∆(V )(1),i = Θ̄
(V )
3,i , and
∆(V )(2),i = Ψ
(V )
3,i . The sequence ∆
(V )
(1),i+1 (i ∈ [1, L − 1]) will be repeated in T̃
n
(1),i, while
∆(V )(2),i−1 (i ∈ [2, L]) will be stored in T̃
n





carry confidential information. This particular encoding is represented in Figure 5.8.
2. Achievability of (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)




is almost the same as that to achieve the previous corner point of region R(1)MI-WTBC: to
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Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
Figure 5.8: Case D when I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)) < I(V ;Z): inner-layer encoding to achieve the corner point
of R(1)MI-WTBC that leads to the construction of Ã1:L[H
(n)









Λ are those areas filled with yellow squares, blue circles, blue and yellow diamonds,
yellow squares overlapped by blue circles, and gray pentagons, respectively. At Block i ∈ [1, L], W (V )(1),i is





by squares, circles and triangles respectively. Also, Θ̄(V )i and Γ̄
(V )
i are denoted by squares and triangles,
respectively, with a line through them. The diamonds at Block i ∈ [2, L − 1] represent Γ(V )1,i−1 ⊕ Γ̄
(V )
1,i+1,
while the squares overlapped by circles denote Ψ(V )2,i−1 ⊕ Θ̄
(V )
2,i+1. For i ∈ [2, L− 1], Ãi[G
(n)] does not carry
confidential information S(V )(1),i, but only Ã1[G
(n)] and ÃL[G(n)] does (into the green area). The elements
of Ψ(V )i−1, or Θ̄
(V )













respectively. At Block 1, Λ(V )1 is denoted by gray pentagons and is repeated in all blocks. Finally, sequences
Υ(V )(1) and Υ
(V )
(2) are those entries inside the red curve at Block 1 and the blue curve at Block L, respectively.
Case E when I(V ; Y(1)) < I(V ; Z) ≤ I(V ; Y(2))




2 | < |C
(n)
1 | and |G
(n)
0 | < |C
(n)
1,2 |.
1. Achievability of (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
















∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣,
and R′(n)1 = R
′(n)
1,2 , ∅. Then, from (5.30)–(5.32), we have R
(n)










From condition (5.28), all previous sets exist. For i ∈ [1, L], we define Ψ(V )1,i , Ψ
(V )
i
and Ψ(V )p,i , ∅ for p ∈ [2, 3]. Also, we define Θ̄
(V )




Θ̄(V )2,i , ∅, and Θ̄
(V )
3,i as the remaining part with size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣. We define Γ(V )1,i as
any part of Γ(V )i with size
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ(V )2,i as the remaining part with size ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, and
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Γ(V )3,i , ∅. Finally, Γ̄
(V )
1,i is defined as any part of Γ̄
(V )
i with size
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ̄(V )2,i , ∅, and
Γ̄(V )3,i as the remaining part of Γ̄
(V )
i with size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. According to (5.36)–(5.39),
















∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ + ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, and ∆(V )(2),i = ∅. Since




does not carry confidential information S(V )(1),2:L−1. For i ∈ [1, L−1],
sequence ∆(V )(1),i+1 will be repeated in outer-layer T̃
n
(1),i.
2. Achievability of (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)





similar to the previous one to achieve the previous corner point of region R(1)MI-WTBC. We










1,2 as for the previous corner point. Thus,
according to (5.30), (5.33) and (5.34), we have R(n)S = ∅ and














p,i , ∅ for p ∈ [2, 3]. Also, Θ
(V )
1,i is defined
as any part of Θ(V )i with size
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣, Θ(V )2,i , ∅, and Θ(V )3,i as the remaining part with size∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣. We define Γ̄(V )1,i as any part of Γ̄(V )i with size ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ̄(V )2,i as the remaining
part with size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, and Γ̄(V )3,i , ∅. Finally, we define Γ(V )1,i as any part of Γ(V )i
with size
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ̄(V )2,i , ∅, and Γ(V )3,i as the remaining part with size ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. From









∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− (∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣), ∆(V )(2),i = ∅ and ∆(V )(1),i = [Θ(V )3,i ,Γ(V )3,i ] with
size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. According to Algorithm 5.2, now Ãn1:L[G(n)] carries
confidential information S(V )(2),1:L. For i ∈ [1, L− 1], ∆
(V )
(1),i+1 will be repeated in T̃
n
(1),i.
Case E when I(V ; Y(1)) ≤ I(V ; Y(2)) < I(V ; Z)
1. Achievability of (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊂ R(1)MI-WTBC. According to condition (5.29),
now we have
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣ and ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. Now,
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and R′(n)1 = R
′(n)
1,2 , ∅. Then, from (5.30)–(5.32), we have R
(n)
S = I(n) = ∅ and
R(n)Λ = G
(n)






p,i , ∅ for p ∈ [2, 3]. Also,
Θ̄(V )1,i is defined as any part of Θ̄
(V )
i with size
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣, Θ̄(V )2,i , ∅, and Θ̄(V )3,i as the
remaining part with size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣. We define Γ̄(V )1,i as any part of Γ̄(V )i with size∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ̄(V )2,i , ∅, and Γ̄(V )3,i as the remaining part with size ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. Finally,
we define Γ(V )1,i as any part of Γ
(V )
i with size
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ(V )2,i as any part of Γ(V )i that is
not included in Γ(V )1,i with size
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣, and Γ(V )3,i as the remaining part with
size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− (∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣). According to (5.36)–(5.39), for i ∈ [1, L] we have








= ∅, ∆(V )(1),i=
[




with size∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, and ∆(V )(2),i= Γ(V )3,i with size ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣−∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣−∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣+∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣.





(i ∈ [1, L− 1]) will be repeated in T̃n(1),i, and ∆
(V )
(2),i−1 (i ∈ [2, L]) will be repeated in T̃
n
(2),i.
2. Achievability of (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)





exactly the same as the one to achieve the previous corner point of region R(1)MI-WTBC.
Case F when I(V ; Y(1) ≤ I(V ; Y(2)) < I(V ; Z)




2 | < |C
(n)
1 | and |G
(n)
0 | < |C
(n)
1,2 |.
1. Achievability of (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)
, R?1W(1) , R
?1
W(2)
) ⊂ R(1)MI-WTBC. In this case, for i ∈ [2, L] the








. Also, for i ∈ [1, L−

























1,2 , ∅. For i ∈ [1, L],
we define Ψ(V )1,i as any part of Ψ
(V )
i with size
∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣, Ψ(V )1,i , ∅, and Ψ(V )3,i as the remaining
part with size
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣. Also, we define Θ̄(V )1,i as any part of Θ̄(V )i with size ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣,
Θ̄(V )2,i , ∅, and Θ̄
(V )
3,i as the remaining part with size
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣−∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣. Finally, we define Γ(V )1,i




i , respectively, with size
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, Γ(V )2,i = Γ̄(V )2,i , ∅,
and Γ(V )3,i and Γ̄
(V )
3,i as the remaining parts with size
∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. According to (5.36)–
















∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣, and ∆(V )(2),i= [Ψ(V )3,i ,Γ(V )3,i ]
with size
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣−∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣+∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣−∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣. Since I(n) = ∅, Ãn2:L−1 does not carry confidential
information S(V )(1),2:L−1. Lastly, ∆
(V )
(1),i+1 (i ∈ [1, L − 1]) will be repeated in T̃
n
(1),i, and
∆(V )(2),i−1 (i ∈ [2, L]) will be repeated in T̃
n
(2),i.
2. Achievability of (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)





almost the same as that to achieve the previous corner point of region R(1)MI-WTBC: to
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p,i for p ∈ [1, 3] and i ∈ [1, L] in each case, we have:
1. when I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)),
• if the PCS operates to achieve (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)




– the inner-layer carries S(V )(1),1:L, and
∣∣I(n)∣∣ = ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣;
– we have Π(V )(1),i = ∅ and ∆
(V )
(1),i = ∅;
– we have ∆(V )(2),i = ∅.
• if the PCS operates to achieve (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)




– the inner-layer carries S(V )(2),1:L, and
∣∣I(n)∣∣ = ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣;







∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣;
– we have ∆(V )(2),i = ∅.
2. when I(V ;Y(1)) < I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)),
• if the PCS operates to achieve (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)




– the inner-layer carries S(V )(1),1:L, but
∣∣I(n)∣∣ = 0;
– we have Π(V )(1),i = ∅, and the size of ∆
(V )
(1),i is
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣;
– we have ∆(V )(2),i = ∅.
• if the PCS operates to achieve (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)




– the inner-layer carries S(V )(2),1:L, and
∣∣I(n)∣∣ = ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣;







∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣;
– we have ∆(V )(2),i = ∅.
3. when I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)) < I(V ;Z),
• if the PCS operates to achieve (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)




– the inner-layer carries S(V )(1),1:L, but
∣∣I(n)∣∣ = 0;
– we have Π(V )(1),i = ∅, and the size of ∆
(V )
(1),i is
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣;
– the length of ∆(V )(2),i is
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣.
• if the PCS operates to achieve (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)




– the inner-layer carries S(V )(2),1:L, but
∣∣I(n)∣∣ = 0;
– we have Π(V )(1),i = ∅, and the size of ∆
(V )
(1),i is
∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣;
– the length of ∆(V )(2),i is
∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣.
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5.2.2 Construction of the outer-layers
Consider that the PCS must achieve (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
)⊆R(k)MI-WTBC, where k ∈ [1, 2].
In order to achieve this corner point, for i ∈ [1, L] the PCS first constructs T̃n(k),i associated
to Receiver k, and then forms T̃n(k̄),i associated to Receiver k̄, where recall that k̄ = [1, 2] \ k.






U(k)|V Z and L
(n)
U(k)|V Y(k)
associated to outer-layer Tn(k) = Un(k)Gn are defined as in (5.11)–(5.14). Besides the
previous sets, define the following partition of H(n)U(k)|V :
F (n)0 , H
(n)
U(k)|V Z ∩ L
(n)
U(k)|V Y(k) , (5.40)
F (n)k , H
(n)
U(k)|V Z \ L
(n)
U(k)|V Y(k) , (5.41)





)C ∩ L(n)U(k)|V Y(k) , (5.42)





)C \ L(n)U(k)|V Y(k) . (5.43)




will be suitable for storing uniformly distributed ran-
dom sequences that are independent of Ṽ ni , and T̃(k),i
[








is suitable for storing information to be secured from the eavesdropper. Moreover,
T̃(k),i
[










is the uniformly distributed part
independent of Ṽ ni that is needed by Receiver k to reliably reconstruct T̃n(k),i from
observations Ỹ n(k),i and sequence Ṽ ni by performing SC decoding.
We consider that I(U(k);Y(k)|V ) ≥ I(U(k);Z|V ) (see Remark 5.8 and Remark 5.9).
Therefore, besides the partition defined in (5.40)–(5.43), we define
D(n)k , any subset of F
(n)
0 with size
∣∣J (n)k ∣∣, (5.44)





{∣∣C(n)k ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)k̄ ∣∣}+. (5.45)
The set D(n)k exists because we have∣∣F (n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣J (n)k ∣∣ = ∣∣∣H(n)U(k)|V Z ∩ L(n)U(k)|V Y(k)∣∣∣− ∣∣∣H(n)U(k)|V ∩ (H(n)U(k)|V Z)C \ L(n)U(k)|V Y(k) ∣∣∣
≥
∣∣∣H(n)U(k)|V Z ∩ L(n)U(k)|V Y(k)∣∣∣− ∣∣∣(H(n)U(k)|V Z)C \ L(n)U(k)|V Y(k) ∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣H(n)U(k)|V Z∣∣∣− ∣∣∣(L(n)U(k)|V Y(k))C∣∣∣ ≥ 0, (5.46)
where the positivity holds by assumption and from applying Theorem 2.1 because
1
n
(∣∣∣H(n)U(k)|V Z∣∣∣− ∣∣∣(L(n)U(k)|V Y(k))C∣∣∣) n→∞−−−−→ H(U(k)|V Z)−H(U(k)|V Y(k)). (5.47)
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On the other hand, according to (5.27)–(5.29), if k = 1 and k̄ = 2 then L(n)k = ∅ in
Situation 1, where I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)); and L
(n)
k 6= ∅ in Situation 2, where
I(V ;Y(1))<I(V ;Z)≤I(V ;Y(2)), and Situation 3, where I(V ;Y(1))≤ I(V ;Y(2))< I(V ;Z).
Otherwise, if k = 2 and k̄ = 1, then we have L(n)k = ∅ in Situation 1 and Situation 2,
while L(n)k 6= ∅ in Situation 3. In situations where L
(n)
k 6= ∅, if we consider only input
distributions that imply (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
) ∈ R4+, set L
(n)
k exists because for






will be intended for storing
S(k), and the rate of S(k) carried in the inner-layer is is negligible (see Section 5.3.1).
2. New sets associated to Tn(k̄),1:L. Sets H
(n)
U(k̄)|V U(k)




associated to Tn(k̄) = U
n




∩ L(n)U(k̄)|V Y(k̄) , (5.48)
Q(n)
k̄










)C ∩ L(n)U(k̄)|V Y(k̄) , (5.50)
B(n)
k̄
, H(n)U(k̄)|V U(k) ∩
(
H(n)U(k̄)|V U(k)Z
)C \ L(n)U(k̄)|V Y(k̄) . (5.51)




will be suitable for storing uniformly






will be suitable for storing information to be secured from the eavesdropper. Moreover,







are required by Receiver k̄ to reliably construct the




(k̄),i) by using SC decoding. Additionally, define
O(n)
k̄
, any subset of Q(n)0 with size
∣∣∣(H(n)U(k̄)|V U(k))C ∩H(n)U(k̄)|V \ L(n)U(k̄)|V Y(k̄) ∣∣∣, (5.52)
N (n)
k̄









, which is defined as follows. If k = 1 and k̄ = 2, then






2 ) with size
{∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣}+.
(5.54)
Consequently, M(n)2 6= ∅ only in Situation 3, where I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)) < I(V ;Z).
On the other hand, if k = 2 and k̄ = 1, then








{ ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ if I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)),∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ otherwise. (5.55)
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Recall that I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)) in Situation 1, where I(V ;Z) < I(V ;Y(1)) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)),
and in Situation 2, where I(V ;Y(1)) < I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)).
If we consider only distributions implying (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)




















the only part that will be intended for storing confidential information S(k̄).
Construction of T̃ n(1),1:L and T̃ n(2),1:L for (R?1S(1) , R
?1
S(2)




In this case (k = 1 and k̄ = 2), given Ṽ ni , for i ∈ [1, L] the encoder first constructs T̃n(1),i
associated to Receiver 1. Then, given Ṽ ni and T̃n(1),i, it forms T̃n(2),i associated to Receiver 2.











1 as in (5.44) and (5.45) respectively.
For i ∈ [1, L], let W (U)(1),i be a uniformly distributed vector of length
∣∣J (n)0 ∪ J (n)1 ∣∣ that
represents part of the private message intended for Receiver 1. The encoder forms
T̃(1),i
[











required by Receiver 1 to reliably estimate T̃n(1),i. Hence, for i ∈ [1, L−1], sequence Θ
(U)
(1),i+1








. This sequence is not repeated directly, but
the encoder copies instead Θ̄(U)(1),i+1 that is obtained as follows. Let κ
(U)
Θ be a uniformly
distributed key with length
∣∣J (n)1 ∣∣ that is privately shared between transmitter and




Θ . Since κ
(U)
Θ is reused in
all blocks, it is clear that its size becomes negligible in terms of rate for L large enough.
For i ∈ [1, L], let S(U)(1),i be a uniformly distributed vector that represents part of the
confidential message intended for legitimate Receiver 1. At Block 1, S(U)(1),1 has size∣∣(F (n)0 ∪F (n)1 ) \ (D(n)1 ∪L(n)1 )∣∣ and is stored in T̃(1),1[(F (n)0 ∪F (n)1 ) \ (D(n)1 ∪L(n)1 )]; for
i ∈ [2, L−1], S(U)(1),i has size
∣∣F (n)0 \(D(n)1 ∪L(n)1 )∣∣ and is stored in T̃(1),i[F (n)0 \(D(n)1 ∪L(n)1 )];
and at Block L, S(U)(1),L has size
∣∣F (n)0 ∣∣ and is stored into T̃(1),L[F (n)0 ]. Moreover, for








and, therefore, Λ(U)(1),1, which contains part of S
(U)
(1),1, is replicated in all blocks.















in the last part of Section 5.2.1, notice that the length of ∆(V )(1),i+1 is
∣∣L(n)1 ∣∣.




and Ṽ ni the encoder forms the remaining
entries of T̃n(1),i by using SC encoding: deterministic SC encoding for the elements of
1From Section 5.2.1, Π̂(V )(1),1:L = ∅ when the PCS operates to achieve the corner point of R
(1)
MI-WTBC.





and random SC encoding for the entries of T̃(1),i
[(
H(n)U(1)|V
)C \ L(n)U(1)|V ].
For i ∈ [1, L], the encoder obtains Φ(U)(1),i , T̃(1),i
[(
H(n)U(1)|V












⊕ κ(U)ΥΦ(1) to Receiver 1, where κ
(U)
ΥΦ(1) is a uniformly distributed key with
size L
∣∣(H(n)U(1)|V )C \ L(n)U(1)|V Y(1)∣∣+ ∣∣H(n)U(1)|V \ L(n)U(1)|V Y(1)∣∣ that is privately shared between
transmitter and Receiver 1.
Figure 5.10 graphically represents this construction of T̃n(1),1:L if we do the following


























)C ← (H(n)U(1)|V U(2))C, O(U)(1),1:L ← ∅. Moreover, at
Block i ∈ [1, L− 1], the encoder repeats Θ(U)(1),i+1 ⊕ κ
(U)
Θ instead of Θ
(U)
(1),i+1.













2 as in (5.52)–(5.54) respectively.
The construction of T̃n(2),1:L is graphically summarized in Figure 5.9. For i ∈ [1, L], let
W
(U)
(2),i be a uniformly distributed vector of length
∣∣B(n)0 ∪B(n)2 ∣∣ that represents the entire













, which is required by Receiver 2 to reliably
estimate T̃n(2),i. Thus, for i ∈ [2, L], Ψ
(U)









For i ∈ [1, L], let S(U)(2),i be a uniformly distributed vector that represents part of the
confidential message intended for legitimate Receiver 2. At Block 1, S(U)(2),1 has size∣∣Q(n)0 ∪ Q(n)2 ∣∣ and is stored in T̃(2),1[Q(n)0 ∪ Q(n)2 ]; and for i ∈ [2, L], S(U)(2),i has size∣∣Q(n)0 \ (O(n)2 ∪ N (n)2 ∪M(n)2 )∣∣ and is stored in T̃(2),i[Q(n)0 \ (O(n)2 ∪ N (n)2 ∪M(n)2 )].









and, hence, Λ(U)(2),1, which contains part of S
(U)
(2),1, is replicated in all blocks.
Furthermore, for i ∈ [2, L] the encoder repeats ∆(V )(2),i−1, which recall that contains part








in the last part of Section 5.2.1, the length of ∆(V )(2),i−1 matches with
∣∣M(n)2 ∣∣.




, Ṽ ni and T̃n(1),i, the encoder forms the













)C \ L(n)U(2)|V U(1)] is drawn randomly.
For i ∈ [1, L], we define sequences O(U)(2),i , T̃(2),i
[(
H(n)U(2)|V U(1)
)C ∩H(n)U(2)|V \L(n)U(2)|V Y(2)]
and Φ(U)(2),i , T̃(2),i
[(
H(n)U(2)|V
)C \ L(n)U(2)|V Y(2)], where notice that [O(U)(2),i,Φ(U)(2),i] contains
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Set B(n)0










Contains part of W
(U)
(2),i








Contains part of W
(U)
(2),1
Contains part of W
(U)
(2),1
Contains part of W
(U)
(2),L


















Block 1 Block i Block L
Inner-layer ÃnL



































































Set M(n)2 ⇢ Q
(n)
0 Set M(n)2 ⇢ Q
(n)
0Set M(n)2 ⇢ Q
(n)
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Set O(n)2 ⇢ Q
(n)
















































Figure 5.9: Construction of outer-layer T̃(2),1:L associated to Receiver 2 when the PCS must aproach





) ⊆ R(1)MI-WTBC. For any Block i ∈ [1, L], blue and green colors
are used to represent the elements of T̃n(2),i that contain independent private and confidential information,
respectively. For i ∈ [2, L], orange, brown, red-purple and blue-purple colors represent those entries that
contain information repeated from Block i − 1: T̃(2),i[M
(n)














red-purple) repeats Λ(U)(2),i−1. Finally, for i ∈ [1, L], T̃(2),i[(H
(n)
U(2)|V U(1)
)C] (in red) is drawn by SC encoding.
those entries of T̃(2),i
[(
H(n)U(2)|V U(1)
)C] that are needed by Receiver 2 to reliably es-











)C \ L(n)U(2)|V Y(2)]. Let κ(U)O
be a uniformly distributed key with size
∣∣(H(n)U(2)|V U(1))C ∩ H(n)U(2)|V \ L(n)U(2)|V Y(2)∣∣ that







O . Since O
(U)
(2),i is required by Receiver 2 to estimate T̃
n
(2),i, for




. Notice that κ(U)O is reused in all
blocks, so it is clear that its size becomes negligible in terms of rate for L large enough.






from Block L, and
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⊕ κ(U)ΥΦ(2) to Receiver 2, κ
(U)
ΥΦ(2) being
a uniformly distributed key with size L
∣∣(H(n)U(2)|V )C \L(n)U(2)|V Y(2)∣∣+ ∣∣H(n)U(2)|V \L(n)U(2)|V Y(2)∣∣
that is privately shared between transmitter and Receiver 2.
Finally, for i ∈ [1, L], the encoder obtains X̃ni , f
(






, where recall that
f(·) may be any deterministic one-to-one function. The transmitter sends X̃ni over the
WTBC, which induces the channel outputs (Ỹ n(1),i, Ỹ n(2),i, Z̃ni ).
Remark 5.7. For i ∈ [2, L], notice that O(U)(2),i−1, which is not negligible in terms of rate, is









is suitable for storing sequences that are uniform and
independent of (Ṽ ni , T̃n(1),i), the secret-key κ
(U)
O is used to ensure that Ō
(U)
(2),i−1 is totally
random (see Section 5.3.2).
Construction of T̃ n(1),1:L and T̃ n(2),1:L for (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)




In this case (k = 2 and k̄ = 1), given Ṽ ni , for i ∈ [1, L] the encoder first constructs T̃n(2),i
associated to Receiver 2. Then, given Ṽ ni and T̃n(2),i, it forms T̃n(1),i associated to Receiver 1.











2 as in (5.44) and (5.45) respectively.
For i ∈ [1, L], let W (U)(2),i be a uniformly distributed vector of length
∣∣J (n)0 ∪ J (n)2 ∣∣ that
represents part of the private message intended for Receiver 2. The encoder forms
T̃(2),i
[











which is required by Receiver 2 to reliably estimate T̃n(2),i. Thus, for i ∈ [2, L], Ψ
(U)
(2),i−1








. This sequence is not repeated directly, but
the encoder copies instead Ψ̄(U)(2),i−1 that is obtained as follows. Let κ
(U)
Ψ be a uniformly
distributed key with length
∣∣J (n)2 ∣∣. Then, for i ∈ [1, L], we obtain Ψ̄(U)(2),i , Ψ(U)(2),i ⊕ κ(U)Ψ .
Since κ(U)Ψ is reused in all blocks, its size is negligible in terms of rate for L large enough.
For i ∈ [1, L], let S(U)(2),i be a uniformly distributed vector that represents the confidential
message intended for Receiver 2. At Block 1, S(U)(2),1 has size







; and for i ∈ [2, L], S(U)(2),i has size
















and, therefore, Λ(U)(2),1, which contains
part of the confidential message S(U)(2),1, is replicated in all blocks.
Furthermore, for i ∈ [2, L], the encoder repeats ∆(V )(2),i−1, which recall that contains part









the last part of Section 5.2.1, the length of sequence ∆(V )(2),i−1 is
∣∣L(n)2 ∣∣.
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For i ∈ [1, L], the encoder obtains Φ(U)(2),i , T̃(2),i
[(
H(n)U(2)|V












⊕ κ(U)ΥΦ(2) to Receiver 2, where κ
(U)
ΥΦ(2) now is a uniformly distributed
key with size L
∣∣(H(n)U(2)|V )C \ L(n)U(2)|V Y(2)∣∣+ ∣∣H(n)U(2)|V \ L(n)U(2)|V Y(2)∣∣ that is privately shared
between transmitter and Receiver 2.
Figure 5.9 may graphically represent this construction of T̃n(2),1:L if we do the following


























)C ← (H(n)U(2)|V U(1))C, O(U)(2),1:L ← ∅. Moreover, at
Block i ∈ [2, L], the encoder repeats Ψ(U)(2),i−1 ⊕ κ
(U)
Ψ instead of Ψ
(U)
(2),i−1.













1 as in (5.52), (5.53) and (5.55) respectively.
The construction of T̃n(2),1:L is graphically summarized in Figure 5.10. For i ∈ [1, L], let
W
(U)
(1),i be a uniformly distributed vector of length
∣∣B(n)0 ∪ B(n)1 ∣∣ that represents the entire












, which is required by












For i ∈ [1, L], let S(U)(1),i be a uniform vector that represents the confidential message
intended for Receiver 1. At Block 1, S(U)(1),1 has size
∣∣(Q(n)0 ∪Q(n)1 )\(O(n)1 ∪N (n)1 ∪M(n)1 )∣∣














; for i ∈ [2, L− 1], S(U)(1),i has
size
∣∣Q(n)0 \ (O(n)1 ∪N (n)1 ∪M(n)1 )∣∣ and is stored in T̃(1),i[Q(n)0 \ (O(n)1 ∪N (n)1 ∪M(n)1 )];
and at Block L, S(U)(1),L has size
∣∣Q(n)0 ∣∣ and is stored into T̃(1),L[Q(n)0 ]. Moreover, for









Hence, Λ(U)(1),1, which contains part of S
(U)
(1),1, is replicated in all blocks.






, which contains part





















, Ṽ ni and Ũn(2),i, the encoder forms the








is formed by performing
deterministic SC encoding, while T̃(1),i
[(
H(n)U(1)|V U(2)
)C \ L(n)U(1)|V U(2)] is drawn randomly.
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Contains part of W
(U)
(1),1
Contains part of W
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(U)
(1),L



















































Block 1 Block i Block L
Inner-layer ÃnL
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(n)






















































































Figure 5.10: Construction of outer-layer T̃(1),1:L associated to Receiver 1 when the PCS must aproach





) ⊆ R(2)MI-WTBC. For any Block i ∈ [1, L], blue and green colors
are used to represent the elements of T̃n(1),i that contain independent private and confidential information,
respectively. For i ∈ [1, L − 1], orange, brown and blue-purple colors represent those entries that contain
information repeated from Block i+ 1: T̃(1),i[M
(n)





(in brown) repeats Θ(U)(1),i+1, and T̃(1),i[O
(n)
1 ] (in blue-purple) repeats Ō
(U)
(1),i+1. Recall that Λ
(U)
(1),1, which
contain part of the confidential information of Block 1, is replicated in T̃(1),2:L[Q
(n)
1 ] (in red-purple). Finally,
for i ∈ [1, L], the elements of T̃(1),i[(H
(n)
U(1)|V U(2)
)C] (in red) are drawn by SC encoding.
For i ∈ [1, L], we define sequences O(U)(1),i , T̃(1),i
[(
H(n)U(1)|V U(2)
)C ∩H(n)U(1)|V \ L(n)U(1)|V Y(1)]
and Φ(U)(1),i , T̃(1),i
[(
H(n)U(1)|V
)C \ L(n)U(1)|V Y(1)], where notice that [O(U)(1),i,Φ(U)(1),i] contains
those entries of T̃(1),i
[(
H(n)U(1)|V U(2)












)C\L(n)U(1)|V Y(1)]. Let κ(U)O be a uniformly
distributed key with size
∣∣(H(n)U(1)|V U(2))C ∩H(n)U(1)|V \ L(n)U(1)|V Y(1)∣∣ that is privately-shared







(1),i is required by Receiver 1 to estimate T̃
n
(1),i, for i ∈ [1, L− 1] the encoder repeats







. Notice that κ(U)O is reused in all blocks, so it is clear that its
size becomes negligible in terms of rate for L large enough. Furthermore, the encoder













⊕ κ(U)ΥΦ(1) to Receiver 1, where κ
(U)
ΥΦ(1) is a uniformly distributed
key with size L
∣∣(H(n)U(1)|V )C \ L(n)U(1)|V Y(1)∣∣+ ∣∣H(n)U(1)|V \ L(n)U(1)|V Y(1)∣∣ that is privately shared
between transmitter and Receiver 1.
Finally, for i ∈ [1, L], the encoder obtains X̃ni , f
(






, where recall that
f(·) may be any deterministic one-to-one function. The transmitter sends X̃ni over the
WTBC, which induces the channel outputs (Ỹ n(1),i, Ỹ n(2),i, Z̃ni ).




, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
) ∈ R(k)MI-WTBC. If we consider that I(U(k);Y(k)|V ) < I(U(k);Z|V ),
according to (5.46) and (5.47), notice that
∣∣F (n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣J (n)k ∣∣ < 0. Consequently, if k = 1, for
i ∈ [1, L − 1] the encoder cannot repeat entirely the sequence Θ̄(U)(1),i+1 of length
∣∣J (n)1 ∣∣ in




. Similarly, if k = 2, for i ∈ [2, L] the encoder cannot repeat the
sequence Ψ̄(U)(2),i−1 of length
∣∣J (n)2 ∣∣ in T̃(2),i[F (n)0 ].
Therefore, under this assumption, the encoding strategy will be as follows. If k = 1, for
i ∈ [1, L] we will define ∆(U)(1),i as any part of Θ̄
(U)
(1),i with size
∣∣J (n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣F (n)0 ∣∣. For i ∈ [1, L−1],









. Similarly, if k = 2, for i ∈ [1, L]
we will define ∆(U)(2),i as any part of Ψ̄
(U)
(2),i with size
∣∣J (n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣F (n)0 ∣∣. For i ∈ [2, L], the sequence




, whereas the remaining





Remark 5.9. If we consider input distributions that imply (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)




for some k ∈ [1, 2], it is clear that if I(U(k);Y(k)|V ) < I(U(k);Z|V ) then we must only
consider those Situations (among 1 to 3) in the inner-layer where I(V ;Y(k)) ≥ I(V ;Z).
In this case, part of the elements of the inner-layer that previously carried confidential
information could be used now to carry ∆(U)(1),2:L or ∆
(U)
(2),1:L−1.
We will not go into the details of the encoding/decoding when I(U(k);Y(k)|V )<I(U(k);Z|V )
because both the construction and the performance analysis will be very similar to those of the
the contemplated cases such that the outer-layer must repeat some elements of the inner-layer.
5.2.3 Decoding
By using κ(V )ΥΦ(k) and κ
(U)













reliably obtained by Receiver k ∈ [1, 2] before starting the decoding process.
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Decoding at Receiver 1
This receiver forms the estimates Ân1:L and T̂n(1),1:L of Ãn1:L and T̃n(1),1:L respectively by going
forward, i.e., from (Ân1 , T̂n(1),1) to (ÂnL, T̂n(1),L). For i ∈ [1, L], it forms Âni first, and then T̂n(1),i.





MI-WTBC is summarized in Algorithm 5.3. Despite Ãn1:L does not carry
information intended for Receiver 1 when the PCS operates to achieve the corner point of
R
(2)
MI-WTBC, recall that this receiver needs Ãn1:L to reliably reconstruct T̃n(1),1:L.











, it knows Ã1
[(
L(n)V |Y(1)
)C] and T̃(1),1[(L(n)U(1)|V Y(1))C], respectively. Therefore,
from observations Ỹ n(1),1 and Ã1
[(
L(n)V |Y(1)
)C], it entirely constructs Ân1 by performing SC
decoding. Then, from Ỹ n(1),1, T̃(1),1
[(
L(n)U(1)|V Y(1)
)C] and V̂ n1 = Ân1Gn, this receiver form T̂n(1),1.
Recall that Λ(V )1 and Λ
(U)
(1),1 have been replicated in all blocks. Thus, Receiver 1 obtains













on whether the PCS must achieve the corner point of R(1)MI-WTBC or R
(2)
MI-WTBC respectively.
For i ∈ [1, L− 1], consider that Ân1:i and T̂n(1),1:i have already been constructed. Then, the
construction of Âni+1 and T̂n(1),i+1 is slightly different depending on whether the PCS must
achieve the corner point of R(1)MI-WTBC (k = 1) or R
(2)
MI-WTBC (k = 2):

















Notice in Algorithm 5.3 that secret-keys κ(V )Θ and κ
(V )
Γ are needed to obtain Θ̂
(V )
i+1 and




i−1 may also be necessary for this purpose,






has already been constructed.
Recall that part of Θ̂(V )i+1 and Γ̂
(V )
i+1 are obtained from T̂n(1),i. On the other hand, from








, and κ(U)Θ is needed to get Θ̂
(U)
(1),i+1.
k = 2) From Âni and T̂n(1),i, it obtains Υ̂
′(V )
(1),i+1 ,









. Now, for i ∈ [1, L − 1] the encoder have
repeated an encrypted version of Ψ(V )i and Γ
(V )





Θ(U)(1),i+1 have been repeated in Block i directly. Hence, notice in Algorithm 5.3 that
secret-keys κ(V )Ψ and κ
(V )




Θ are used in this case.




O , which recall
that contains part of the elements of T̂n(1),i+1 that have been drawn by performing SC










)C] and Ỹ n(1),i+1, it performs SC










V̂ ni+1 = Âni+1Gn and Ỹ n(1),i+1, it performs SC decoding to construct T̂n(1),i+1.
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Algorithm 5.3 Decoding at Receiver 1 when PCS operates to achieve the corner point of R(k)MI-WTBC







































. by using SC decoding












5: for i = 1 to L− 1 do
6: Π̂(V )(2),i ← Âi[I
(n) ∩ G(n)2 ]
7: if k = 1 then
8: Ψ̂(V )i ← Âi[C
(n)





9: ˆ̄Θ(V )1,i+1 ← Âi[R
(n)
1 ] and










ˆ̄Γ(V )2,i+1 ← Âi[R
′(n)
1 ]
11: ∆(U)(1),i+1 ← T̂(1),i[L
(n)
1 ] . ∆
(U)
(1),i+1 =
[ ˆ̄Θ(V )3,i+1, ˆ̄Γ(V )3,i+1]
12: Θ̂(V )i+1 ←
[ ˆ̄Θ(V )1,i+1, ˆ̄Θ(V )2,i+1, ˆ̄Θ(V )3,i+1]⊕ κ(V )Θ
13: Γ̂(V )i+1 ←
[ˆ̄Γ(V )1,i+1, ˆ̄Γ(V )2,i+1, ˆ̄Γ(V )3,i+1]⊕ κ(V )Γ
14: Υ̂′(V )(1),i+1 ←
(
























18: Ψ̂(V )i ← Âi[C
(n)















20: Θ̂(V )1,i+1 ← Âi[R
(n)






21: Γ̂(V )1,i+1 ← Âi[R
(n)
1,2 ]⊕





















23: Υ̂′(V )(1),i+1 ←
( ˆ̄Ψ(V )1,i , ˆ̄Γ(V )2,i , Π̂(V )(2),i, Π̂(V )(1),i+1, Θ̂(V )i+1, Γ̂(V )i+1, Λ̂(V )i+1)
24: Θ̂(U)(1),i+1 ← T̂(1),i[N
(n)
1 ]
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Decoding at Receiver 2
This receiver forms the estimates Ân1:L and T̂n(2),1:L of Ãn1:L and T̃n(2),1:L respectively by going
backward, that is, from (ÂnL, T̂n(2),L) to (Ân1 , T̂n(2),1).





MI-WTBC is summarized in Algorithm 5.4. Despite Ãn1:L does not carry
information intended for Receiver 2 when the PCS operates to achieve the corner point of
R
(1)
MI-WTBC, recall that this receiver needs Ãn1:L to reliably reconstruct T̃n(2),1:L.











, it knows ÃL
[(
L(n)V |Y(2)
)C] and T̃(2),L[(L(n)U(2)|V Y(2))C], respectively. Hence, from
observations Ỹ n(2),L and ÃL
[(
L(n)V |Y(2)
)C], it entirely constructs ÂnL by performing SC decoding.
Then, from Ỹ n(2),L, T̃(2),L
[(
L(n)U(2)|V Y(2)
)C] and V̂ nL = ÂnLGn, this receiver form T̂n(2),L.
Recall that Λ(V )1 and Λ
(U)
(2),1 have been replicated in all blocks. Thus, Receiver 2 obtains













on whether the PCS must achieve the corner point of R(1)MI-WTBC or R
(2)
MI-WTBC respectively.
For i ∈ [2, L], consider that Âni:L and T̂n(2),i:L have already been formed. Then, the
construction of Âni−1 and T̂n(2),i−1 is slightly different depending on whether the PCS must
achieve the corner point of R(1)MI-WTBC (k = 1) or R
(2)
MI-WTBC (k = 2):
k = 1) From Âni and T̂n(2),i, it obtains Υ̂
′(V )
(2),i−1 ,









. Notice in Algorithm 5.4 that κ(V )Θ and κ
(V )
Γ
are needed because the encoder have repeated an encrypted version of Θ̂(V )i and Γ̂
(V )
i
at Block i − 1. In order to obtain Ψ̂(V )i−1 and Γ̂
(V )
i−1, recall that part of these sequences
may have been repeated in T̃n(2),i. Moreover, notice that part of the encrypted versions
of Θ̂(V )i+1 and Γ̂
(V )











has already been constructed. Now Receiver 2 obtains Ψ(U)(2),i−1




O from T̃n(2),i, where recall that Ô
(U)
(2),i−1 contains part of
the elements of T̂n(2),i−1 that have been drawn by performing SC encoding.









































)C] and Ỹ n(2),i−1, it performs SC










V̂ ni−1 = Âni−1Gn and Ỹ n(2),i−1, it performs SC decoding to construct T̂n(2),i−1.
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Algorithm 5.4 Decoding at Receiver 2 when PCS operates to achieve the corner point of R(k)MI-WTBC







































. by using SC decoding












5: for i = L to 2 do
6: Π̂(V )(2),i−1 ← Âi[R
(n)
S ]
7: if k = 1 then
8: Θ̂(V )i ← Âi[C
(n)















10: Ψ̂(V )1,i−1 ← Âi[R
(n)






11: Γ̂(V )1,i−1 ← Âi[R
(n)
1,2 ]⊕





12: ∆(U)(2),i−1 ← T̂(2),i[M
(n)








13: Υ̂′(V )(1),i−1 ←
( ˆ̄Θ(V )1,i , ˆ̄Γ(V )2,i , Π̂(V )(2),i−1, Ψ̂(V )i−1, Γ̂(V )i−1, Λ̂(V )i−1)
14: Ψ̂(U)(2),i−1 ← T̂(2),i[N
(n)
2 ]














18: Θ̂(V )i ← Âi[C
(n)





19: ˆ̄Ψ(V )1,i−1 ← Âi[R
(n)
2 ] and










ˆ̄Γ(V )2,i−1 ← Âi[R
′(n)
2 ]
21: ∆(U)(2),i−1 ← T̂(2),i[L
(n)
2 ] . ∆
(U)
(2),i−1 =
[ ˆ̄Ψ(V )3,i−1, ˆ̄Γ(V )3,i−1]
22: Ψ̂(V )i−1 ←
[ ˆ̄Ψ(V )1,i−1, ˆ̄Ψ(V )2,i−1, ˆ̄Ψ(V )3,i−1]⊕ κ(V )Ψ
23: Γ̂(V )i−1 ←
[ˆ̄Γ(V )1,i−1, ˆ̄Γ(V )2,i−1, ˆ̄Γ(V )3,i−1]⊕ κ(V )Γ
24: Υ̂′(V )(2),i−1 ←
(
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Remark 5.10. According to the previous decoding algorithms, Receiver k ∈ [1, 2] decodes
both Ãni and T̃n(k),i from Block i ∈ [1, L] before moving to adjacent blocks (polar-based





, which is required by this receiver to reliably estimate Ãni+1, is repeated in
T̃n(1),i. Similarly, Receiver 2 needs ∆
(V )
(2),i−1 to reliably decode Ã
n
i−1, but it is repeated in T̂n(2),i.
Consider another decoding strategy for Receiver k ∈ [1, 2] that obtains first Ân1:L, and then
decodes the outer-layer T̃n(k),1:L. We refer to this decoding strategy as polar-based successive
decoding. Clearly, (R?2S(1) , R
?2
S(2)
, R?2W(1) , R
?2
W(2)
) ⊂ R(2)MI-WTBC is not achievable by using succes-





part of Section 5.2.1, in all cases T̃n(k),i contains elements required by Receiver 1 to reliably
decode Ãni+1. Furthermore, for the same reason, all situations where I(V ;Y(k)) < I(V ;Z) for
some k ∈ [1, 2] are not possible by using this strategy. Consequently, it is clear that joint
decoding enlarges the inner-bound on the achievable region for a particular distribution2.
5.3 Performance of the polar coding scheme
The analysis of the polar coding scheme of Section 5.2 leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1. Let (X , pY(1)Y(2)Z|X ,Y(1)×Y(2)×Z) be an arbitrary WTBC where X ∈ {0, 1}.
The PCS in Section 5.2 achieves any corner point (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)




given in (5.3)–(5.6) for any k ∈ [1, 2].
Corollary 5.1. The PCS achieves any rate tuple of R(k)MI-WTBC defined in Proposition 5.2.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 follows in four steps and is provided in the following subsections.
In Section 5.3.1 we show that the PCS approaches (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)




for any k ∈ [1, 2]. In Section 5.3.2 we prove that, for all i ∈ [1, L], the joint distribution of
(Ṽ ni , Ũn(1),i, Ũn(2),i, X̃ni , Ỹ n(1),i, Ỹ n(2),i, Z̃ni ) is asymptotically indistinguishable of the one of the
original DMS that is used for the polar code construction. Finally, in Section 5.3.3 and
Section 5.3.4 we show that the polar coding scheme satisfies the reliability and the secrecy
conditions given in (5.1) and (5.2) respectively.
5.3.1 Transmission rates




, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
) ⊂ R(k)MI-WTBC defined in (5.3)–(5.6) for any k ∈ [1, 2]. Also, we
2Although for a particular distribution the inner-bound is strictly larger with joint decoding, we cannot
affirm that this decoding strategy enlarges RMI-WTBC: rate points that are not achievable with successive
decoding for this particular distribution may be achievable under another distribution.
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asymptotically negligible in terms of rate, and so is the overall length of κ(V )Θ and κ
(U)
Θ if the




Ψ if the PCS
operates to achieve the corner point of R(2)MI-WTBC. Moreover, we show that so is the amount
of randomness required by the encoding (number of entries drawn by random SC encoding).
Private message rate












and W (U)(k),i = T̃(k),i
[









(∣∣W (V )(k),i∣∣+ ∣∣W (U)(k),i∣∣) (a)= 1n(∣∣∣H(n)V \ H(n)V |Z∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣H(n)U(k)|V \ H(n)U(k)|V Z∣∣∣)
(b)= 1
n
(∣∣H(n)V ∣∣− ∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣+ ∣∣H(n)U(k)|V ∣∣− ∣∣H(n)U(k)|V Z∣∣)
n→∞−−−−→ H(V )−H(V |Z) +H(U(k)|V )−H(U(k)|V Z),




k in (5.42) and
(5.43) respectively; (b) follows from the fact that H(n)V ⊇ H
(n)





and the limit holds by Theorem 2.1.
2. Rate of W(k̄). For i ∈ [1, L], all private information W(k̄),i is carried in layer T̃n(k̄),i.











∣∣W (U)(k̄),i∣∣ (a)= 1n ∣∣∣H(n)U(k̄)|V U(k) \ H(n)U(k̄)|V U(k)Z∣∣∣
(b)= 1
n
∣∣H(n)U(k̄)|V U(k)∣∣− 1n ∣∣H(n)U(k̄)|V U(k)Z∣∣
n→∞−−−−→ H(U(k̄)|V U(k))−H(U(k̄)|V U(k)Z),
where (a) holds by definition of B(n)0 and B
(n)
k̄
in (5.50) and (5.51) respectively; (b) holds
because H(n)U(k̄)|V U(k) ⊇ H
(n)
U(k̄)|V U(k)Z
; and the limit holds by Theorem 2.1.
Therefore, the PCS attains R?kW(k) and R
?k
W(k̄)
defined in (5.5) and (5.6) respectively.
Confidential message rate




, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
) ⊂ R(k)MI-WTBC, the inner-layer Ãn1:L and the outer-layer T̃n(k),1:L
carry confidential information S(k) intended for Receiver k, while the outer-layer T̃n(k̄),1:L
carries confidential information S(k̄) intended for Receiver k̄.
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1. Rate of S(k). First, consider the confidential information S
(V )
(k) that is carried in the


















the definition of the set I(n) depends on whether the PCS must achieve the corner point
of regions R(1)MI-WTBC or R
(2)
MI-WTBC.
If the PCS operates to achieve the corner point of R(1)MI-WTBC, we have∣∣I(n)∣∣ (a)= ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣R(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣R′(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣R(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣R′(n)1 ∣∣
(b)=
{∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣}+
(c)=
{∣∣∣H(n)V |Z ∩ L(n)V |Y(1)∣∣∣− ∣∣∣(H(n)V |Z)C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣∣}+
=
{∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣− ∣∣(L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣}+, (5.56)
where (a) holds by the definition of I(n) in (5.31); (b) holds because, in all cases when
I(V ;Y(1)) < I(V ;Z), we have
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ = ∣∣R(n)1,2 ∣∣+ ∣∣R′(n)1,2 ∣∣+ ∣∣R(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣R′(n)1 ∣∣ and∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ (see conditions in (5.28) and (5.29)) and, otherwise, we
have
∣∣R(n)1,2 ∣∣+∣∣R′(n)1 ∣∣ = ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣, ∣∣R(n)1 ∣∣+∣∣R′(n)1,2 ∣∣ = ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ and ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ ≥ ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣−∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣
(see condition in (5.27)); and (c) follows from the partition ofH(n)V defined in (5.19)–(5.26).
Similarly, if the PCS operates to achieve the corner point of R(2)MI-WTBC, we have∣∣I(n)∣∣ (a)= ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣R(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣R′(n)1,2 ∣∣
−
∣∣R(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣R′(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣R(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣R′(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣R(n)S ∣∣
(b)=
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣R(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣R′(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣R(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣R′(n)2 ∣∣
(c)=
{∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣}+
(d)=
{∣∣∣H(n)V |Z ∩ L(n)V |Y(2)∣∣∣− ∣∣∣(H(n)V |Z)C ∩ (L(n)V |Y(2))C∣∣∣}+
=
{∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣− ∣∣(L(n)V |Y(2))C∣∣}+, (5.57)
where (a) holds by the definition of I(n) in (5.33); (b) follows from (5.30) because the
set R(n)S has size
∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣R(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣R′(n)1 ∣∣; (c) holds because, in all cases contemplated
in Section 5.2.1 when I(V ;Y(2)) < I(V ;Z), we have
∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+ ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣ = ∣∣R(n)1,2 ∣∣+ ∣∣R′(n)1,2 ∣∣+∣∣R(n)2 ∣∣+∣∣R′(n)2 ∣∣ and ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣+∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣ < ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣−∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ (see condition in (5.29)) and, otherwise,
we have
∣∣R(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣R′(n)1,2 ∣∣ = ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ and ∣∣R(n)1,2 ∣∣+ ∣∣R′(n)2 ∣∣ = ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣ (see conditions in (5.27)
and (5.28)); and (d) follows from the partition of H(n)V defined in (5.19)–(5.26).
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(∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣− ∣∣∣(L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣∣)
(c)= 1
n














where (a) holds by the partition of H(n)V in (5.19)–(5.26); (b) follows from applying
elementary set operations and because
∣∣L(n)V |Y(1) ∩ L(n)V |Y(2)∣∣ ≤ ∣∣L(n)V |Y(`)∣∣ for any ` ∈ [1, 2];
(c) follows from (5.56) and (5.57); and the limit when n goes to infinity follows from
applying Theorem 2.1.
Now, consider the confidential information S(U)(k) that is carried in the outer-layer T̃
n
(k),1:L.









At Block 1, if k = 1 then we have S(U)(1),1 = T̃(1),1
[(











otherwise, we have S(U)(2),1 = T̃(2),1
[




. Finally, at Block L, if k = 1 then we



























(∣∣H(n)U(k)|V Z∣∣− ∣∣(L(n)U(k)|V Y(k))C∣∣− {∣∣C(n)k ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)k̄ ∣∣}+)
+ 1
nL
(∣∣H(n)U(k)|V Y(k) ∣∣+ {∣∣C(n)k ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)k̄ ∣∣}+)
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where (a) holds by (5.40)–(5.46) and recall that
∣∣D(n)k ∣∣+ ∣∣F (n)k ∣∣ = ∣∣H(n)U(k)|V \ L(n)U(k)|V Y(k)∣∣,
which is greater or equal to
∣∣H(n)U(k)|V Y(k)∣∣; and the limit when n goes to infinity follows
from applying Theorem 2.1, where we have used similar reasoning as in (5.56) and (5.57)
to obtain
{∣∣C(n)k ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)k̄ ∣∣}+ n→∞−−−−→ {H(V |Y(k))−H(V |Z)}+.









(∣∣S(V )(k),i∣∣+ ∣∣S(U)(k),i∣∣) n→∞−−−−→ H(V U(k)|Z)−H(V U(k)|Y(k)),
which is equal to the rate R?kS(k) defined in (5.3).
2. Rate of S(k̄). The confidential message S(k̄) is carried entirely in T̃n(k̄),1:L. According to


























































∣∣Q(n)0 \ (O(n)k̄ ∪N (n)k̄ ∪M(n)k̄ )∣∣+ 1nL ∣∣O(n)k̄ ∪N (n)k̄ ∪M(n)k̄ ∪Q(n)k̄ ∣∣
(a)= 1
n
(∣∣∣H(n)U(k̄)|V U(k)Z ∩ L(n)U(k̄)|V Y(k̄)∣∣∣− ∣∣∣(H(n)U(k̄)|V U(k))C ∩H(n)U(k̄)|V \ L(n)U(k̄)|V Y(k̄) ∣∣∣
−















(∣∣∣H(n)U(k̄)|V U(k)Z ∩ L(n)U(k̄)|V Y(k̄)∣∣∣− ∣∣∣(H(n)U(k̄)|V U(k)Z)C \ L(n)U(k̄)|V Y(k̄) ∣∣∣− ∣∣M(n)k̄ ∣∣)
+ 1
nL
(∣∣∣H(n)U(k̄)|V Y(k̄)∣∣∣+ ∣∣M(n)k̄ ∣∣)
= 1
n
(∣∣∣H(n)U(k̄)|V U(k)Z∣∣∣− ∣∣∣(L(n)U(k̄)|V Y(k̄))C∣∣∣− ∣∣M(n)k̄ ∣∣)+ 1nL(∣∣∣H(n)U(k̄)|V Y(k̄) ∣∣∣+ ∣∣M(n)k̄ ∣∣)
n→∞−−−−→ H(U(k̄)|V U(k)Z)−H(U(k̄)|V Y(k̄))−
(





H(U(k̄)|V Y(k̄))− (H(V |Y(k̄))−min{H(V |Y(2)), H(V |Z)})
)
L→∞−−−−→ H(U(k̄)|V U(k)Z)−H(U(k̄)|V Y(k̄))−
(
H(V |Y(k̄))−min{H(V |Y(2)), H(V |Z)}
)
,




)C ∩ H(n)U(k̄)|V and H(n)U(k̄)|V U(k) ∩ (H(n)U(k̄)|V U(k)Z)C are disjoint and










∣∣ = ∣∣H(n)U(k̄)|V \L(n)U(k̄)|V Y(k̄)∣∣,
which is greater or equal to
∣∣H(n)U(k̄)|V Y(k̄)∣∣; and the limit when n goes to infinity follows
from applying Theorem 2.1 and the definition of M(n)
k̄
. If k̄ = 1, according to (5.55)
we have
∣∣M(n)1 ∣∣ = ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣ + ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣ − ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ − ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ if I(V ;Z) ≤ I(V ;Y(2)), whereas∣∣M(n)1 ∣∣ = ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ if I(V ;Z) > I(V ;Y(2)), and we have∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣ n→∞−−−−→ H(V |Y(1))−H(V |Z)),
which follows from (5.56), while from the partition of H(n)V in (5.19)–(5.26) we obtain∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)2 ∣∣− ∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣ = ∣∣(L(n)V |Y(1))C ∩ L(n)V |Y(2)∣∣− ∣∣(L(n)V |Y(2))C ∩ L(n)V |Y(1)∣∣
=
∣∣(L(n)V |Y(1))C∣∣− ∣∣(L(n)V |Y(2))C∣∣,
n→∞−−−−→ H(V |Y(1))−H(V |Y(2)).
Otherwise, if k̄ = 2, from (5.54) we have
∣∣M(n)2 ∣∣={∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣}+ and{∣∣C(n)2 ∣∣+ ∣∣C(n)1,2 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)0 ∣∣− ∣∣G(n)1 ∣∣}+ n→∞−−−−→ {H(V |Y(2))−H(V |Z)}+
= H(V |Y(2))−min{H(V |Y(2)), H(V |Z)}.
Therefore, the PCS attains R?kS(k̄) defined in (5.4).
Private-shared sequence rate
First, recall that in Chapter 4 (Section 4.3.1) we have proved that
1
nL
(∣∣κ(V )Θ ∣∣+ ∣∣κ(V )Γ ∣∣+ 2∑
k=1
∣∣κ(V )ΥΦ(k) ∣∣) n,L→∞−−−−−→ 0.
If we substitute
∣∣κ(V )Θ ∣∣ by ∣∣κ(V )Ψ ∣∣, it is very easy to prove, by applying similar reasoning, that
the overall length is negligible in terms of rate as well.
If k = 1, we have
∣∣κ(U)Θ ∣∣ = ∣∣J (n)1 ∣∣ and ∣∣κ(U)Ψ ∣∣ = 0, whereas ∣∣κ(U)Θ ∣∣ = 0 and ∣∣κ(U)Ψ ∣∣ = ∣∣B(n)2 ∣∣
if k = 2. From the definition of J (n)1 and B
(n)
2 in (5.43) and (5.51) respectively, we obtain
1
nL
∣∣κ(U)Θ ∣∣ ≤ ∣∣(L(n)U(1)|V Y(1))C∣∣ n→∞−−−−→ 1LH(U(1)|V Y(1)) L→∞−−−−→ 0,
1
nL
∣∣κ(U)Ψ ∣∣ ≤ ∣∣(L(n)U(2)|V Y(2))C∣∣ n→∞−−−−→ 1LH(U(2)|V Y(2)) L→∞−−−−→ 0.
where the limit when n goes to infinity follows from applying Theorem 2.1.
















∣∣(H(n)U(k̄)|V )C \ L(n)U(k̄)|V Y(k̄) ∣∣+ ∣∣H(n)U(k̄)|V \ L(n)U(k̄)|V Y(k̄)∣∣)
+ 1
nL











∣∣(H(n)U(`)|V Y(`))C \ L(n)U(`)|V Y(`) ∣∣+ 1nL ∣∣(L(n)U(k)|V Y(k))C∣∣+ 2nL ∣∣(L(n)U(k̄)|V Y(k̄))C∣∣
n→∞−−−−→ 1
L
(H(U(k)|V Y(k)) + 2H(U(k̄)|V Y(k̄)))
L→∞−−−−→ 0,
where (a) holds because H(n)U(`)|V Y(`) ⊆ H
(n)
U(`)|V for any ` ∈ [1, 2]; and the limit when n goes
to infinity follows from applying Theorem 2.1.
Therefore, the amount of private-shared information between transmitter and legitimate
receivers is negligible in terms of rate, and so is the rate of the additional transmissions.
Rate of the additional randomness







)C \ L(n)U(k)|V ] and T̃(k̄),i[(H(n)U(k̄)|V U(k))C \ L(n)U(k̄)|V U(k)]. Nevertheless, we have
1
n
(∣∣(H(n)V )C \ L(n)V ∣∣+ ∣∣∣(H(n)U(k)|V )C \ L(n)U(k)|V ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣(H(n)U(k̄)|V U(k))C \ L(n)U(k̄)|V U(k) ∣∣∣) n→∞−−−−→ 0,
where the limit as n approaches infinity follows from applying Theorem 2.1.
5.3.2 Distribution of the DMS after the polar encoding





denote the distribution of (Ãni , T̃n(1),i, T̃n(2),i) after the encoding.





and the marginal distribution pAnTn(1)Tn(2)
of the original DMS are nearly statistically indistinguishable for sufficiently large n and,












and pV nTn(1)Tn(2)XnY n(1)Y n(2)Zn . This result is
crucial for the reliability and secrecy performance of the polar coding scheme.
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n) ≤ δ(∗)n ,

















Proof. For the first claim, see Lemma 2.3 taking TV , 3. The second holds by Corollary 2.2
because, for all i ∈ [1, L], sequence X̃ni and Xni are deterministic functions of (Ãni , T̃n(1),i, T̃n(2),i)
and (An, Tn(1), Tn(2)) respectively, and q̃V ni Tn(1),iTn(2),iXni Y n(1),iY n(2),iZni ≡ q̃Xni pY n(1)Y n(2)Zn|Xn .
Remark 5.11. Consider the PCS operating to achieve the corner point of R(k)MI-WTBC for some
k ∈ [1, 2]. In this case, O(U)(k̄),i ⊂ T̃(k̄),i
[(
H(n)U(k̄)|V U(k)
)C ∩H(n)U(k̄)|V ] is repeated, for i ∈ [2, L], in
T̃n(k̄),i−1 (if k̄ = 1) or, for i ∈ [1, L − 1], in T̃
n
(k̄),i+1 (if k̄ = 2). In both situations, O
(U)
(k̄),i is
drawn by performing SC encoding and is repeated in some of the elements of the corresponding
adjacent block whose indices correspond to H(n)U(k̄)|V U(k)Z . Nevertheless, O
(U)
(k̄),i is not repeated




O (see Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.10). Hence,
notice that κ(U)O ensures that Ō
(U)






is equivalent to (2.16) and apply Lemma 2.3 in the previous proof.
5.3.3 Reliability analysis
Consider that the PCS must achieve (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
, R?kW(1) , R
?k
W(2)
) ⊂ R(k)MI-WTBC. In this section
we prove that Receiver k is able to reconstruct (W(k), S(k)) with arbitrary small error
probability, while Receiver k̄ is able to reconstruct (W(k̄), S(k̄)). Recall that the inner-layer
Ãn1:L and the outer-layer T̃n(k),1:L carry (W(k), S(k)), and the outer-layer T̃n(k̄),1:L carries
(W(k̄), S(k̄)). Although Ãn1:L only contains information intended for Receiver k, the other
receiver must reliably reconstruct them in order to be able to decode T̃n(k̄),1:L.






at Receiver ` ∈ [1, 2].





and pV nTn(`)Y n(`) be marginals of q̃V ni Tn(1),iTn(2),iXni Y n(1),iY n(2),iZni
and pV nTn(1)Tn(2)XnY n(1)Y n(2)Zn respectively, and define an optimal coupling [LPW09]























































)C]) 6=(Ãi[(L(n)V |Y(`))C], T̃(`),i[(L(n)U(`)|V Y(`))C])}.
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(`),1:L) is available to legitimate Receiver `. Thus,












)C] and T̃(1),1[(L(n)U(1)|V Y(1))C], while given (Υ(V )(2) ,Φ(V )(2),1:L) and (Υ(U)(2) ,Φ(U)(2),1:L)
legitimate Receiver 2 knows ÃL
[(
L(n)V |Y(2)
)C] and T̃(2),L[(L(n)U(2)|V Y(2))C]. Furthermore, due to







































)C]) is repeated, for i ∈


















































































































































where (a) holds by Theorem 2.1; (b) follows from the optimal coupling and Lemma 5.1; and
(c) holds by induction and (5.60)–(5.61). Therefore, by the union bound, we obtain
P
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and, consequently, for sufficiently large n the PCS satisfies the reliability condition in (5.1).
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5.3.4 Secrecy analysis








Consider that the PCS operates to achieve (R?kS(1) , R
?k
S(2)
















. Hence, the following lemma
shows that strong secrecy holds for any Block i ∈ [1, L].






















and δ(∗)n is defined as in Lemma 5.1.
Proof. See Appendix 5.A.
The following step is to prove asymptotically statistically independence between eaves-
dropper’s observations from Blocks 1 to L. We address this part slightly differently depending
on whether the PCS must achieve the corner point of R(1)MI-WTBC or R
(2)
MI-WTBC.
Secrecy analysis when polar code operates to achieve the corner point of R(1)MI-WTBC























. According to the previous




and W (U)(1),i = T̃(1),i
[





































































⊆ Ω̄(1),i+1 is repeated in T̃n(1),i but now this dependency appears













denotes the entire sequence depending on R̃n(1),i that is repeated in R̃n(1),i+1 if i ∈ [1, L− 1].







, which, together with Ō(U)(2),i, will be repeated in T̃
n
(2),i+1 if i ∈ [1, L−1].




Θ ], notice that
Figure 5.11 represents a Bayesian graph that describes the dependencies between the variables
involved in the PCS of Section 5.2 when it operates to achieve the corner point of R(1)MI-WTBC.
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Although we have seen that the PCS introduces bidirectional dependencies, we have
reformulated the encoding to obtain that they take place forward only. To do so, additionally
we regard Ω̄(1),i as an independent random sequence generated at Block i− 1 and properly






















































Block i   1 Block i Block i + 1
⌦̄(1),i+1 ⌦̄(1),i+2⌦̄(1),i
T̃n(2),i+1
Figure 5.11: Graphical representation (Bayesian graph) of the dependencies between random variables
involved in the PCS when it operates to achieve the corner point of R(1)MI-WTBC. Independent random variables
are indicated by white nodes, whereas those that are dependent are indicated by gray nodes.
The following lemma shows that eavesdropper observations Z̃ni are asymptotically statis-
tically independent of observations Z̃n1:i−1 from previous blocks.








where δ(S)n is defined as in Lemma 5.2.
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where (a) holds by Lemma 5.3; and (b) holds by independence between (S(1),2:LS(2),2:L) and
any random variable from Block 1, and from applying Lemma 5.2 to bound I(S(1),1S(2),1; Z̃n1 ).
Thus, for sufficiently large n, the PCS satisfies the strong secrecy condition in (5.2).
Secrecy analysis when polar code operates to achieve the corner point of R(2)MI-WTBC























. According to the previous




and W (U)(2),i = T̃(2),i
[







































































Ω̄(2),i−1 is repeated in T̃n(2),i, and now this dependency appears implicitly.


















. For convenience, now we would like to have backward dependencies only.










, for i ∈ [2, L− 1]






, and S′(V )(2),L = Ãi
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, for i ∈ [2, L− 1]












, and S′(U)(2),L = T̃(2),L
[



























denotes the entire sequence depending on R̃n(2),i+1 that is repeated in R̃n(2),i.



































, which, together with Ō(U)(1),i, will be repeated in T̃
n
(1),i−1 if i ∈ [2, L].






, which denotes the part of Ãni that is repeated in T̃n(1),i−1.




Ψ ], notice that
Figure 5.12 represents a Bayesian graph that describes the dependencies between the variables
involved in the PCS of Section 5.2 when it operate to achieve the corner point of R(2)MI-WTBC.
In order to obtain that dependencies take place backward only, we regard Ω̄(2),i, for
i ∈ [2, L], as an independent random sequence that is generated at Block i+ 1 and is properly
stored in R̃n(2),i+1. Then, by using κΩ, the encoder obtains W ′(2),i that is repeated in Block i.


















































Figure 5.12: Graphical representation (Bayesian graph) of the dependencies between random variables
involved in the PCS when it operates to achieve the corner point of R(2)MI-WTBC. Independent random variables
are indicated by white nodes, whereas those that are dependent are indicated by gray nodes.
The following lemma shows that eavesdropper observations Z̃ni are asymptotically statis-
tically independent of observations Z̃ni+1:L.








where δ(S)n is defined as in Lemma 5.2.

























where (a) holds by Lemma 5.4; and (b) holds by independence between (S(1),1:L−1, S(2),1:L−1)
and variables from Block L, and from applying Lemma 5.2 to bound I(S(1),LS(2),L; Z̃nL).
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Thus, for sufficiently large n, the PCS satisfies the strong secrecy condition in (5.2).
Remark 5.12. For i ∈ [1, L], recall that O(U)(1),i is not generated independently, but drawn by
using SC encoding. Hence, if the PCS operates to achieve the corner point of R(2)MI-WTBC, we
only can obtain a causal Bayesian graph by reformulating the encoding so that dependencies
between blocks take place backward only.
Remark 5.13. We conjecture that only the secret-key κ(U)O is needed for the PCS to satisfy
the strong secrecy condition when operates to achieve any of the corner points. However, the
others are required to prove this condition by means of analyzing a causal Bayesian graph.
5.4 Concluding remarks
A strongly secure PCS has been proposed for the WTBC with two legitimate receivers
and one eavesdropper. We have compared two inner-bounds on the achievable region of the
MI-WTBC model, where a transmitter wants to send different information (private and
confidential) intended for each receiver. Then, we have provided a polar code that achieves
the inner-bound that is strictly larger for a particular input distribution. The only difference
between the random coding techniques used to characterize the two bounds is the decoding
strategy: joint decoding in the stronger inner-bound, and successive decoding in the other.
Our scheme uses polar-based Marton’s coding, which requires three encoding layers: one
inner-layer that must be reliably decoded by both receivers, and two outer-layers associated
to each legitimate receiver. Due to the non-degradedness assumption of the channel, the
encoder builds a chaining construction that induces bidirectional dependencies between
adjacent blocks, which need to be taken carefully into account in the secrecy analysis.
In order to achieve the larger inner-bound for a particular distribution, the chaining
construction must repeat some elements from the inner-layer to the outer-layers of adjacent
blocks, and turns out that this cross-dependency between encoding layers makes the use
of polar-based joint decoding crucial. As in Chapter 4, the use of a negligible secret-key
is required to prove that eavesdropper’s observations for different blocks are statistically
independent of one another, which is necessary to show that the polar code satisfies the
strong secrecy condition. Furthermore, now the PCS needs to use another secret-key that
also becomes negligible in terms of rate as the number of blocks grows indefinitely. This
key is required to randomize a non-negligible set of elements of one outer-layer that are
drawn by means of SC encoding and are needed by the corresponding receiver. In this way,
the chaining construction can repeat these elements in adjacent blocks without causing a
significant distortion on the input distribution.
Appendix
5.A Proof of Lemma 5.2

















































]∣∣Zn)+ 6nδ(∗)n − 2δ(∗)n log δ(∗)n
(b)
≤ 3nδn + 6nδ(∗)n − 2δ(∗)n log δ(∗)n










































∣∣T 1:j−1(k̄) V nTn(k)Zn)
≥
∣∣H(n)V |Z∣∣(1− δn) + ∣∣H(n)U(k)|V Z∣∣(1− δn) + ∣∣H(n)U(k̄)|V U(k̄)Z∣∣(1− δn)
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where we have used the fact that conditioning does not increase entropy, the invertibility
of Gn, and the definition of H(n)V |Z , H
(n)
U(k)|V Z and H
(n)
U(k̄)|V U(k̄)Z
in (5.9), (5.13) and (5.17)
respectively.
5.B Proof of Lemma 5.3




































































1:i−1; Z̃ni W ′(1),i
∣∣Bi−1)






























= δ(S)n + I
(





where (a) holds by independence between (S(1),i+1:L, S(2),i+1:L) and any random variable
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; (d) follows from
applying d-separation [Pea09] over the Bayesian graph in Figure 5.11 to obtain that Z̃ni





follows from applying d-separation to obtain that W ′(1),i and Z̃n1:i−1 are conditionally inde-
pendent given (Bi−1, R̃(1),1:i−1, S(2),1:i−1); and (f) holds because Ω̄
(V )
(1),i is independent of
Bi−1, S(2),1:i−1 and any random variable from Block 1 to (i− 2), and because from applying
crypto-lemma [G.D03] we obtain that Ω̄(V )(1),i ⊕ κ
(V )
Ω is independent of R̃n(1),i−1.
5.C Proof of Lemma 5.4






































































∣∣S′(1),iS′(2),iΞ(2),i+1 	(V )(1),i+1 Ξ(1),i+1Ō(U)(1),i+1)
(b)







∣∣S′(1),iS′(2),iΞ(2),i+1 	(V )(1),i+1 Ξ(1),i+1Ō(U)(1),i+1)














i+1:L; Z̃ni W ′(2),i
∣∣Bi+1)
















































(1),i+1:L; Ω̄(2),i ⊕ κΩ
∣∣Bi+1)
(f)= δ(S)n
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where (a) holds by independence between (S′(1),1:i−1, S′(2),1:i−1) and any random variable


































; (d) follows from
applying d-separation [Pea09] over the Bayesian graph in Figure 5.12 to obtain that Z̃ni





follows from applying d-separation to obtain that W ′(2),i and Z̃ni+1:L are conditionally inde-
pendent given (Bi+1, R̃(2),i+1:L, S′(1),i+1:L); and (f) holds because Ω̄
(V )
(2),i is independent of
Bi+1, S(1),1:i−1 and any random variable from Block i+ 2 to L, and because from applying
crypto-lemma [G.D03] we obtain that Ω̄(V )(2),i ⊕ κ
(V )
Ω is independent of R̃n(2),i+1.
6
Conclusion and final remarks
In this thesis we have presented and analyzed polar coding schemes for different channel
models over the wiretap broadcast channel. This channel is characterized by one transmitter
that wishes to send confidential (and non-confidential) information to different legitimate
receivers in the presence of eavesdroppers. Besides reliability, all the channel models considered
in this dissertation impose the polar coding scheme to satisfy the strong secrecy condition,
which is an information-theoretic security condition that requires asymptotically independence
between the confidential information transmitted over the channel and the eavesdropper’s
observations. In the following, we summarize the main contributions of this thesis and propose
possible directions for future work.
In Chapter 2, we have revisited the fundamental theorems of polar codes and their
application for different channel models from the viewpoint of source polarization. Specifically,
we have seen the source polarization theorem, which states that the elements of a random
vector can be divided into two disjoint sets after applying the polar transform: one which
contains practically all the randomness, and another one that is almost deterministic. However,
there is a negligible (in terms of rate) set of elements that have not polarized, that is, neither
are practically random nor deterministic. This theorem is crucial for source coding because,
given the random elements, one can reliably reconstruct the entire vector by performing
successive cancellation decoding. Furthermore, for those models where the broadcast channel
is degraded, we have seen that the subset property of the polarized elements is important.
Otherwise, if the broadcast channel is non-degraded, the subset property does not hold and,
therefore, we must consider that transmission takes place over several blocks and a chaining
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construction that allows different receivers to decode their corresponding messages reliably
and confidentially. In channel coding, the polar-based encoder must construct codewords
whose joint distribution matches with the one used for the polar code construction. In
this sense, in the last part of this chapter we provided a generic polar-based encoding for
multi-user settings that satisfies the previous requirement making use of a randomness which
is asymptotically negligible in terms of rate.
In Chapter 3, we described two different polar coding schemes for two different settings
over the degraded wiretap broadcast channel, where a transmitter wishes to send confidential
information to an arbitrary number of receivers with the presence of an arbitrary number
of eavesdroppers. In these models, a layered decoding structure requires receivers with
better channel quality to reliably decode more messages, and a layered secrecy structure
requires eavesdroppers with worse channel quality to be kept ignorant of more messages. The
degradedness condition of the broadcast channel allows to avoid any chaining construction,
and the polar coding scheme is able to satisfy the reliability and secrecy condition in one
single block. Furthermore, in this chapter we proposed practical methods for the construction
of polar codes under reliability and secrecy constraints. Although we focused in particular
settings, our methods can be extended to any channel model with secrecy constraints. Indeed,
as far as we know, this is the first time that the secrecy performance of a polar coding scheme
has been evaluated in terms of an information-theoretic security measure.
In Chapter 4, we described a polar coding scheme for a model over the general wiretap
broadcast channel, were the transmitter wishes to send confidential (and non-confidential)
information to two legitimate receivers in the presence of one eavesdropper. We do not
make any assumption regarding the degraded nature of the broadcast channel, which implies
building a chaining construction to achieve the best-known inner bound on the achievable
region of this model. This chaining construction in the encoding introduces bidirectional
dependencies between blocks. Consequently, a secret key with negligible size in terms of rate
is necessary to represent all these dependencies by means of a causal Bayesian graph that
allows us proving that the polar code satisfies the strong secrecy condition.
Finally, in Chapter 5 we extended the results of the previous chapter by considering a
model over the wiretap broadcast channel in which the transmitter sends different confiden-
tial (and non-confidential) information to each legitimate receiver in the presence of one
eavesdropper. We proposed a polar coding scheme that achieves the best-known inner-bound
on the achievable region of this model. In the proposed scheme, the encoding uses polar-
based Marton’s coding where one inner-layer must be reliably decoded by both legitimate
receivers, and each receiver must decode its own corresponding outer-layer. Due to the non-
degradedness condition of the broadcast channel, the encoder builds a chaining construction
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that induces bidirectional dependencies between adjacent blocks. Indeed, we showed that
these dependencies can occur between different encoding layers of different blocks. As in
Chapter 4, the use of a negligible secret-key (in terms of rate) is required to prove that the
polar code satisfies the strong secrecy condition. Moreover, now we need another secret-key
that incurs a negligible rate penalty to ensure that the joint distribution induced by the
encoder is close to the one used for the code construction, which is crucial for the reliability
and secrecy performance of the coding scheme.
Despite polar codes look promising for forthcoming communication scenarios requiring
information-theoretic security, some questions remain open and need to be addressed in the
future:
1. In Chapter 2 we provided a generic polar-based encoder that minimizes the amount of
randomness required at the transmitter. Nevertheless, how to completely remove all the
random decisions is a problem that remains open. Specifically, this random decisions
are needed for the elements that have not polarized. Unfortunately, the behavior of
these elements after applying the polar transform is still not properly understood.
2. The need for additional secret transmissions. The polar coding scheme of Chapter 3
must separately send those elements that are not uniformly distributed and are required
by the corresponding receivers to reliably decode the information. Despite the size of
this additional transmission becomes negligible in terms of rate when the blocklength
grows to infinity, it may be a drawback in practical scenarios. Again, notice that it is
the set of elements that have not polarized the one that is problematic.
On the other hand, the polar coding schemes described in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5
must separately send those non-uniformly distributed elements that are required by
the corresponding receivers of each encoding block. Moreover, in these coding schemes
the chaining construction requires an additional transmission of a non-negligible set of
elements (with respect to the blocklength) that are needed to initialize the decoding
algorithms. Indeed, when we consider the transmission taking place over several blocks,
it may be possible to convey those non-uniformly distributed elements by means of the
chaining construction as long as we use an additional secret-key that randomizes them.
Hence, part of the elements that previously contained confidential information could be
used to convey the randomized version of these problematic elements without causing
significant distortion. Since they are negligible in terms of rate with respect to the
blocklength, the polar coding schemes will still approach the capacity asymptotically.
However, notice that this means having to use another secret-key.
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3. The need for secret-keys. Despite the length of the secret-keys required by the polar
coding schemes described in this dissertation are asymptotically negligible in terms of
rate, their use may seem contradictory in the context of keyless secret communication.
We must distinguish three different uses of these secret-keys. First, they may be required
to send the previous additional transmissions confidentially to the corresponding
receivers (one-time pad encryption). Second, in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 we have
described polar coding schemes that induce bidirectional dependencies between blocks,
and secret-keys are required to prove statistical independence between eavesdropper’s
observations of each block and, hence, to prove that the polar coding scheme satisfy
the corresponding strong secrecy condition. Third, due to the polar-based Marton’s
coding, the polar coding scheme of Chapter 5 needs to repeat some elements that are
drawn by means of successive cancellation decoding. However, in order to introduce
insignificant distortion, only a randomized version of these elements can be repeated.
Regarding the use of secret-keys to prove statistical independence between eavesdrop-
per’s observations, we have conjectured indeed that they may not be necessary for this
purpose. Nevertheless, without using these secret-keys, probably one should evaluate
the information leakage differently. The following example may help to understand
why we use them and why we conjecture that they may not be necessary.
Consider the Bayesian network of Figure 6.1. Clearly, random variablesW1 andW2 make
Z1 and Z2 dependent. Moreover, we assume that I(W1;Z2) ≤ εn and I(W2;Z1) ≤ εn,
where εn
n→∞−−−−→ 0. Notice that this Bayesian graph may be an oversimplification of
the bidirectional dependencies induced by the polar coding schemes of Chapter 4
and Chapter 5, where W1 and W2 may denote private messages that are stored in
non-confidential elements corresponding to Block 1 and Block 2 respectively, and part
of these elements are properly repeated in confidential positions of the other block. We
would like to show that Z1 and Z2 are asymptotically independent, and we obtain
I(Z1;Z2) ≤ I(Z1W1;Z2)
≤ εn + I(Z1;Z2|W1)
≤ εn + I(Z1;W2Z2|W1)
≤ εn + I(W2;Z1|W1).
where the last inequality holds because I(Z1;Z2|W1W2) = 0 by applying d-separation.
Although I(W2;Z1) ≤ εn, we are not able to upper-bound I(W2;Z1|W1) and, con-





Figure 6.1: Bayesian graph that represents an oversimplification of the dependencies between random
variables involved in the polar coding schemes of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
In fact, if only W1 is repeated in confidential positions of Block 2, or only W2 is
repeated in confidential positions of Block 1, we would have I(Z1;Z2|W1) = 0 or
I(Z1;Z2|W2) = 0, respectively. Hence, despite it seems reasonable to expect that Z1
and Z2 are independent, we are not able to found an upper-bound on I(Z1;Z2).
4. Practical aspects of the coding schemes. Despite in Chapter 3 we proposed practical
methods for constructing polar coding schemes for models with secrecy constraints,
further work still remains to be done in this direction. For instance, it seems important
to find tighter bounds on the information-theoretic measures that we have used to
construct good polar codes. Moreover, notice that the chaining construction of the
polar coding schemes described in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 implies a large memory
capacity requirement at either the transmitter or one of the receivers side. For instance,
consider that the encoder sends the codeword corresponding to each block as soon
as it is constructed. Then, in the proposed coding schemes, Receiver 1 can start the
decoding after receiving the corresponding observations of each block but Receiver 2
must await the observations of the last block.
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